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CIIAPTER I 
IH':PRODUGTIon 
This thesis is a presentation of L,he legal and the 
learned opInion of the Destroyer-Naval Base Doal of 19"10. 'l'his 
spectacular and momentous ac:reeiaent was achieved, sOlely throuGh 
executive action, by President ?ranklln Eoosevelt of the Unitod 
stutes, and Prir.e Minister Winsl~on Churchill of' r,;nsland, throu~;h 
sec Y'at nogotia. tlons ; ,etvn)n 1,210 two T)Vern'"'lOnts "':r~O:l ,Tuno to 
From the Arllorican viewpoint, thetran;3for was ou.tstand-
inc_ The United States :ained stratecic areas which creatly 1n-
creased the potentiality I)f .Lts national iefense. It J't3co.i.vod 
oi_~ht sitos on islands along the Atlantic coast and in the Garib-
bean area where air and naval 0ases ~ould be constructed. The 
nuad of bases for national and hemIspheric lefonse had long been 
eClphas ized by na va 1 find mill tary experts. 
t'L,ny c; ()n~:;re:.L.;nlen, whi le recognlzini; that tho acquisi-
tion of the ba!38S was thuely Insuranee I:1Gainst, poss.iblo enemy ut-
tack, questioned tho const1. tutionallty of the 1.·eal, since the 
treaty was arran,.:;ed without the advlco and con3ent of the .senate" 
. 
~Toreover, reputable students of intornatlonal law con.:::ddered 
1 
)' 
2 
that it was-a serious breach of America's historic and often re-
iterated neutrality policy and that such belligerent action would 
lead to war. 
The EnSlish Govern.'11ent welcomed the transfer, for it 
received l'ifty overage destroyers desperately needed to reinforce 
the serious and alarming shipping losses which had been inflicted 
by German submarines. 
The thesis proper has resolved itself into four divi-
sions. The second chapter Is a discussion of the neutrality pol-
icy of the Unl te d States as it was interpreted by three schools 
of thought, the classicists, sanetionists and isolationists, from 
1933 to 1039. In the third chapter, the history of the ~)estroy-
er-Naval Base Veal is told. r:L1he .Administration Vias convlnced 
that to safeguard. national peace, America should impede the ag-
::;res;Jor, the Axis, by aiding the victim, the Jemocracies. Chap-
ter four is a discussion of legal opinion. It includes the reac-
tions of ConGressmen who acclaimed the arrangement because it 
would strenGthen national defense; the opinions of Senators and 
Representatives who questioned the constitutionality of the Pres-
ident's sole executive action; and the interpretations of inter-
national lawyers, some of whom defended it by assertinG that 
America was no longer noutral from the point of view of interna-
tional law, while others attempted to prove that it was a serious 
breach of the nation's statutory provisions concerninG neutral-
ity. In chapter five, an analYSis of the tremendous effect of 
3 
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the.Hlliam Allen White Committee to Defend America by Aiding the 
IAllies, by focusins its attention upon mobilizing public opinion 
for the release of the fifty llestroyors, 1s sivon. This chapter 
inoludes a discussion of the favorable and unfavorable reactions 
of the press in the United ~tates, Canada, 00uth America, Europe, 
iAustralia, Asia and the islands' affected alone the Atlantic coast. 
Early in June, 1940, Prime rUnister 'illinston Churchill 
cabled President Roosevelt requesting the loan or Gift of fifty 
destroyers to bridge the gap between those which Great Britain 
pad left and a large number still under construction. T'he Presi-
~ent replied that the release of such vessels would require con-
srossional action. But as the situation in ';/estern Europe grew 
~ore desperate after the fall of France, Roosevelt became con-
~inced that if Britain were conquered, war for the United States 
jNould be inevitable, [.md. Gemany would attack the #estern Hemi-
sphere. 
Soon afterwards, the Presidont as~,ured the lUlies that 
they could dip into Atnerican resources, and that ,;morlca would ex-
tend to the "opponents of force" the ;tluterial resources or tho 
United States. Beginning to show a deep interest in the defense 
of the 'Nestern HemiapheI'e, Roosevelt cabled Churchill that the 
!imerican fleet would assume responsibili ty for the d'efense of all 
rt;ho Americas. 'J'he Prime Minister pledged that in case England 
I{'ell, the Hoyal Navy would be sent to overseas bases. 
Almost irn:-nedia tely, neeotia tiona in regard to the Uni tee 
)' 
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states acquiring potential air and naval bases in the ~o3tarn 
Hemisphere, and roleasing fifty destroyers to Great Britain bosan 
to take on definite fonn. Lurins the first week of August, seri-
ous consultations took place in the Roosevelt cabinet, and it was 
recoGnized that the release of tho Jestroyors would be a serious 
breach of neutrality and contrat>y "GO all standards of interna-
tional law, and was specifically i'orbidc.ten by tho statutes of 
li3:33 Bnd Ull? Nevertheless the Attorney Genaral, Hobert ,Jackson, 
in a lengthy opinion found or created looph)los whereby the trans-
fer could be carried out by sole executive action. 
Insofar as the writer has been able to determine, no one 
las conducted an investi~ation similar in scope to that of this 
thesis. It includes t;he leeal, press, and public opinion of the 
Destroyer-Naval Base Deal. '1:'he wri ter haa discovered tha t related 
accounts, er.ren the most reliable, are prejudiced either from tho 
~nglish or from the American viewpoint. 'This is true in the case 
of Robert E. Sherwood. t s intimate biography , Roosevelt and Hopkins, 
":inston Churchill's l"lnest Hour, li'orrest liavis and Ernest 
Lindley's How War Came and the Mer~oirs of Cordell Hull. 
The followinG is a description of the sources. Of tho 
Qollectod Papers of' ~ Bas:::;ett Mooro, VDlwnos IV, VI allU VIr 
Ireveal that John Bassott ;';oore believed that traditbmal neutral-
ity should be adherred to strictly, since it was the po1icy by 
neans of which the United States had maintained peace and security 
for more than a contury. Moore declared that sanctions, 
-5 
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collect:ve security, Hnd measures short of war would not procure 
~ because thoy wero bellib':erent acts themselvos. peRC (, 
James Brown Scott, edl tor of 'Ihe Reports 1£ the Hague 
Conf'0rences of 1899 and 1907, presents a detailed account of the 
Thirteenth Hague Convention concerning tho rishts anCi duties of 
p.18utral powers in naval war. The C~.mGressional Record of the 
House and ~enate for the 76th ConGress, 3rd Session contains the 
favorable B.nd unfavorable reaetions of ConGrossmen to tho :iJeal, 
~nd the rosolutlonsof'forou by Jona tors of the ';aval Co:nuitteo for 
the purchase of naval and air bases in tho Caribboan area. 
ltlppendix of the 76 th Congros:.:', 3rd ~)ess ion, contains val uable 
newspaper n1"t:lcl~s and legal interpretations on the agreement. 
~'he Parliaraentary ~eba tes I House of Commons and House of Lords, 
~olumes 364 and 117 respectively, give complete texts of :;peeches 
lellv.3red by the Prime Minister, Parliamentary member::." and His 
,jajc~sty, King George VI. ;i~ilfred Funk, editor of Roosevelt's For-
~lGn Policy, 1933-1D41, presents the President's announcement of 
~}le Deal to Coneress, tho letters exchanged between Cordell Jfull 
sma Lord Lothian, and the lu£;al opinion of Attorney General Robert 
Jackson. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, in their Documents on 
.:~lerican Porelf~n RelatioLs, Voiw1'lo II, prc:;lsents tho details o.f 
Ghe proposed release of the torpedo boa t~:; to Great I)'rl tain. 
lurld ,.\ :~f'ail's, ID10, describe t110 means .founl by the /.Jninistra-
~ion whereby neatrallty restrictions were eased so that the 
,0' 
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de:nocracies would receive needed assistance. Although they pre-
sented the isolationists' sentiments, they were in favor of the 
lRoosoveltAdmlnistration. Cordoll Hull's [;lemoirs, Volume I, con-
tains a most complete account of the history of the enactment of 
~eutrallty leGislation from 1935 to 1930. It presents a fine dis-
C:lS8ion of Hull's interpretatiohs of American neutrality. Hull 
~as an ardent follower of the 'llilson-Stimson School of collecti ve 
security. His description of the l;ostroyer-J3ase Deal is cor:lplote. 
-Ie was in favor of Roosevelt's policies. Henry L. ~;t i~nson and 
',\cGeorge Bundy's, On Active ~)ervice in Peace ~ War, is useful 
{'or its account of 0timson's attitude toward collective security. 
J. 'l'hornas Flyrint s, 'I'he RJosevelt ::yth, was usod for the account 
;iven of a uicnificant cabinet :neetinz; cor:cernel with the release 
of the ~estroyers. Since the author was so prejudiced aCainst 
!Roosevelt, he must be checked aGainst more reliable sources. 
ialter Johnson's two books, ~ Battle Against Isolation and 
Villlam Allen ~hlte's A~erlca, are reliable discussions of the ac-
ttivlty of the 'iiilliam Allen White Committee. Charles G. F'emdck's 
ttwo works, A:nerlcan lioutrali t;r: '1'r1al and 'Ei'ailure and his Interna-
!1".10na1 Law, are presentations of the ,nany sided views on the neu-
:ora11 ty p:.>licy of the United Sta tos. i~:iw in Borchard and 'i'lilliam 
p. LUtSe, au thoI'S of Heutral! ty for the Unl ted Sta tes', px'esent a 
.. earned account of America's neutrality policy from 'i:ashingtont s 
9.dministration to the presont. ':':;lncere believers in tradi tional 
1eutrallty, they were::; particularly severe concerninc Woodrow 
7 
Wilson'S pro-ally attitude durlnc tho ~'i.rst.';orll ~;ar. Charlos 
F. Phillips and James V. Garland, in The At:lerican I;outrality 
Problem, uphold tradi tiorlal neutrality, but at the ~ai1H3 time pr'e-
sent a clear analysis of the other schools of thought. William 
Allen Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong in ~ ;';e Stay Neutral?, 
take the attitude that traditibnal neutrality could not work 
under the existing international sltu,ation. The American Journal 
of International Law, XXXIV, October, 1940, presents thelogal 
- --
interpretation of international lawyers of tho Deal. 
From the following periodicals the writer obtained opin-
ions on the projected air awl naval bases; Poreign Policy Heports 
XVI, 1940: Christian SCience. ~~1onitor, ';;eekly Ma.Gazine, December, 
1\)<10; The 19th Century and After, CAXIX, 1940; National Geogra-
£hic Magazine, LXXIX, January, 1940; America, LXIII, September, 
1~)40; Catholic ,'iorld, eLI, ,..:epte;nber, 1~)40; ~, X.i~XVI, :~;optor'\-
ber, 19 410; Crlris t ian Century, LVI I, Septerr.,ber, 1940; 9.h1na V/eokly 
Heview, XCIV, September', 1940; ~ llewRopub1ic, GIlT, AU,-;ust, 
1;)10; and Life, IX, 1940. 
The chief newspaper source is the ~ York Times, 1940, 
which presents edi torial reports frOiTl newspapers throughout the 
world. Other press opinion was obtaIned fro:n the ~ York Herald 
rrribune, the Chicago Daily Tribune, the Chicago Daf1l News, tho 
';iashington Evening~, the Boston~, the ~)t. Louis ~-Dis-
patch, the 0etroit Froe Press Hnd the Los Angeles 1'imos. 
.. ' 
CHAP1'ER II 
Three adheronts of thouCht struGGled to control the 
unitod Stat~s neutrality policy dur-ing the troubled internationa 
3i tua tion between H)33 und 1939; the ardont believers in tradi-
tional neutrality, the classicists; the adherents of collective 
securi ty, the sanctionists; and those who encouratIed 11:1. nda tory 
e:nbarGoes, the isolationists. l It is the purpose of this chapte 
to present the philosophy of each croup in its association wi th 
international situations involvinG American neutrality problems, 
and to show that the sanctionist group :lominatod the situation 
after the outbreak of the European upheaval in 1939. 
The classicists upheld traditional neutrality as it 
was practiced in the United ~)tates previous to the ~'Jorld War. 
Althoueh there were few supporters of traditional neutrality in 
C:.,mGi'ess in these years, l1evertheless, it was urgently tdvocated 
b . the vonerable John ]3as~3ett ',oore, renowned authol"lty on inter-
na tional law, and by r'rofes;:iors l::dwin Borchard and William Lage 
1 Charles F. Phillips and .James V. GarlanU, The Amer-
ican Neutrali ty Pr'oblem, liew York, 1938, 199. 
8 
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of the Yale "Law School. They insisted that the United ~tates ad 
here strictly to the laws of neutrality as they had been devel-
oped over four centuries, and as they had been adopted by :::liGna-
tory powers in international conventions. 2 
International law had defined the richts and duties of 
be lliccrents and of neatra 1s •. ~>!.nco war 13 a leZa 1 p!''')co,hre, D. 
neutral state may choose to remain aloof from a war betweon two 
states or groups of states. But it must inaintain towards the 
belligorents certain rights and duties defined by customary l~w 
an,i by international conventions or treaties.3 In lUll, Sir 
Thomas Barclay, an eminent international lawyer, declared that 
neutrality was the most progressive branch of moderninternation 
al law. It is the branch of international law in which the prac 
tice of self-restraint takes the place of direct sanctions of 
domestic law most effectively. tJ: 
The idea that neutrality is necessary to self-preserva-
tion has prevailed since the Hanseatic and the i.1edi terranean 
cities of the twelfth, thirteenth find fourteenth centuries 
developed international trade and SOUGht protection for it in a 
2 Edwin Borchard and 'iiillia:n Lase, Neutrality: for tho 
United btates, New~~avon, 13l, 4 • 
fo'ailure, 
17-18. 
.3 Charles G. FenWick, American Noutrality: Trial and 
New York, 1940, 6. 
4 Borchard and Lase, ?l'eutrality for the United States, 
10 
legal system. The maritime codes of those centuries became the 
foundation for later international law. 5 With the growth of the 
s ta te .:.; :ls tern after the s lxteenth century, neu trali ty achieved im-
portance. Neutrality in modern times was foreshadowed by Hugo 
Grotius, a learned .Lutch jurist, who in 1625 published an exten-
sive treatise, De Jure B~ ~ Pacis. Influenced by the moral 
law, Grotius expected nations to examine the just merits of tho 
controversy and to take sides accordingly. During the century 
succeedinG Grotlus, neutral states, whose vessols uero 
the carryinG trade, SOUGht by treaty and otherwise to protect 
their commerce a,-~uinst the ef'Cects of war. '1'0 the rules of C0r1-
traband laid down by Grotius, moro elaborate and precise rogula-
tionswere added. 6 In 1650, Holland began to conclude treaties 
stipulating that "free ships," that is, neutral ships, should 
make "free ,;oods. 11 It was the growing importanee of intornation-
al trade, combined with the naval power of the neutral states en-
Cag)d in it, which became hiGhly responsiole for the conception 
of the "riE;hts" of a neutral. 
Soon after tho American Declaration of Indepen2ence, 
John Adams, commenting on a proposed alliance with France, re-
marked concerning the American policy of nonintervention that 
"we ought to lay it down as a first principle and ~ maxim never 
6 Fenwick, American lieutrali ty, 10. 
11 
to be forGotten to maintain an entire neutrality in all future 
wars." 7 lior was this principle taken liChtly when the United 
states, f'ightin£; for its existence during the American Rovolu-
tion, signed the Treaty of Alliance with Prance :1.n 1778. 
The first test of' the krerican nonintervention policy 
came in 1793 when the war betwaen Great Britain and F'rance assune 
a dis tinct! vely mari time form. In ;,~arch, 1796, GeorGe \Nashirlcto 
wrote to h1s Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, that tho gov-
ernrnont should use overy means in its power to prevent the 
citizens from "embroillngll the Jnited States "with eithGr of 
these powers by endeavorinG to maintain a strict neutrality."8 
In this connection, ,Jashincton conf,,)rred 'ill th his cab '~"not, for 
the treaty with Prance had not been revokGd. D It was decided 
that the privileges promised to :;lrench ;;,hips in the ports of the 
Unitod Statos need not be inco~patible with the position of neu-
tral i ty. "yvashington was deti'3rrnLned that Francophile popular 
e.xc i te~nent should not proc ipi ta te unhapP;l c omi:1itmonts for 
7 (tuoted in Borchard and LaGe, Heutra li ty for ~ Uni-
~ ~)tate!:3, 21. 
8 John Bassett:,looro, '1'he Collected Papers of John 
Bassett Moore, New Haven, HH;J:, --rv, 267. - -
9 Ibid., 264. "By tho treaty of commerce'of 1778, the 
ships of war-alld privateers of the one country were entitled to 
enter the ports of' the other with their pl'"'lzes, without being 
subjected to any examination as to their lawfulness, while 
cruisers of the enemy were in like circu~nstancos to be exclUded, 
unless in case of stress of weather." 
,'. 
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American foreign policy. Accordingly, on April 22, 1793, the 
President affirmed the neutrality pollcy of the United States ln 
a formal pro clama tion. Subsequent followers of tradi tional neu-
trality contend that this was not only a logical step in the 
policy of nonintervention in European affairs, but that it 
marked the cornerstone of the American foreign policy.lO 
Prance ;lid not conte~3t the positIon of~oT't1al noutrallt: 
taken by President WashinGton, but she dispa tched. Ci tizon EJraond 
Genet to the United States to seek the extension of the privi-
leGos granted by the treaty. Gonet, enthusiastically received b 
the Republicans, believed he could bring popular preS3ure to bea 
to force the hand of tho government. AlthouGh the :Crench minis-
ter was formally received by the President, he nevertheless was 
(-:;iven to understand that the Proclamation of Neutrality would be 
inforced and that the fitting out of privatoers noither was in 
conformity with the 'l'reaty of Alliance, nor was it in line with 
the principles of neutrality and sovereignty.1l In this connec-
tion, Thomas Jefferson explained with remarkable clearness the 
nature and the obliGations of neutrality. As it was "the right 
of every nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the 
warring powers, therefore, no help should be Given tOJ:tthor 
27. 
10 BorcLard and Lage, I'ie;mtralit;z for trle Jnited .>tates, 
11 Moore, Collected Papers, IV, 268. 
-
," 
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unIes:; stipu.lated by treaty, in mon, arms or anything olso, 
J.irectly serving for war. 1t If the United S'Cates had the right 
to rof'use permission to arm,vGssels and raise men within its 
ports and territories, it was "bound by the law of neutrality to 
exercise that right and to prohibit such armaments and i.:mlist-
ments.,,12 Consistent with thts policy, compensation was made to 
Dri tish sub jacts for injuries inflic ted, by Prench p'I'i va tears in 
v101ation of American neutrallty.13 'Ihe fai ~ure of l.,he Ti'ronch 
to influence the nation's policy merely maI'ked tho bOL;innins of 
the struggle of the United :.Jtates to ma:ntain its nOLlt~-'a11.t;!. 
In ~ay, 1703, the French National Convention decreed that its 
ships of war and privatoers were to seize merchant vessels laden 
with provisions bound for an enemyts port. The British retal-
iated with a like Order in Council. Although both these measures 
stIpulated that the pr)visions of neutral owned vessels were to 
be paid for, the compensation promised was far less than the 
12 lE.!.9:. 
13 Ibid., 269. 'I1he foregoing doctrine of neutrality 
was enforced by tho passaCe of the first American Neutrality Act, 
June 4, 1794, which forbade within the United States the acc~pt­
ance and exercise of commissions, the enlistment of men, the fit-
ting and arm:ing of vessels in the service of any prince or state 
with which the government was at peaee. These rules were em-
bodied in the neutrality acts of In17 and 1818 and .have been 
incorporated in the revised statutes of the United Slates. 
~ 
would. have brou;:ht at the Dort of destination. carc;o '-' £ 
14 
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I twas re cognized that 1)OwerS at peace were entitled to 
trade w1th powers at war but the rule was s'J.bjoct to exceptions. 
It was ad!'1i tted that belliGerents mieht attempt to cut off trade 
wi tll the en.emy ports. By bloclradin[; t:16::!, they m':'cht also pro-
hibit tl-r6 transport of contraband to the enemy. The penalty for 
enteril1[', a blockaded port was confiscation, wl:ile the penalty fo 
c.arryinc: contraband entailed the loss of prohibi ted al .. t::.cles and 
tl1e freight. However, there was no precise and General a:,::.reer.:on+-
alther as to w:'lat constituted a blockade or what articles were 
considered contraband. If paper blockades could be loCally os-
tablisl1ed without force, or if the contraband list could be aut'-
ficently extended, then the riGht of neutrals to trade wIth bel-
15 
li;.~:6rents could be reduced to a shadow. 
After the brief interval of peace resulting from the 
'l'reaty of Amiens, the death strugGle between F'rance and !'.,n[land 
was renewed. '1.'his time the United States was swept into the VOl" 
tex. The reciprocal issuing of retalitory Orders in Council and 
Hapoleonic Decrees a[ain threatened the trade of At:lerican mer-
ehants and tested the diplomatic resources of the Department of 
State. Neutral rights were all but blotted out by the contendinr 
14 The Un! ted States was cOGpensated to sor:-,6 decree by the 
Jay 'l'renty with England in 1794; it collected $11,000,000 for 
confiscated CaI'i.::oes. 
15 ~\:oore, Colle cted Papers.& IV, 272. 
15 
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belliGerents.. 'These orci:) 'S and Jecr-ees, '(Ii th their sweeping 
denials of the rishts of neutrals, were l"!1et with vigorous pro-
tests by the United ~tates, the greatest of the remaininG neu-
tral 11ari time powers. Lesperate efforts were made after 1807 to 
follow the adv lce 81 ven by Viashlngton in his Farewell Add.ress, 
not to entancle the nation's "peace and prosperity in the toils 
of European ·;mbltion •••• " 
Finally, in 1807, American commerce became so seriously 
crippled that .Tefferson forced a sweoping .l.!;mbarGoli.ct throuc;h 
Conc ress • Its purpose was to restraln lblerican citizens f'ro~n a 
trade to whiCh they,;ere 1e::;a11y entitled, but in which the ::ov-
ernment could not effectIvely protect them. But when sectional 
outbursts of anger threatened serious consequences because of the 
embargo's paralyzing restrictions, it was replaced by the Nonin-
tercourse Act" and the United States tried bargaining with the 
bel Ue;erents. 
Although the :fuited States was finally drawn into the 
war, adherents of strict noutrality contended that the ~iar of 
1812 was not the result of the difficulties of remaining neutral. 
American neutral rights wore more respected in 1812 than they had 
been in 1806 a.nd lB07. A combination of dlpl-,matic bl~nders and 
pressure from the;ii,r Huwks in ConGross forced the .issue. l6 
I""" .. ' 
16 
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'To the arC,lment that it is impossible for the United 
~tat9S to maintaIn neutrality during a European war and that the 
~ar of 1812 proves it, the Classicists affirmed that for twenty 
years, 1792 to 1812, peace was maintained in apitc 01' tne Great-
est provocations, especially those of 1798. 
'1:he severest test of the system of tradi tional noutral-
ity, and one in which the United Statos was an int~rested Party, 
was made in the case of the 1tlaba;'18 Cla1.ms. I.i:lle corn.orco raidor, 
the Alabama, and her sister shIps had been constructed by the 
B1'i tish for the Confederacy durin;::; the Ci viI ,jar to prey upon 
Union ships. 1'he United States claimed damages a(;ainst Great 
Britain. After a protracted delay, the question was finally sub-
mitted to arbitration. As a result, the famous Treaty of ~ash-
inston of May 8, 1871, was accepted by botn nations. It included 
some very definite rule:;! for neutrals during war. Henceforth, a 
neutral must prevent the fitting out within its own territory of 
any vessel for participation in the war or must prevent the de-
parture of such a vessel therefrom. Moreover, a neutral power 
should not permit a belligerent to make use of its territory as a 
base fOI' milltary operations, or for incr8a31nt; tho military ef-
fectiveness of a vessel or its armament, or for recruiting. This 
amicable settlement was a siCna1 contri~mtion to thD further 
development of neutrality.17 
17 Moore, Collected Papers, VI, 458. 
17 
CO~3istent wi th the tradi tlonal neutrality policy 0-:: thE 
united States in its stern determination to avoid war was the 
participation of the American delegation at the two Hague Peace 
conferences of 1899 and 1907. Although the Conference of 1899 
made no efforts to codify the existing law of neutrality, a num-
ber of treaties were drawn up providing for the amelioration of 
the condltions and results of warfare and a code of rules for thE 
conduct of a more humane type of war. 170reovor, as a result of 
the preserverin13 energy of the American delegation, a Permanent 
Court of International Arbi tration was or~ainized. 'the Second 
Dague Peace Conference was called at tho insistence of Theodore 
Roosevelt, then President of the United States. Among the four~ 
teen conventions was one designed to draw up special rules con-
cerninG the riGhts and duties of noutral powers in naval war.lf) 
Si-->nificantly, Article 6 of the 'l'llLrtecnth FaGue Convention def-
initely states that "the supply in any manner, directly or in-
directly by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of war ships, 
ammunition or war material of any kind is forbidden." Neverthe-
loss, at the 0econd Hague Conference a nu:nber of controversial 
is:3ues were left unsettlod, notably questions relating to the 
18 James Brown Scott, ed., The Reports of ~ Hague 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, New York, 1917, 833. The word con-
vention in regarcrto the HaGue Conferences has two meaninGS. It 
refers to the assembly of delegates who convened for a specific 
purpose, for example, the Group that met to draw up rules for the 
amelioration of the conditions of warfare. 'fhe word convention 
r'efers also to a particular agreement or trea ty, ror example, the 
Thriteenth Hague Convention. 
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scope 0:-:' blockade Hn:} the character of contraband :.:;oods. In 
1908, u smaller Croup of the lea2inC maritime Powers, incl~dinc 
the United States, met at the London Naval Conference. ~hortly 
thereafter, the Declaration of London was issued which laid :lown 
certain fairly definite rilles for the conduct of naval warfare 
and for the classification of contraband. 
As one nation after another slipped lnto the abyss in 
Aucust, 1914 President I'.'oodrow l"dlson issued the customary Proc-
lamation of American Neutrality. "The United states must be neu 
tra 1 in fact as we 11 as in name, II he told the ns tion. 19 'l'he war 
had not been long in progress ~efore Jashington realized that th 
elaborate rules of neutrality drawn up b~T the Hague C.onf3rences 
and the wondon Naval Conference had not solved the conflicts of 
interest between belliGerents anu noutrals. The Administration 
soucht from both belligE)rent ~;roups the recoeni tion of the :.Jecla-
ration of London. AlthouCh Germany and Austria, faced with a 
naval blockade, promptly consented to the Declaration as a rule 
of law, ;:,neland, unwilline to place trammels on her dominant soa 
power, would accept it only with "certain modifications and addi-
tions" whIch effectively impaired neutral ri8hts.20 
19-20. 19 Borchard and LaGe, Ueutra1itx ~ the United States, . 
20 Professor Borchard maintained that when England re-
fused to accept the Declaration of London the Department of :':'tate 
should have returned at once to the rules of international law 
because there was little misunderstanding betweon the United 
::,tates and Great Britain on these rules. 
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4t In.order to insure the continued economic prosperity of 
noncombatants, und to onable noutrals to continuo to tT'nde ,;ith 
noncombata.nts, the rille had been established ever since tho sev-
enteenth century that goods which were capable of bOUl military 
and nonmilltary use should not be confiscable unless the captor 
could definitely prove that they were destined for army or naval 
service. Such coods camo to be known as soods "conditionally 
contraband," the principal item of which was foodstuffs. 21 In 
April, 1916 this distinction between the two classifications was 
officially abolished by the british Government, for it considered 
tr...at all goods could be of direct or indirect aid to the 001-
liGerent forces. 
'I'he 3ri tish also took unprecedented liberties wi th the 
tradItional riCht of visit and search. England insisted that 
r.1odern ships were so large that it was iruposJible to make a thor-
oUt;h investiGation of their CarCOG3 w:thout in'ln[,;inr; tho vo:::;sels 
to purt. Lioreover, in November, 1814 the Bri tish doclared the 
IJorth .sea a milItary area. It was so thorOUGhly mineu that a 
neutral ship dare not enter it wIthout f'irst stoppin0 at an Ene-
lish port for sal line Jirections. Since no instructions were 
provided if the cargo was objectionable, all commerce passed 
tLrough British waters. Although the united L;tates'pr,:)tested 
ac.:;ainst these abuses, the ,'dlson Administration was unwilling to 
21 Ibid., 14. 
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make the po;'test effecti vee Hence, the abuses continued, and the 
expanded contraband lists served the same military purpose as an 
actual blockade .22 This was the o'")ening wedge of American inter-
vention, as Nilliam J(mn:i.n;sijr:!an, then ;]ecretary of ~;tat(), sJ.:t.d 
later concerning Arnerican neutrality: "I submit the thouGht that 
the administration was lacking. in neutrality not in commission 
but in omission; not in notes whIch were written, but in notes 
which were not w~itten •••• "23 
1'har 0 are several basic reasons why the doabincton Gov-
ernrnent did not enforce what it had so stalwartly asserted were 
its riGhts. Woodrow Wilson, born of B:!:'itish ancestry, was a 
stronG admireI~ of EnGlish culture, and encouraged by his Anglo-
phile cabinet, grew more and more sympathetic toward the Allies. 
Robert Lansing, appointed SecY'otary of State in June, l()l,S, showec: 
his hostility toward Germany when he complained, 
the German Government is utterly hostile to all na '.:ims 
with democratic institutions •••• Germany must not be per-
mitted to win this war or to break evon ••• American public 
opinion must be preparod for the time, which may come, 
when we will have to cast aside our nf)ub~a 11 1:y t'l TL: "10-
come one of tho champions of lJernocracy."" 
Apart from cabinet mombJrs, C olono 1 .L~dw('l.rd House, the .Pres Ident r s 
most trusted adviser, influonced many of 0ilson's critical 
22 .!..!?l:.Q., 15. 
23 William J. Bryan andary B. Dryan, 'I'he Memoirs .Q.f. 
.. llliam Jenninr,;s Bryan, Chicago, 1925, 404. 
24 Hobert Lansing, ~ Wtlr Memoirs of Pobort Lana in;::;;, 
Indianapolis. 1935 19-21 
21 
--i :.:.enerally in the interest of the Allies. In additl::m decis ons, ,_ 
to him, ',';al tel" Hines PH(;e, the American Ambassador to London, 
became sO captivated by Britisll society and culture that the 
British statesmen had no difficJ.lty convincIng Page that the 
Allies 'iVere fighting Amepica's battle for democracy. Such con-
stant discrimination by the leaueps of' the adminiatratiun led the 
way toward American intervention. 
vne of the more ecpegious examples of favoritism to the 
25 Allies was the financinG of the munitions supply. At the out-
break of the war, American In1ustry, wallowing !n ~l Jo~ros3io~, 
had i:.juickly revived and prospored with the pheno~:16nal developmon 
of war trade. At first t.tle Allies mude use of the 1a1"";0 }\uler.i..ca 
debits in }l';urope, but these were rapidl:r exhausted. iJatee, it 
was realized in America that unless loans and credits were ox-
tended by the United States or its bankers, the traffic in Amor-
lcan war supplies would be seriously diminished. Secretary of 
the Treasury William GIbbs 1cAdoo made an eloqUent plaa to WilsD 
for auti}..)ri ty to permi t the Federal EaseI've banks to discount 
Allied bills and acceptances, and to permit those Governments to 
float loans in the United ~tates. The President yIelded, altho 
not publicly.26 In October, 1917, Robert LansinG advanced the 
argu~!lent tha.t bank cradi ts for the purchase of supplies wore not 
25 Borchard and iJaco, :~eu.tral:t t,y" for the Unttod :~tatHs ,~ ---....,;,.,.;.;.;...;;.~--......;.;;.. 
40. 
26 ~. 
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public loans and should not be banned. Wilson privately and 
orally let it be known to interested bankers that the Administra-
tion would sanction the advancing of credits. 
Although the Gennan and Austrian Governments lodged 
strong protests against the traffic in war materials, the State 
Department replied that it was .lawful for an individual or firm 
of a neutral country to sell military supplies to a belligerent. 
The United States did not object to selling arms and ammunition 
to Germany, but if the latter could not import them because of 
the British navy, that was one of the misfortunes of war. Ac __ '! 
ingly, the American Government continued to pursue a policy that 
violated the true slP,irit, if not the strict letter, of neutrality, 
The large scale assitance that the Americans gave to 
the Allies drove the Germans to the desperate measure of subma-
rine warfare. When the German Government announced a war area 
around the British Isles, and declared that neutrals on board 
enemy merchantmen, or even neutral ships, might incidentally be 
killed, the State Department protested against these "unprece-
dented ll methods and declared that the United States would hold 
the German Government to strict accountability. Yet, in Novembe~ 
1915, when the British had proclaimed the North Sea a military 
area, not a word of protest was made by the Wilson Administration 
John Bassett Moore maintained that the United States did 
not become involved in the first World '~iar aa-~ a result of its ef-
forts to assert and defend its rights as a neutral. 'This 
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assertion is. open to question. /\lthollCh the Jnited ~;tates, from 
time to time, protested against belliGerent interference with it 
trade, it had no .i.ntention of rcsiBtinz.; such interfeJ:>dllce by 
measures of coercion. The United ~tates really assorted ri~hts 
neV0r before claimed by a neutral 00vernment. This is particu-
larly true in regard to the demand that belli~erent armed mer-
chantmont be trea ted as peaceful ships. ~rhis demand was contrar 
to international precedent and also to well established A:!'lerican 
judicial opinion. 27 
After two years of controversy between the United States 
and both belligerents, President Wilson became convinced that the 
position of neutrali ty was inher'ently untenable. fI'l'he busines::.. 
of neutrality is over," he told the Senate on October 26, 1916. 
IHlson's policy was tha.t no nation mast thereafter be permitted 
to declare war nnd set ln motion forces so destructive to the 
normal com:nerce of peaceful nations. Allnat~ions r;1U8t unite to 
put an end to lawlessness. 28 '1'0 believers in collective security 
then, the (mtrance of the Gnt ted ~:,ta tes into Vlar in 1917 was an 
act in defense of the riGht of all nations to be free from the 
disruptive effects of war. 
This principle of collective responsibility or collec-
ttve security was embodied in the Covenant of the L~aGue of Nut:t 
27 Moore, Collected Papers, VII, 86, 87. 
28 FenWick, American Neutrality, 16. 
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in 1019. It was accepte] by all the members of the Leaeue to in 
sure the future peace of the world. For those nations who jOine' 
the Leaeue it put an end to the traditional law of neutralIty. 
Under Article 10, the members assumed the oblic;ation lito respect 
and pI'eserve as against external aggression the territorial in-
tecrity and existinE; political· independence of all members of th 
Lea;;ue. II 11his made it irn.pofls ible for H member to stand asi de 
take no part in the common ll~fense of the victim of an act of 
. 29 gres;.non. Article 11 of the t.,;O\fenant made ".:iny war or threat 
of war" a matter of concern to ~~he vIhole League an1 D'.tthcP'lzod 
the League to take "any aation that m.ay be deemed wise and ef-
fee tual to safeGuard the peace of nations. II Thu3che lfl8r.lberti of 
the League were collectively responsible to find ways and means 
of preserving the peace in the presence of a situation of what-
ever kind that miGht threaten it. EVen t.houCh the acceptance of 
the Leaeue Covenant by the United :::tates was defeated in the Arne 
lcan ~enate, due to partisan politics more than anythinG else, 
there were many in the country who upheld th(, theory that collec-
tive security, with the active cooperation of the United 0tates, 
was necessary for the maintenance of world peace.30 Henry L. 
Stl~son, chief a~vocate of the sanctionlst Croup, declarod that 
29 Charles G. Fenwick, International Law, Hew York, 
19'18, 613. 
30 'Thomas A. Dailey, r~'he i.liplomatic ;;istol>y of ..!dlQ. 
American People, 3rd eel., New York, 19"17, 67G-677. 
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tho gre:::.t 
4ft lqsson of the '.'hrld. ';Jar flW£'L:J that tho United .Jtates 
could not remain aloof from world affairs and s till keep the 
world safe for democracy.1I Both Stimson and Elihu Root fully 
believed that a new era was cominG in international law and that 
the docl-rine of neutrality must be abandoned. As Stimson wrote 
in Pobru/.iry, 1919, to '.'Hllia:-n Hays, the Reptl.blican National 
Chairman" 
'The time is s rely eoming when in international 
law an act of a2:bression by one nation upon another will 
be reGarded as an offense against the community of nations • 
... ! feel that our country should take advantaGe of this 
time to help move the world along towards that condition 
of development.31 
Not deterred by temporary :'J.efeat, the advocates of 
co 110e ti ve security confined their efforts for some years to ttl e 
coop~ration of the United -:tates Vii til tho social and the oconomic 
actions of the League, believing that political cooperation would 
come in due time. At first, unofficial .ri:nerican observer's sat 
with the LeaC;ue Committees in "consultative" or "advisoryJl capac-
ities for the purpose of discussing strictly nonpolitical matters. 
In 192'1:, /Imerican delega tes were officially named to represent 
the united States at the Second Opium Conference. By HMO, the 
Uni ted States had taken part in rnore than forty League c ()nfereroe~ 
all presumably nonpolitical. By 1931, the United States had five 
permanent officials stationed at Geneva to represent American 
31 Henry L. Stimson and r.leGeorge Bundy, On Active 
f.ervice in Peace and~, New York, 1918, 102-10.3.-
4t"., i] interests. yl!"l .0 pay:i.n£; IIp service to trn.clitional neutl~ality, 
the post-war United .:.itates was ,:"Dvi.nz; toward active cou;Jeration 
with the LeaGue. 
Official recognition to the theory of cooperation for 
the rr:aintenance of world pea.ce was [;1 ven by the ~Jni ted ;;;ta tes 
GOVOY'nment in AUGust, 19W~, when it signed, ~:Jlonc wi th ('ourteen 
other Powers, the KelloG,:::;-Briand AGreement or the Pac t of Pari s. 
'l'he contracting part1.es conc~er:med recourse to war for the solu-
tion of ixlterna tional controvers les i they agreed tha t the sottle-
mont of disputes of wha toyer kind should never be S(OUCht except 
by pacific means. 32 The Pact of Paris constituted a declaration 
of policy not to resort to war. 33 Adherents of collecti vo se-
curity contended that from this time on, the United States could 
not adopt an attitu<.le of ith1iffcrencc, or of strict not1.tr'111tJ, 
if a :3isnatory of tho Pact were to flaunt its obligations. The 
siening of the Pact also meant that the United ~tntes would 
henceforth lend its indirect support to tho League system. 
The collectiv9 security adherents gave this interpre-
to tion to the: Kellogg-Briand Pac t shortly after Japan invaded 
;.'nr:churia in ;,larch, 1931. Secretary of State Stjmson issued a 
statement in January, 19~)2, declaring that the Unit'3d .:tates 
could not recoenize the legality of any situation which rni~ht 
32 Fenwick, knorican Neutral! ty, 2G. 
209-210. 
Phillips and Garland, ~mericon ~eutrality Problem, 
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be "contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of 
. " purlS. A few months later, ~ecretary Ctlmson oxpressed the 
opinion that "under the former concepts of international lawn 
states not parties to a conflict could only exercise "a strict 
neutrality alike toward the injured and the aGsressor ••• but now 
under the covenants of the KelloGG-Briand Pact such a conflict 
becomes 0:' legal concern to evorybody connec ted wi th the '1'reaty. f! 
Although this position was not tested because Japan did not de-
clare war on China, the interpretation carried the implication 
that in the event of its v101ation the United States would con-
sul t wi th the other siena tories and rnodify its cus tomary policy 
of impartiality accordinG to the decision taken. 34 
The vigorous debate on noutr~lity which becan shortly 
after this in the United States lasted until tho outbreak 0: war 
in 1939. 1'he adherents ,of collective security, the sanctionists, 
urced that if the United States would not lecome an active part-
ner in the League, it should, :It least, adjust its policies so 
that the efforts of the League to restrain acts of aegression 
would not be defeated. The United Jtates should abandon poli-
cies of neu trali ty which belon{;ed to tho old ana rchy of pre-World 
'I'jar da:rs and cooperate with tho LeaGue to the extent of not 1n-
slsting upon the traditional riGhts of neutral trade, when such 
trade would prevent the League from enforcing the provisions of 
34 Fenwick, International ~, 615. 
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<It Article 16 o.f the Covenant. The sanctionists did not regard 
police action by the League as "war'" in the traJi tional sense; 
they preferred to rule out the whole conception of neutrality as 
belon,;inG to a past era in which war had a recoGnized IGGul sta-
tus. a5 
Opposition to the abar;.donment of neutrality came from 
the classicists, who had no faith in the Leaeue of Nations as it 
had been framed. They upheld the time honored methods of peace-
ful settlement, conciliation and arbitration. If these proce-
dures would not suffice, methods of coercion certainly would not. 
Sanctions were nothInG more than war in another form. Let the 
United States keep out of European affairs and take its stand on 
true a nd tried neutrali ty. 'Ihe advice t-;l ven by V.'ashlneton :3hould 
be adhered to for nothinG had happened to :nake it any less appli-
cable as the years had Jone by. 
l!Jhen I\.do19h Hitler, in 193:j, beGan his program of re-
a r:na.'l1ent, Prosillent Hoo3evelt "lu.Je it cloar thnt he ~_oanod GtrOlC 
ly in the dirac tien of colloc ti ve security. In an acl,lres 3 to the 
nations of the vvorld, malie on ,:ay 16, 193,~), Hoosevelt urged tile 
a.doption of the so-called ~;lacDonalu Plan for the elimination of: 
weapons desiGned primarily for aGi3ress i ve warfare. He pointed 
out that 
35 Fenwick, American IJeutrality, 29-30. 
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. Modern weapons of of~ense are vastly stronGer 
than modern weapons of defense. Frontier forts, trenches, 
wire entanglements, coast defenses--in a word, fixod for-
tifics tlons--are no lonGor i:>1proGna;;le to tho attack of 
war planes, heavy mobile art1Ilery, land battleships 
called tanks, and poison Cas. 
If the nations would acree not to possess or use these weapons, 
then the "frontiers and independence of every nation" would be-
come secure. 36 
A few days later, Norman Davis, deleGate of the United 
states to the Geneva Conference on the '!:"'imitation of Armaments, 
upheld the sanctionist theory when he said that the United 0tates 
was willing to consult with other states 1n case of a threat to 
peace. If any disciplinary measures were to be undertaken 
aGainst an aGGressor nation, the United .:..:tates would refrain fro 
any action that would impede collective effort. 
In B'ebruary, 1934, a resolution was sUGgested by ;;)en-
ator Hiram Johnson of California, v/hich, if adopted, would have 
permitted the prohibition on export3 to apply irllpartially to all 
parties in a dispute. ~Hnce this amendment "voald ha ve beon di-
rected not only u3ainst the aecressor but against the victim of 
aC<;ros~~ ion, the Administra tion uld not press for its passace •37 
nowever, in ~ay, 1934, a new resolution was enacted which gave 
the President authority to apply an arms embargo aGainst two 
36 John D. Hicks, ~ American Nation, New York, 1941, 719-720. 
37 FenWick, American IJeutralIty, 32-33. 
.. -
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belligerents., Bolivia and Paraguay, if he found that this would 
contribute to the cessation of hostilities between them. 
As the year 1935 advanced, thoro was concreto indicatior 
f l ' . ., that war _ever was srre<:LnG In ~~rope. I tal:-t had n lrond:r rn'o-
pared for immediate aGGression in Ethiopia. Germany, ,CilthouGh 
she would not be ready for military combat for some time, was suo-
ceeuine; in keeping Europe uneasy. Meanwhile, Britain and Ii'ranco 
had too many differences between them to act alike in the face of 
common danser. In Lhe Far gast, Japan, while consolidatinc her 
posi tion in ~~anchuria, was exerting strong pressure to keep China 
disuni ted until Japan was ready for a complete mlli tary :nove. Up 
to this time, the debate betweon the aanctionists and the oppo-
nents of collective security had been concerned primarily with 
the effects of an lLnerican embargo on arms. Those who advocated 
cooperation with the Le~gue urged u discriminatory embargo, so 
tha t the ac;.:;ress or would be prevented from obtaining arms. 38 But 
they accepted 30:newllat reluctantly ;;n ernbarGo directed aJ:ain~~t 
both partios, because, at least, this crn!l~ provent tho ~oreat 
of Leasue sanctions against tho aC~rossor, and the League could 
aid the victim. 39 
',~li th the growinG certainty tha t a aecond world war was 
38 1.£!..sl., 34. 
39 ~. 
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in the making, the isolationists, 0. most ar·ticulate c:;roup led by 
Sena tor (terald P. nye of North Dakota, presented convincing arCu 
ments in favor of their principles. I].'hey tenaciously upheld the 
idea that an embarGo on arms shipments would protect th(-} United 
states aCainst involvement in war, because the profIt motive for 
war would not develop amon;,; war Industries. 'l'he::r affirmed that 
it was not the busines.s of the Uni toll ;3ta '!:;os to act as jUdfje of 
Internationalmorals, that ls, to :1etornine who was the fiC;Z;res-
sor. 40 Let the United States keep out of war by having nothinG 
to Jo wi th any bellieerent country. ~Soreover, their ar6uments 
were strengthened by the hearinr;s conducted by the Nye Comrrlittee 
on mun1.tiolls industry profiteering from 1914 to 1917 •. These 
hearings revealed the enormous profits which American armament 
manufacturers and bankers had rna:le durine the i[:orld ,Jar. A 
stron,; public sentiment. responded to this Information wi th the 
demand that this sort of thing not be permitted to happen 
again.41 
rl'he :":ta te Lepartrnent, under the leallership of Cordell 
Hull, followed tl~ reasoninG of the sanctionists in regard to the 
United Sta tea' pollcy toward ehe Ljrowing J.anger of war in the 
Eastern Hemisphere. lInd.er current concH tions, it felt a nation 
199. 
40 Phillips and Garland, American Neutrality Problem, 
41 Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, 
1948, I, 398. 
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need not and. ahould not remaIn strictly neutral. Because war by 
an arBressor in any part of the world would affect the security 
of all peaceful countries, the Department considered it to be the 
duty of the 'Jni ted ~ta tes to mateo the fullest practicable contri-
bution toward cooperation with all law abiding nations to pre-
42 
serve peace. l't:oreover, th.e s.tato Department dld not accept in 
full the doctrine of Hugo Grotius concernins the necessIty of ex-
amining the moral merits of a controversy and of supporting the 
nation in the right. Being in the riCht in a dispute did not 
eive a nation the privilege of going to war to aettle it. It 
was often difficult to determine which of the disputants was in 
the right. Furthermore, such a policy would involve the United 
States in disputes allover the world. But if the rule of world 
order under law were broken in any party of the world by resort tc 
arms by an aggressor, such a fact affected the nation's security, 
and therefore, the Uni ted States should impede the aggressor to 
43 
safeguard its peace. Accordingly, a strict neutrality could 
not be reconciled with cooperation with the League. The State 
Department thus followed the policy of Wilson and Stim.son in that 
no nation could It any 10nGel~ remain neutral as aGainst any willful 
44 
disturbance of the peace of the world. ff The Secreta!'Y of 
42 Ibid., 40. 
-
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid.,408. 
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state accu3~d the isolationists of failine:; to consider these 
points. 
'Ihe word neutrality to the isolationists was magic, lik 
open sesame or hocus-pocus. Accordincly, the sanctionists of th 
state Department accused the Nye Comnittee of arousing an isola-
tionist sentiment that tied tho hands of the Administration just 
at the very time it should have been free to place the weicht of 
its influence behind the maintenance of peace. :101" did the 3tat 
~epartmant in 1935 want neutrality legislation like that advoca 
by the isolationists. It wO;.lld bind the Execative so that pros-
pectivo aggressors like Germany, Italy or Japan would kr.ow that 
they could declare vtlflr on nn intondod victIm und the ;fn2.tod ~.tam 
would then be co:n.pelled Lo see that its citizens did not furn .. ~sh 
arms lo the victim. 
'1'he lIeutralityAct of June, bj3':> , in force until Feb-
ruary 29, 1936, contained a mandatory arms embargo requiring the 
President to invoke the embargo at the outbreak or JurinG the 
gres::; of a war. Thereupon, it would ue unlawful for American ci 
lzen3 to export such arms as the Executive miGht designate to any 
belligorent. After the application of the embargo, it would be 
unla.wful to export al:>L1S, ammuni tion or implements of war from any 
place in the ~nlted States to any port 
or to a.ny neutral. port for transshipment to 
Although the act was approved by the Presid t, 
Cordell Hull objected to the mandatory features 
beca.use they helo. that tho measure con3t.i..tuted an inva:;;ioll of th 
constitutional and traditional ~o' .. !er of the Sxecativc to con(h.l.ct 
the foreiGn relations of the United ;:~tates. 45 Moreover, the 
president stated that 
the policy of the Government is definitely co:nrai tted to 
the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of any entan-
glements whlch would lead, us into conflict •••• lt is the 
policy of the Go~ernment by every peaceful means ••• to co-
onerate wi th other :3 i:lliL,rl v minded covern.llents to pro-
m~te peace. 46 • 
Thus the President, in very Guarded lanGuaGe, took the .side of 
those who would have civen him discretionary power, so that the 
threat of an embargo miGht operate to prevent potential ag;res-
so .... " 47 ... v. 
~hen Italy defied the ~eaSue and went to war against 
Ethiopia, President Roosevelt proclaimed the embargo. In addi-
tion, the President wont boyond t:le tem.s of tho In.w 'l:1d l;;::-!lwd a 
moral embarGo, that is,"a warning to the American people that 
trade with the belligerents would be at tho risk of the trader. 
The atte:npt to discouraGo trnde which the law did not prohibit 
was carried fUrther by a warning on October 30, 1935, against 
"transactions of any characterll with e1 thor of the bell.ieorent 
nations except at tho risk of tho trader. Again, on November 15, 
45 1.!?l9.., 413. 
46 Phillips and Garland, American Neutrality Problem, 
208-209. 
47 Penwick, American Noutl~ality, 35. 
35 
.,. 
1935, it was. announced by the Depart~nen t of .:Jta te that the ship-
ment to the belliceront of 011, copper, trucks, scrap iron and 
other articles could be rOGard.ed as contrnry to tho ::~onoral 
spirt t of the Neutrality Act. lillIe rros Ident thus clearly indi-
cated his desire not to l).uve the n:)sG:1CO of the vn:ted ,-,tatos 
from the counsels of the Leagu~ operate to defeat whatever sanc-
tions might be put into effect acalnst Italy. 
The classicists, who were not in sy:::pathy with either 
the believers in collective security or the isolationist.3, main-
tainod that tho supposition that traditional neutrality was a 
thine.; of tho past was unsound in theory and [alse in fact. The 
United :":tates f neutrality laws were 8till on the statute books, 
and "if they wero to be r0pealed it should be done Jirectly and 
not by implication, or by embarkinG on a lawless course in the 
name of peace. n48 'rhe notion that the law of neutrality was ob-
solote wns merely a blindfolding device, spun by vlishf'u.l ;:;hinklnc 
to attain that ond. It seo;;lOd stranCo to the f'ollowe:;~~ of' strict 
neutrality that thero was a ~peclal c~l~ in tho Jnited ~tatQs do-
voted ta th.o ~li38e'illnation of the idea that t~:e law of neutrallty 
was obs alete, when pa:eties to the Covenant of the .we ague still 
con.si<ioreu it as a subsistinG part of Liternational law. 49 
;~rnphaticall:r did they a ttack the arms embul'C;o by :;;etting 
48 Moore, Collected Papers, VI, 184. 
49 Ibid. 
forth the c lear rul;:~s of nout.raJ. i ty concernin;:; cont raband: 
A neutpal Government is not oblized to ~:;uppross 
the contraband trade of its citi~ens, but it 1s forbid-
dJn itself to supply contraband to a belligerent, and 
particularly is it forbidden itself either to sell or to 
:::;;_ va mun! tions of war. Neutrality e:nbraces not only im-
partiality but also abstontion fro~ participation In the 
conf'lict. The prohibition of the; neutral governn-lOnt it-
self to supply arms and muni tians of war is based upon 
tho unquestionable fact tbat the supply of such articles 
to a fiGhtinG ('orce is D. direct c:mtributi:m to 1 ts nil-
itary sources und as such is a papticipation in t::l0 vlar; 
and if a c:;ov)rnment does this, it virtually com;-1its an 
act of war. If it does it in b0half of ono of tho par-
ties, it auunJons Its neutrality nnd is ,;uilty of UI,;{wd 
intervention. If it does it for both parties, although 
it may be said to be impartial it does what neither of 
the parties themselves can do, namely, fights for each 
acainst the other. 50 
Isolationist sentiment was considerably stronGer in the 
United States toward the closo of 1935. Large secments of people 
disill~sioned by the failure of the League to stop Japanese 8G-
gression in China, to prevent thC-;l Italo-h:thiopean war, and to pro-
mote lisarmament, turned. away from tbe idea of the United "';tates 
cooperatinG with the League and accepted the isolationists' poli-
cies. 51 
The State Department tried to use its influence to in-
duce Ci)nsreSs to place a discretionary embargo on the new act. 52 
50 ~., 485. 
51 Hull, MemolI'S, I, 463. 
52 A discretionary embar30 is one that wo lId elve the 
Prosident full power to place an arms embarGO where tho weight of 
Amorican influence would be used to prevent wars of aCsression. 
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1'0 this ond:. it received oplnlon~3 from various American represen .. 
tatives abI'oad emphasizing the desirability of as much executive 
discretion as possible. Dut the new act mude no attempt to in-
crease the President's discretion in ;:;.pplying tho ar::1S ombar.jo. 
'l'he bill was adverse to the basic doctrine pursued by the ;jta te 
Depart~nent from 1933 on that tl;l.e United :::'tates ShOllld do nothinG 
President signed the bill on ?ebruary 29, l03C, he is::JUed aGain 
a statement sUG~esting a moral omoargo. 
Toward the close of 1936, the sanctionist cult was en-
couracod by a fa.vorable (leclsion of the "upreme Court upholding 
the richt of Congress to deleGate to the President authority to 
impose an arm,,) embargo aGc,2.nst bolliGerent nn.tIona. 53 'I'he Court 
dec Lied thu t 3 ince embarrassment w,s to be avoided and success 
achioved in ;~1J1erican International relations, Concres~)ional log-
ls1alion must often ~ive the President a degree of discretion and 
freedou "fro:n statutory restrictions. 1I 
As the ex.piration date of the ~Jeutrality Act of 1D66 ap-
proached, the sLruc~le over the now neutrality legislation cen-
tared chiefly on the issue of whether the President should be 
[;1 ven dis Cl"ct ionary ;)OVlor. 'fhe adllOront.s of t~'adi tion[11 neu.trHl-
tty declared that crantinG the President uncontrolled 
53 '1his was the case of the Uni ted ;:.:.tates of America 
appellant v Curtis3-"rl~,;ht .Dxport Corporation, CU.rtiss Aeroplane 
and :iotor Company, Incorpora teu, and Uarr Shipp inc; Corpora tlon. 
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discretionary power was dan30rous; it would be a surrender by 
ConCress of its constItutional power to declare war. 54 The 
classicists explained that am.ong the non-amIcable processes in 
international law an embarco was chacterlzed as n measure short 
of war. i<'urthermore, exp~rience had ;Jhown tha t an embarco, co-
arcive in its nature, was likeJ.y to result in an avowed state of 
war. 55 To.:::;i ve the execut i v(? the power in his discretion to 
adopt and prosecute measures that would lead to war W33 virtuall 
durinD the discusoions there were many misconceptions concerninc 
the law of neutralit~f. :'or exa:Hple,. neutrality appoarou to De 
an adjustable thing, one that could bo chan~ed from day to day 
according to COlld.L tions. On the contrar:r, the laws of neutrality 
were fixed and certain. These laws ;isd been of Gradual crowth 
embodying the results of experienc:e. Pr'3viously, the Unl ted 
2itates had made i:1portant contributions to neutrality laws; it 
would be against American interest to substitute definiteness for 
a "blank charter to jug,,;le with unforoseen conditions as they 
may arise. 11 
Nevertheless, the isolationists had their way and the 
new Act of May, 19J7, retained with some minor chances the manda-
tory arms embargo. 'I'hs new fea ture of tho 10GIs 1a t'ion was "cash 
54 Moore, Collected Papors, VII, 84. 
5j ~., 85. 
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and carry,II~.enacted for two years. It moant that coods and ma-
terials other than ar:ns, which wero em!Jar(Soos by earlier provi-
'f the Act. could not be sions 0 , ship;)od to or for belllc;orents in 
American vessels. ']'he President, could .,lso provide that all 
rights, title or interest in such shipments must pass to the pur-
chaser before they left the United .states. ?'urther:nore, no in-
surance on Guch articles should be de('3n1ed to be an A:nerican in-
teres t. The time of Invokin~: the cash and carry fea t~lre of the 
Act was le!.'t to ttle :li::.;cretion of the President. It was to c':)ue 
into effoct only "iihen he J.s~;ued a l")r')clamat.l:mc;hat a state of 
war existed and that the cash and carry provision was "necossary 
to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United 
:)ta tes. 1156 
Jpholdl.n;; the "cash and carry" provision, the isolation-
is ts reasoned that if the "fx'eedom of the seas .. " that is, the de-
fense of noutral richts of intercourse find trade, was contribu-
tory to the entrance of tho un1 ted ~~ta tas into the ;; orld "ar, it 
would be better to abandon freedom of the seas und keep ~merlcan 
ships at home. Moreover, if the Americans would have an int~rest 
in the Goods until they reaclled Lheir destination, oetter prevent 
that interest y making it unlawful :';0 export thom until "all 
right, title and interest" in them should have been.t:r'ansferred 
-----.------.------
:jG 
Can de ,-,tay 
--
",11111am Allon Du.lles and Ha:71ilton Fish ,\.J'r'wtron:.:;, 
l;eutral<!, hew York, 1,:.:5, 72-75. 
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to some foro,i2n Government, corporation or national which might 
take the risk instead. 57 
As the year 1339 wore on, it became increasingly clear 
that the Roosevelt Adm'nistration was determined to throw its in 
fluence into the balance on the side of the do~ocraclos against 
the dictators. '1'h8 President un:l the :::'ecretary of State wanted 
the mnnda tory arms embargo removed so tho. t "{merics. would be pre-
pared to assist tho British and the French, but, even more fun-
damentally, so as to prevent the outbreak of war in 8urope. 
Moreover, if the removal of the mHndatory ar::13 e:nbar:.;o ,lld not 
prevent war, it would make les~; likely a. vlctOI'Y i. ... or t~:e powars 
unfriendly to the Un l ted ;:.;tatos. 58 
In tbis connectiDn, the President and the .iecretary of 
State decided to place their pressure on the House, ~or the 
Senate, convincingly isolationist, would be less likely to yield. 
Once the House repealed the arms embargo, the ~)enate miGht be 
swayed in the interventionists' favor. Accordingly, a bill \'/'.:3 
introduced into the Eouse by Ropresenta ti '.Ie Sol Blooel. :{owever, 
intorventionists were keenly disappoInted, for the new bill was 
59 amended by the insertion of a ~odified arms ambargo. Next the 
Administration turned to the 0enate. 
57 Penwick, A~aerican Neutrality, 110. 
f58 Hull, Memoirs, I, 641-ti42. 
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On.July 11, 1~)39, the ,~>-jnate COrtE1ittoe on F'oreign Re-
lations voted twelve to eleven to postpone all consideration of 
neutra1.i ty legislation until the ne).t ses3ion of ConGress, Jan-
uary, 1 40. Althou3h the President ur;::;ed prompt action on the 
llftlnz; of the arrilS o~nbargo, Consress adjourned on August 4 wi th. 
out reachinc; a decision. This· w',s tIle last effedtive stand of 
the powerful isolationist ,;..:roup in the United :)tates. After war 
CS:'!lO in Europe, it was never sQff'iciently strunG to thwar·t an 
Administration pr·oposal. 60 
l'he neutrality legislation was still in .force when war 
W.;s declared by Great Britain aGainsL Germany. Promptly, on 
September 5, the President issued a proclamation ~)rincinc the fr0< 
visions of the 1937 ,\c1.. into effect. iJut sinco tho !leash HnU 
carl':-r" clause had expired in l'~a~r, 1}3D, ;",.1erican mcrcha~J.tr:len, laJ 
en wi th various types of raw mn terlals, were rree to steam throuj 
the European combat zone. The way was now open for the creatio~ 
of new incidents which might brInG on serious consequences wi th 
the belliGerents. 61 
President Roo3evel t sum:oned Conc;ress in spec la 1 S83-
sian on 6eptomber 21, 1939, he appeared before that body with a 
ternational law. 1I In place of the embarco on arms,' thE~ PresLlent 
61 FenwIck, American IJc:utrality:, 44. 
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stated that"', the ~:overnment would insist th(~t "A'11arican citizens 
and Amorican sh:i.ps keop away from. Im:!ledlate perils of the actual 
zones of (;onfllct. 1162 Al thou[:;h the President had arGued solel~r 
on Srounds of a return to internat:lonal law and traditional neu-
trality, actually it was in the interests of helpinc the democ-
racies resist aggression that Roosevelt recommended a repeal of 
the ar:<1S embarGo. 63 
'I'he debate that followed was a rnomentoll.s one in American 
hsl tory. The isola tionls ts ins is t.)d tha t the rQ peal of the arms 
embarz;o was unneutral, since war had started. ':L'he sarwtlonlsts 
arClled that retaininG the embarGO would throw t~merict1.n Influence 
on the side of the aS~~;res30r. They insistod that i:it.ler ',.ould 
never havo attac~r.od if be had not boon '~"s;Juri.Jd t,llat; Dr'ltu)n fHlcl 
?rance could secura no nr",.lS In the 'Jnl to,J Stat'3s. 
After six intorr:1innble weeks, the .lebate finally ended 
on :;ovember 3, ID:39, when Con,5ress lifted the a1"'::13 ernbarC;',). A 
"cash and carr~T" plan was also set up for arms and other certain 
materials and articles:_ncluded in the Act of 1937. 
Thus came to a close the lonE: struG,:l') amonG the contes-
taLts concornin.::; the correct policy that the United ':::;tates i3flould 
follow toward belLGorent countri(3s. But the :.:;ituation in 1039 
wus, indeed, para.doxical..,hile paying lip service. to tr:,:dltioDaJ 
62 Ibld., 45. 
63 B~iley, Diplomatic HiBtory, 760. 
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llftod, 
~ut to facilitate t~e 
pllrcl1flse of warrla terials by the democrac lese On paper it wa3 
tr'.dltiorw,l neutraU.ty, but in spirit it was collective security 
_-to in.pede the ClG,.:;res30r by aiding the victim. 
CHAPTER rII 
:!.'HE DESTROYER-NAVAL BASE DEAL 
In 1938, the German ~jazi 3tate, W1dar the aGgressive 
leadership of Adolph Hitler, iJaaugurated its militaristic ItDrlve 
-, t It to the r!.as • Thu first step of open agGression was directed 
against Austria, when Hitler rorcad its officials to appoint 
Nazis to high Governrnental posi tions. l'hen he prevented a pleb-
lscite by marching Nazi troops into Austria, takinG over the 
Bovernment and annoul1cinu; that the country was part of the German 
Empire. 
England and France protested this interference, ~ut the 
Chancellor, undisma;:ied, moved towards Czcckoslovakla and the rich 
;)udeten lands. By March, 1939, liazi power controlled that CO'.ln-
try. ;'Jext, Germany demanded from Poland the free city of Da.nzig 
and the Polish Corridor. Vigorously backed by her western Allies 
France and Bri tain, Pola nd resistod the German demands and in-
slsted that whatever chances were necessary in the map of Europe 
must be made by peaceful negotiation, without the constant threat 
of force. Accordin:..:;ly, on ',~arch 31, 193D, Prime Minister Neville 
Chamber-lain of Great Eri tain, fully supported by the French 
Government, promised Poland all possible aiel in case the 
44 
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indepenclenc; of that country was Lhreatenod. 
On August 23, 1930, GermiHlY si£~ned a nonaGcression pact 
with Russia. Apparently, .;:iltler hoped. that the Ierman-l~ussian 
86reement would friGhten the French and British from their prom-
ise to help Poland. However, ""';ngland and France were datorrnined; 
they warned Hitler that violating Poland's borders meant war. 
But the Nazl'}ovornment, Y'einforced by the nonaggression pact, 0 
Septe::1ber 1 sent the German mill tary might over the Polish bordo.r, 
Bri tutn and France replied by :leclarine war. It was 0eptember 3, 
1939, and the second World Jar had begun. l 
'The first ten months of tho war wi tnessed an uninter-
rupted series of German military successes. At dawn,. on April 9, 
1940, Hitler engulfed neutral Denmark without warning, without a 
declaration of war, a nd in violation of a nonaggression treaty 
negotiated less than a y()ar earl1>.;r. iiimultancously, th~nazi 
war machine launche<l an attack on neutral ::orway, asain without 
a declaration of war. 
The Scandinavian invasion shocked the American public 
and perceptibly lessened the neutrality-at-all-costs sentiment. 
The Administration was aware of t; is attitude, and talk Grew in 
the S~ate Lepartment of SivlnS credIt and even air and naval 
aid to the Dritlsh. 2 
1 Bailey, Dl.elomatic History, 748-753. 
1840, 9. 
2 "tiashlngton and ';Jar," Newsweek .. I:ew York, XV, May 6, 
!' 
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The-, onslaught continued, and on 1\tay 10, 1940, acain 
t warninr?, wi thou t a. dec lara tian of war, :lnd in viola tiall 
."i thOU ~ 
nona~-r~s"ion ple~~e of a ,c.,,:,;> '.' ." ..... .., , German soldiers swarmed into Belgium, 
Holland and Luxemburg. President Hoosevelt, commenting on the 
new developments, assured a press conference that the situation 
did not materially alter Americ,an neutrality. However, later 
that same day, in an address to the Pan-American Scientific Con-
greSS, the President hewed more closely to realities and his own 
personal sentiment. He informed his audience that a continuance 
of such processes presented a definite challenge to the type of 
civilization to which the people of the ~estern Hemisphere were 
accustomed. Until recently, ;1e said, "too many citizens of the 
American republics believed thomse 1 ves wholly safe." lJ.'he people 
of the Americas could not continue their peaceful cons traction if 
all the other cJntinents embracod "by preforence or by cmJpulsion 
7-
a wholly different principle of life."':> 
On the day that the Gormans marched into tho Low Coun-
tries, the Primo :,:1n1s ter of l:!:nGland, Neville Chamborla in, re-
sicned his office, and j, inston Churchill, the former :?lrst Lord 
of tho British Admiralty, accepted the post of the KinG'S First 
3 ~., ;,!ay 20, 1940, 35. 
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M1n1s tcr • 4 
Upon the surrender of Hollancl, the Gerrilans, deployed 
from the l:ol'th Sea to Swi tzerland, turned toward l;orthern Fral109. 5 
ste~ldi 1y the French and Allied troops were forced to retreat 
toward Soissons and Amiens. 6 ~ithin a few weeks, the Allied line 
was broken. Om German army occupied several of the channel ports 
in Fra~ce, and attempted to su.rround the EnGlish and rjelgian 
artnie s • ·./hen King Leopold Burrender-od tho entire ;~;olC:Lan arMy, 
tho .~llCllsh made iJ. :lllsterly r'etreat to Lunklrk. In ::ipi to of 
heavy C:erman :)ombin~::, !!lost of the ar:1Y, over 300,000, was roscuod 
by gnGllsh and French boats. 
Although there was a perceptible liftinG of hoarts when 
the announcement was made of the evacuation at Dunkirk, those wI 
any knowledGe of milltary reality could derive little immediate 
sat:'sfaction from thisrernarkable achievement, for the men ta~cen 
off the beaches had to leave nll of their hoavy equipmont behind 
them, and there were pitifully inadec;ua te replacements in Great 
4 Robert~. ~;herwood, Hoosevelt and '<~oEkins, Hew YC)rk, 
1940, 1-1:1. Other members of the ~;n611shj</ar-Cabinet were Lord 
President of the Council, Neville Chamberlain; Lord Privy 30al, 
Chambers H. Attlee; Secretary of ~tate for I;'oreign Affairs, (untll 
the death of Lord Lothian) Lord Hali fax; Minister vi i thout Port-
folio, Arthur Greenwood. 
5 Winston ~). Churchtll, Thoir li'inest ~, Dostol'l, 
6 Soissons is northeast of Paris on tho Alane TIivor; 
l\miens 1s about seventU-five miles north and alii;htly west of 
ParIs on the Somme River. 
48 
"I 
Britain. It was at that point that tho United States became a 
decisively strateGic factor in the war. 
In the ~idst of this raginG battle, ~inston Churchill 
recei veu a telephone mess:-lge, early on l</,ay 15, from Paul Reynaud, 
the French Premier, that the :}err:lans had broken the line near 
Sedan,7 and were pouring through in erea t numbers wi th tanl{s and 
armored cars. 8 "VVe have lost the battle," ol'led Heynaud de3pair-
ingly, "we are bea tenl II 
fihen Churchill reached Paris a fe Vi hours later, General 
Oa:1101in, Commander-in-Chief of tho }"ronch armies, con.['ir:1011 th~ts 
state:nent with the ini'oI'L!lation that the Ger:llans had overrun the 
whole of the communications and the countryside O':f an irr'osistlli 
incursion wi th armored vehicles, but far worse, there were no 
stratesic reserves in that desperate hour. 9 That same day, the 
Engli3h Prime ;11inister cabled his first messaee to President 
Fra!1klln Roosevelt. It wa.s full of dark forebodinGS of the Ger-
man conquest of Europe. He warned the Prosident that if the Uni-
ted 3tates withheld too long, it miGht have to face a co~p1etely 
subjugated Na~ifieJ Europe. Churchill asked him to proclaim non-
belligerency; this would mean that the United States would help 
7 Se,lan is on the Northern French border,. along tho 
Ardennes r\~ountalns. 
8 Churchill, Finest ~, 42. 
9 1E..!.s!., 4G. 
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All 'es 'with everythln.'t short of actually en;~a:.::in,-: armed the 1 '-' ~ ~ '-' 
forces. He asked for the "loan of forty or fifty of your older 
destroyers to bridge the gap betweon what we have now and the 
large new construction we put in hand at the becinning of the 
war. II If, in the interval, Italy ~.lhould, with another hundred 
submarines, eo to war against Great Britain, the ':':;n;.::lish ~nisht be 
strained to the breaking point. 10 On May 18, the President ro-
plied that the loan, or the gift, of the destroyers would require 
the authorization of ConGress, and that it was not the opportune 
moment to present such a problem to this leGislativo body.ll 
Another messaGe was sent to <iashineton on ;.,ay 18 that 
the i~nGlish expoc ted to bo a ttackod by the Germans heforo V(Jl~y 
long. If American aS3istanco was to play any part, it ~hould be 
available within a short time. Two days later, Chu.rchill ex-
prossed regret that the . destroyers could not be made available. 
If they were sent in six weeks, "they would play an invaluable 
part.,,12 
As the battle of France intensified in fury, the 
WashIngton ,\dministration began to ask anxious questions concern-
ing the disposition of the Allied fleet in the event of a quIck 
German victory. If !Iitler Got it, the United Stutes would be 
10 ~., 24. 
11 1.21:.1. 
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seriollsly h::~ndicappod. 0plnion in official .. ashlllGton rapLUy 
crystallized into a deterr:Iination that whatever ha ppencd to 
France, the United States must Jo all possible to encouraGe the 
British to keep fiGhting and to prevent Hltler from Getting 
their fleet .13 
At this time, the AdrnJ.nistration began discussi8ns on 
the p:Jsslbility of the United States acquirinc oases in tho Ca1"-
ibbean, and perhaps in the Atlantic. On May 113, President 
Roosevelt told Conc;res:3, 
l'11ese are oulinOU3 Jays--Jays wLose swift and 
shocking developm.ents force every neutral nation to 
look to its defenses in tho liGht of new factors. 'l'11.e 
brutal force of modern offensive WHr has been loosed in 
all its horror. New Powers of destruction, incredibly 
swift and deadly, have been developed; lind Lhose who 
wi.eld them ar'o ]'>~lthlGH3 .:.~nd. dap:dl~';. no 01(: :lof'onr;o is 
80 s trone that it r'oqulres no further s trenctheninc; und 
no attack is so unll>-:e1y or' iF.possible UIUt it may be 
i:.:;nored. 
Let us exami.ne, without ~.H3lf-Jeceptioll, tho 
dangers which confront us. Let us measure our strent,;th 
and Ollr do.:. ... en3e wi thollt se 1f-de LiS ion. 
The clear fact is that the American people must 
recast their th.lnking al)Qut r;.atiomd protection ••• Our own 
vi tal interests are widespread. More than ever the pro-
tection of the whole il.merican Homisphere acainst invasion 
01' control or domina tion by non-American nations has the 
united support of tho twenty-one American RepublIcs, 
includinG tho United States. More than ever this pvo-
taction calls for ready-at-hand woaponH capable of 
breat (;lObillty because of the potential s:-,eed of modern 
attack ••• Furthermoro, it brine .. 1 the neVi possibilities 
of' the use of neaI'er bases from whIch an attack or attacks 
on the American continents could l)o made •••• 
Graphically, t:le President pointed to tL.e :.:.hort (dstances between 
13 Newsweek, X.V, I,1ny 1040, 31. 
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potential PQ:ntn of air invasion and vital ~~erlcnn centor's. If 
I3ermuJa fell into hostile hanus, in lea;:; than three hours i;louern 
bombers could reach American Gharos, ''Ihi le from £1 base 1n the 
outer ~est Indies, the Florida coast could be reached in 200 
minutes. The islands off tbe \;est l\fri.cHn coast were onl:r 1,500 
miles from Brazil. FlyinC tim$ from the Cape Verde Island to 
Para, Brazi 1, was seven hours; from Para, Brazil, 1':'0 Caracas, 
Venezuela, four hours; :md ('rom Vonezuola to Cuba and tho Canal 
Zone it was only n two and a haLf' hour trip.14 
The President shrewdly put the isolationists sentiment 
tomporarily to rout when he pointed out that Concress with him-
self consti tuted "a team" on defense. nevertheless, some articu-
late isolationists believed that the President's interventionist 
policy was dangerous, and that he considered the country no 
longor neutral but nonbelliceront.15 
DurinG those historic weeks, when horror was pilad upon 
borror, Hoosevelt came to a faterul deciSion, strictly on his own. 
as to what tho United States' course in the war should oe. 16 The 
Prosident was convinced that if Britain fell, disastrous war for 
the Uni ted 3ta tas would be inevi table, :md that Germany would 
14 William A.,~hl te, Defense .D?.!: America, ·~:ew York, 
1940, 177-180. 
15 newsweek, XV, filay 27, l;:HO, 32. 
_y 16 Robert E. Sherwood, "Secret Papers of .ilarry L. 
l1opkins, II Collier's, :lew York, CXXI, June 5, 1948, 14. 
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atta.ck the 'I~stern IIemisphero. Roosevelt's Greatest fear, tl:e 
and subsequently, was of a nee~tiated peace. I~ cownunlcated his 
concern to the Bri tish Govorm1ont about the time that the corres-
cl with ~inston Churchill be~.an.18 pon enee -
On Juno 4 itl'. Churchill made a dramH tic and ur~:;ont plea 
for American help when he told ,the House of Commons that if the 
"Island" were subjueated and starving, the Empire beyond the seas 
woulJ carry- on, "Uh ti 1 in God t s Good t irue, the Hew World miGht 
step forth to the rescu.e and liberation of tho 01d.,,19 A few 
hours after Premier Musc.oli.ni had announeod his decision of join-
inG hllnds with Hitler, Pl'6sident Roosevelt assured the Allios 
that they could d::.p into America.n resources when he pledged on 
June 10, in Charlottesville, Virginia that 
in OLl.r Amorican unity, we will pursue two obvious and 
simultaneous coursosj we will extond to the opponents of 
force the material resources of this nation tdld, at the 
sa,!le time, we will harness and spoed up the use' of those 
resources in order that we oUl~selves in the A;-ilericas 
may have equipment ani traininG o\iua.l to the task of any 
omercency and overy do~on3o •••• 20-
There could. be no rni3sinc the dopth of his foelin;, Gincs he put 
into the words all the ~.;r'~phasis at his COfil::UU1u.. 
17 ~. 
18 Ibid. Roosevelt thereafter addressed his cables to 
Churehlll as t'he "F;ormer Haval Person"; Churchill adllressed most 
of his cables to Roosevelt as tlpotus ll , i.e. President of the 
United States. 
19 ~~herwood, ~oosevel t and ~ropkins, 143. 
20 ~ ~ Times, June 11, 1<340, p. 6:7. 
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The Pr(;)flch reaction to the President's pled::;e was a des-
per-ate :C1.ppea1 from Premier Reynau.d for "aid and materiGl support 
bY a.ll means short of an expedi tionary force •••• 1 beseech you to 
do this before it is too l:::tte. I know the gravity of such a 
gesture. 1121 To this, Roosevelt replied that the United Gtates 
was ;natlns every poss j.ble effort under existir,c c ondi t io!.ls to 
send airp lanes, artillery c..r~.:i muni tiolls of ::cin;;r id!ll':'3; and ;;0 
lons as 'c;b3 Allied J:)vornme.nt:3 continued to resist, tho peop10 of 
Amaric~ would redouble their efforts so that materials and s~pp . 
The BrItish were vitally inspired ~J Prosident 
Roosevelt's Charlottesville spe~ch, and the Primo Minister cabled 
the President expressinG h.is entl:usiasm. .4ca.in, he took occasion 
to polilt out that nothlnd would bo so important as forty or fifty 
old des troyel's a lread;! +,ocon<.1i ttonod. 'I\hoy wo:;ld brIdGe tho J;a.p 
of 8ix "lonths before the w' rtirl~e cOl1;ltr~tct:i.on could coue in to 
use. The l.Jnblish shou.ld 1:18. ve tho":; to ..:::uurd. the i r :llias t Coast 
ui:alnst the invasion of the new :,oavy Gorman-Italian submarine 
attacic which wou.ld certcJ.inl~' be launched aGainst Dri tish comuerce. 
"'l'~lO s train may be beyond our rGSOUl~Ces and the ocoan traffic by 
~)l """'''''''00'1 Pno"o'lo1t ,. y,.l ~·;o-l~J.·r··" ·1.44 
-- "-).!.\.vl.h I J.l'.,..l ~ .... ,...I ~ ~"'I}l.:lo. .Lo..)1 _ •• ~ 
21 ~','ilfred Funk, ed., Hoosevolt's I;-torei,;n ;Colley, 
1933-1941, !~ew York, 1942, 255-256. 
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\ VI ' l" v""e may be '" trq~ --1'-'" ~.!ot a day slloula' b r., loqt. ,,23 whi G11 e.l.. . ," .:: <:.H16 01... - ~ u - v_ 
ate :'lGS S H.;36 came from Primo -lnistor Churchill that :?rance could 
be sa.ved L)J H Prosi<:::ential ,nUlouHcornent that the ~;niteJ '"-.-Lates 
would, If' necessary, enter the WRY'. The President replied that 
he could make no such commitment; only ConGress could declare 
war. AltLotleh Yr. Churchill ViliS well awa!'e orcihi.:." still, in 
8 rnmnent of despo!-a. t ion, he was ready 1.·0 try al~:Tth.tns. 24 
On Jun0 22, Frnnco siened a soparate peace. :7'rotrl this 
point on, B:C-'itain had to ticht alone, nn~ it was anticipated that 
an 1:-:1portant ilhasc of the eom!.nc car'i.paicn.:ould ::0 ;~ou_:ht in the 
wate~'s of the h;n,_;l:Lsh Channel. ,11 subseCiuent cables to Hoosevelt, 
Churchill rupoat.o(l nan;; tin~es his hope t,ha t the Pres id.ent could 
arrcUlCd fO}:' the leasos 0.:[' itmericllll destroyer,::; to the'ri tish. 25 
Afte:r' the fall of ?rance, tho cables between tLo ',illite 
;~ sl:inC 
many i:lnx:tous quostion:::.;. Vlb.ut vould be (:one,.itl: thu B:r~jtish boets 
fleet would be deployed I-lmonc bases ~>U.ch as J:ewfoti.Ihlland, Jlden 
and Capetown. '.;..'lJ6 A,r:e rican floe t would ass u:';e respcms i 01 1i ty for 
23 
24 ::';herwood, Eoosevel t and 1 [opkins, 146. 
25 .f.1?l:..c!. 
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defense of all tlle V~estern Ilerdsphere. The President com-
znunicated to Churchill his bellef that the vi tal strength of the 
fleet and the cOInrl1and of the seas means the Itsaving of democracy 
and the recovery of those suffering terilporary reverses. tt The 
pr:flneMinister pledged that the Royal Navy, or part of' it, would 
never be surrendered to Hitler; and that all s'.lrviving units of 
the ho~;;8 fleet would be deployed in overseas bases as the Presi-
dent sUGgested. However, Churchill wax'ned him that every avail-
able :orl tish armed ship would be violently enca~;ed in the defense 
of the Bri tlsh Isles, and therefore, the very fact of successful 
German invasion would presuppose the total destrilctlon of the 
27 
hO!:le flee t. 
Several times the President asserted that he would do 
all he possibly could to help Great Britain. He believed t~1at 
with Bri tain and her navy gone, all American tradl tional concepts 
of sec;..lrity in the Atlantic Ocean, the :,:onroe DoctrIne, t; .. e prin-
clple of freedom of the seas, and the solidarity of ttle V.ostern 
28 
Hemisphere would become mere memories. 
The early summer days of 1940 were truly dark ones for 
Great Brl tain. She was alone, surrounded by ener:lles, a:1d no part 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. I 148. 
~.-----------.! 
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of the Britis11 Empire could send decisive aid. 29 Since the fall 
f' Denmark, lrorway, the Low Count ries and Prance, the Germans had 
0-
a wide window on the ~ontinent openinG on to the Atlantic. This 
was a srave threat to the United Kingdom's life line of supply, 
for without food and other provisions from overseas, EnGland 
would perish. 
BDitaln was weaker at sea in June, 1940. But Nazi sou 
power was so improved that it began to r'eflect itself in the toll 
of Enbllsh merchant shippinC.00 r.n:w followinG chart reveals the 
groSS British naval tonna~ sunk i'ro:'1 ;,:t:,y, l~HO, to September, 
1940, inclusive.31 
MONTES NO. ! GROSS TONS 
I 
!;tIay 1940 31 82,429 I I 
i 
June 1940 61 232,560 • ,
July 1940 64 271,056 
AuC. 1940 56 278,323 
Sept. 1940 62 324,030 
Total 274 1,238,398 
Such fiGures did not tell the whole story. Muny ships 
29 ~., 148. 
30 :7'orest Davis and L:rnest K. Lindloi, ~ 'v,ar Cano: 
~ Allerican .'ihite Paper, Hew York, 19'12. 89. 
31 Churchill, i<'inest ~, Appendix 13, 71'!. 
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which escaped destruction were severly damaced and were withdrawn 
from service while undercoinG repairs in 3hipyards and drydocks 
32 already overburdened with new construction. Frequently such op-
erations were interrupted by air raids; hence, construction and 
repair vvork were retarded. 33 With enemy U-Boats opera tins fro:n 
the continental ports of the English Channel and the ~i!Gditerra-
nean ~ea, these waters beca~e peril~us for the British and Allied 
merchantmen. Consequently, ships headed "or 3ri tish ports were 
compelled to follow more c iY'l!U.i tOllS pontes, th ;rob:.r nnkin:~ pos-
r, /I 
.c> "l ,)":1: sible fewer voyaces t::1Un 1. or:ner y. By midsll10r of 1840, the 
German submarinE:! menace in the lwrth l\tlantlc had reaelled a ues-
35 perately daneerous point. 
At the outbreak of the war, Great Britain had had a mer-
chant fleet of about 19,000,000 tons of vessels of 1,000 tons or 
more. At the end of 1940, she had lost 2,800,000 tons. About 
1,000,000 tons of new ships had been built, Rnd she had obtained 
about 8,000,000 tons by purchas6 from neutrals, by capture of en-
emy ves~els, and by taking over some of the ships of her allies~6 
32 \c~hitney H. Shepardson and 1JilliHL:l J. ScroC;:s, The 
United States in~Jorld {kffairs-1:Q.1Q, New York, l'J,a, 255. 
33 ~. 
34 ~. 
35 
194'1, 172. 
Sumner i.olles, TilO :.i.'imo .E2.!: DeCision, 
S8 
." 
But the whole number of ships acquired from the Allies and neu-
tra.l s did not constitute a new additiun to Britain's shipping s 
vice because a considorable number of them had alroaQy been 
ha.nJlinC British traffic before they passed under her control. 
The inroads maue upon Bri tish convoys were disastrous, 
and .i~ri tish destroyers, which wore the key to successful convoy-
ing, were beinG sunk at an ularming rate. Unai(iod, tho Britlsh 
GOV0rnrnent had no assurance that it could stem the tide and 
stabilize its losses. O*t of such dire straits as these there 
arOStj the need for American destroyers. 
After the collapse of France, America moved steadi ly 
closer to nonbolliceroncy. f,'fmy poople bol.tevod that ''..1.,1 to Bri-
tain was in itself the country's Lest protection, while others, 
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more ca,J.tious, recoGnized that 31'1 tain was h:_<rd proessed. Yet, 
they asked themselves if it would be right to cast away any of 
their own severely limited resources for what seemed to be a des-
parate samble. ;;;oreover, aid to Bri tain had to be weighed a;;a1 
tho country's requirem.ents for home defense. But the Adminlstra-
tion was letermlned in the face of ruthles;J uGgressiDn. '?:lbliclyj 
1 t denounced 30viet Russia for the attack on ?inland, Germar;,y for 
tho invasion of Scandinavia and the Low Countries, Italy for 
stabuinc l"rance in the back, ;ind Japan for her conduct in 
37 Shepardson and Scrogl~s, .!:l.!. S • .ill ~'Jorld Affairs, 
238-240. 
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As early U:J rta:rch, 1'340, ways bo;~:an to 1<, fOU:1J \'lhoT'Cl-
bY neutrality restrictions could bo eased in America :30 tr.lat the 
Allies micht receive the as:3istance needed • .39 '.L'ho It'ar Department 
permitted the British emd the French Goverrunents to obtain at 
once over 500 new type fiGhting planes. In addition to this, wher 
tho Anelo-French Purchasing Commis3ion showod doep interest in 
buyinc the latest and fastest type planes, the ,.ar Department 
waived its claims so that orders could be placed. ~hen Congress 
complained, the President intervened in a :3pecial messase on ;,:ay 
16, in which he requested the legisla ture "not to hamper ••• the 
delivery of American-made planes to foreign nations which have 
ordered them. II Late in '<uy, when the French and tho Lrltish 
statesmen sent frantic appeals to the United :.:.;tates for all pos-
sible aid, the :~avy Department made arrangements wi th an aircraft 
• 1-'1 ff 1 th t f'if't i 1 ' .. 1 1 --,; t """,,,, company 1n )Ll a 0 so . a' ..... y U. r'p anes ¥irllCn .)0 on~Je. 0 .';" .(;.,.r. 
Heserves Squadrons could be deli v:.:rod to the plant. '1'hoso alr-
planes W!3re to be replaced w 1 th planes of a s·J.perior type. "hen 
the title to the used aircraft revorted to the ~anufacturer, tho 
38 l.E.1.::!., 239. 
39 !£i£., 240-243. 
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ope bar to their sale to be1lieerents was removed. 40 During Jun 
the War Department followed the lead of the Navy and traded in 
eir.:;hty bombers, and the iilari time Co:nmission approved the sale of 
siX cargo carriers to Great B;:-itain. :'on111;'/h11e, the Havy IJepart-
ment made arrangements to trade in ten motor-torpedo boats and t 
subchasors then under constructllon in the ~lectric doat Company 
shipyard. In place of these vessels which the builder would sell 
to the Br'l tish Government, the :iavy would later obtain similar 
41 
craft • 
The easing of the neutrality restrictions stirred up 
fresh criticism from the isolationist members of Concress who a1-
leged that the country WI1S \jeinr; stripped of its defenses. It 
was boldly denounced by Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the 
Senate l;aval Committee, who insisted that th,:; release by the 'ilavy 
of a score or more of torpedo and submarine chasing boats to the 
British was a crevious wrong and that such actions would bring 
on war. 42 
The Attorney Ger'era1 unearthed a statuto of June 15, 
, .. 40 Ibid., 243. Such a procedure WaS 10 bal unuer an act ~f :ll8.J 12, 19rr;-whereby motor propelled vehicles, airplanes, en-
bines of other parts miGht he exchanGed in part payment for new 
equipment of s 1milar character to be used for the same purpose as 
the material exchan~ed. 
41 ~., 245. 
42 S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, Documents on ~erican ForeL;n Relations. II, Boston, 1041, 288. -
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1917, one provision of which was applicable to this case. This 
measure stated that during any war in which the United States was 
/l neutral it was unlawful "to send out of the United Statos lt any 
vessel of war lIwith any intent or under any agreement that it 
should be deliv3red to a bellit;;erer:.t n&tlon. 43 This statute, use 
against the release of the torpedo boats, was to have an importan 
bearinG on the decision Given by Attorney General Robert Jackson 
on the Destroyer-Base Deal a few weeks 1ater. 44 Following the 
receipt from. the Attorney Genoral of thLs infJrmation, the Prosi-
dent cancelled the Navy Departr::ent's release of these boats to t. 
British Government. In adJition, a significant new law was en-
acted on June 28 making the disposition of cov,}rnment military 
matorial subject to certification that it was "not essential to 
the defense of the United States" and requirinG submission of 
conditions for its transfer to Com~?littees of Congl'Oss. 
The President's tremendous wartime decision was to back 
the seeminGly hopeless cause of the Jritish with everythinc th:~t 
he could poss 1b1y orfer in the way of material and moral encourat;; 
ment. 45 Undoubtedly, the President was influenced by stratogic 
considerations, such as the i'uportance of the United Kinr;do:n as a 
base Gnd of the Royal Navy as a weapon for the defense of the 
43 ~., 701. 
4/1: Srlepardson and SCDCec, u. s. in i:,l or1d Affairs, 215. 
45 Sherwood, Hooseve1t and Hopkins, 150. 
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iVeS tern Her:li-spherc. Hi s moral cons idera t ions, however, were far 
greater and more important. ~or in that desperate hour when 
France had called ror help and ha hnd not bean able tooffar any 
kind of satisfactory reply, Roosevelt axperienced the bittorest 
sense of defaat. lIe was dat3rmi:lej it would not happen aga111. 46 
In June, 1940, Roosevelt made siGnificant wartime char~s 
in his cabinet. For some time, the President had been displeased 
wi th his Secretary of 'i'/ar, Harry H. l,Joodring. lIis detert1 ~ned is 
lationist sympathies and his inability to provide leaderShip in 
that inportant departuent madel/oodrine a ;;jerious lia'oi l.ity in 
h ,. t 47 t e caDlno • About .June 16, when he had refused to as.::;ent to 
the transfer for a number of army planes to tho Uritish unless it 
could be done without affecting American defense, he was im~odi­
ately asked to resign. 48 Soon af'terwards, a similar incident 
brou;ht about tho resicnation of the Secretary of the Uavy, 
Charles Edison. ~hen at a cabinet meeting the President proposed 
liert s, 
46 l!2l.s!. 
47 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., ";,10rgenthau t s Diaries, II Col-
new York, C.x.X, October 11, 1947, 74. 
48 'l'homas J. Flynn, The Hoosevel t Myth, l~ew York, 1948, 
221; Newsweek, }"VI, July 1, 1940,99. Criticism broko out in the 
Democratic Party when the I',hite l~ouse, contrary to custom, re-
fused to publish hS "too personal" i'~oodrinbfs letter of resiGna-
tion. The contonts of thIs letter have not yet b30n divulged. 
The only hint of what ~oodrinG said came from the President's ro-
as..; uranee in acceptinG the res L.::;n8. tLm that the arms r)::-'o:3ram Vias 
"not aimed at int~rvention in worlel af'fairs whIch do not concern 
the American hemisphere." 
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thO tctlnsf'or. of fifty Jesl.royors to Great 1$1'1 tuln, J:::,llson pro-
tested, and President Roosevelt was deeply annoyed. 49 The Presi-
dent n')minatod Colonel Henr'y L. Stimson to replace :larry H. 
~oodrinG, and Colonel Frank Knox to succeed Charles E~lson. 
were obvious reasons for U~e!::e cLoices, as in the case of Colo-
nel ~timson, who heartily acreed with Roosevelt's ideas on Ameri-
can foreisn policy. A few days b~fore his appointment, Stimson 
had aclvi sed repesl of the Neu tra li ty Ac t of 1930, showed hI s fa v 
toward allov{ing the Allied. fleets the ).1se of the United States 
ports as lJases, and favored the::eniing of supplies to the ;\,llies, 
"if necesdary in our own ships and under convoy.u50 
Many Congressmen saw in the appoLntment of Stimson, one 
of Hie nations most bellic)se tlflre oatr)Y'S" in matters or ':"oroi,:::;n 
policy, a f:lrthor serious step alon.:.; a perilous rJaJ. ':Lhey felt 
that the nominations of . .;;timson 8.nd r(nox presaGed darlnb action 
daslzned to aid hard pressed ilrltain. 51 At tho subsequent Senate 
inquiry by the ~,1iLttary Affatrs Committee, Ltimson said that 
thore was one If vIc t im holJing tlle barrier of the Horth A tlan tic .• 
Evory day that Great Britain holds out agaInst Hitler cros~Jing 
the Atlantic, the better it will be ·"01" us." 52 VJhen the :Senate 
40 Ibid., 221-222. 
50 Newsweek, XVI, July 1, lJ10, 2~. 
51 .!.£.ls!., 29. 
52 ~ X2!lf. 'I'imes, July 3, 1':10, p. 1:8. 
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comrni ttee questioned Colonel Kn lX, he said that he supposed he 
had beon appointed by the PI'SS ident because ::.hey agreed 11 on the 
quest of sea pOVler, its uses and its destiny." In pursui t of 
this aim, the United ;::itates should extend all possible moral and 
economic aid, every aid short of military participation to 
Great Britain in the hope that ·t is help would insurG her ultinat 
victory, or at least keep the fight alive until the United 3tates 
had time to prepare Lor war. 53 
About this time, the British Ambassador to Washington, 
L.ord Lothian, Philip Kerr, communicated his anxiety to ~'I inston 
Churchill concernine the Prime Minister's speech of June 4, to 
the effect that l£ngland would never surrender, and that if 
England was defeated, the rest of the Dri tisil Empire, guarded by 
the British fleet, would carryon until America came to the ros-
cue. 54 Lord Lothian feared lest these words be misinterpreted 
and the United States reeeive Gho impl'os:.;ion that in cuse of Bri-
tis:; collapse, tho fleet wou.1J first bo allowed to escape to 
America. }t'rom Church.Lll came a reassuring message that his last 
words were addressed primarily to Germany and Italy and to the 
Demini ons. Ueve rthe less, not ovorlooking the American viewpoint, 
the Primo ~inister maintained that if Great Britain broke under 
invasion a proo-German Governmont micht obtain far easier te!"'ms 
53 l!?!.£!., p. 10:,), p. 1U:3. 
54 Churchill, Finest Hour, 389-400. 
" 
.et 
German"; by surrenderin;: the fleet. 55 Furthermore, Churchil from J '-' 
told Lord i.othian to talk to the President in this sense and thus 
discourage any complacent as~wnption on the part of the United 
states that by its present pollcy it would pick up the Jebrls of 
the British Empire. 56 
Nearly a month passed· before Lord Lothian detected any 
hope that the American destroyers would be released. Finally, he 
telegraphed Churchill that the American public was beginning to 
realize that the Uni ted Sta tes was in danger of losln[j the Bri-
tish fleet completely if the war went against Great Britain and 
if knerica remained neutral. But it woul,l be extremely difficult 
to influence American public opinion to consider letting Jreat 
Britain have the destroyers unless it cou.ld be assured that, if 
the United States entered the war, the Bri tisb fleat or such of' 
1t as was afloat would cross the Atlantic In case Great ilritain 
were overrun. 57 
Toward the end of July, the Prime :'Unister took up the 
matter a,;ain. He urL~ently cautioned the President that it was 
most necessary for the British to have tho destroyers, since the 
Germans had the entire Prench coastline from which to launch U-
Boat and dive-bDmber attacks upon BDitiah trade anJ food. 
55 ~., 400. 
56 ~. 
57 Ibid., 401. 
-
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constantly they, were forced to repel threatened invasion in the 
Channel, and to ~uard the exi ts from the '~edi torrllnean. Hecont-
1y, the air attacks on their s111pping had become even more In-
. ou" He said that wi thin the f)recedin;~ ten J.ays fou.r de-jurJ. w. 
stroyers had been sunk, and eleven damaged, and continued: 
We could not sustain the present rate 
of casualties for long, and if we cannot get a 
3ubstantial rein!.'orcement, the whole fate of the 
war may be decided by this minor and easily rem-
iJiable factor •••• Leave nothing undone to ensure 
that fifty or sixty of your oldest destroyers 
are sent to me at once •••• ~i:r. President ••• I must 
tell you ••• thls is a thing to do now •••• I know 
you will do all in your power, but I feel entltled 
and bound to put thet:gravity ~md urt;ency of the 
position before you.oS 
During the first week of August, 1940, profound and anx-
ious consultations took place in ~ashington. A plan was 3Ug-
Bested that fifty reconditioned American destroyers might be 
traded to Great Britain in exchange for a series of bases in 
the:iest Indian Islands and Bermuda. 59 nut the transfer to 
Great Britain of fifty American warships was a decidedly bel-
l1gorent ac t. l]y all standards of interna tional law it would 
justify the Jerman Government in declaring war upon the United 
States. Doreover, two statutes, one passed in 1883, the other 
58 Ibid., 401-402. 
59 ~., 403. 
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enacted in -1917 ,'orbade such transfer. 60 But i1' there were le 
Cal reasons blockinG the transfer on the part of the United 
states, on the British side there were political implications 
involved. ~nGland had no desire to ceda &nerican colonies, nor 
were the colonies eager to be cut adrift from tho british .8m-
pire. In addition to this, the President, well acquainted with 
the political, ethnic and economic problems of these British 
possessions, showed a wholehearteJ aversion to a transfer of 
their soverei;nty.61 
But as fortified bases, these same British islands woul 
screen the hemisphere's land mass from overseas aC3ression. The 
President cautiously propounded to his Secretary of the Navy, 
60 Funk, Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 275. By section 5 
of the Act of March 3, 1883, Concress placed restrictions upon 
the method to be followed by the Secretary of the £Javy in dispos 
inc of naval vessels which had been found unfit for further use 
and stricken from the naval registry. "No vessel of the navy 
shall hereafter be sold in any other manner than herein provided 
or for less than such appraised value, unless the President of 
the Uni ted .states shall othorwis e direc t in v1t'i tine. II (ch 141, 
0tat, 30c 5, 582, 509-GOO,lJ.S.C., title 34, sec ,:1:02.) 'i'ho Es-
pionage Act of June, 1917-(c11 30, 40 .stat 217, 222 U.S.C., title 
18, sec 33) reads, fldurine a war in which tho United :5tates is a 
neutral nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of the juri8di 
tion of the United States any vessel built, armod or equipped as 
a vessel of war, or converted from a private vessel into a ves-
sel of war, with any intent or under any ar;reement or contract, 
written or oral, that such vessel shall be delivered to a bel-
ligerent nation, or to an agent, officer or citizeh of such na-
tion, or with reasonable cause to balieve that the said vessel 
shall or will be employed in the service of uny such belliGerent 
nation after its departure from the juriad10tion of the United 
~;ta tes. " 
61 Davis and Lindley, ~ ~ar~, 84. 
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Colonel Knox~ a solution whereby, avoiiing the question of sov-
ereiGnty, the British and Colonial Govarnments would lease the 
sites to the United States Government. Thus EnGland would have 
her colonies intact and obtain the ~lfty staunch c~nvoy craft. 
The United States would Gain a chain of bases enablinc it [~he 
more effecti vely t.o safeguard t'he hemisphere, inc ludlne!; the jjO-
minion of Canada and other British possessions. 62 
Immediately after this convorsation, Colonel ~10X dis-
cussed the leasehold proposal with Lord Lothian .. A ftor communi-
eatinG the proposal to Downing ~treGt, the ;\mbassador was assurod 
that the leasine indefinitely of bases and not the actual sale 
wa.s a.Greeable. But he was instructed to sound the President more 
fully on the touchy question of sovereiGnty to make certain that 
the assurances of the 2ecretary of the Navy faithfully l'oflected 
President Roosevelt's attitude. 63 
So that Lord Lothian would have no misgivings on the 
SUbj3ct, the President gave the Ambassador a swift word picture 
tour of conditions in the }.lriti3h iciostern 'Iornispr18re P')Sf1os:d.or.s. 
Soc here, Philip, you may as well Get this 
stra13ht once and ~or all, I'm not purchasinG any head-
aches for the United ..:,tatetl. ',0 don't want your colonie::>. 
"IJhy :::;hould we want liewf'oundland; that f s a bank-
:t'upt colony? If you're thinkinG of c:ivin,s it away, elve 
it to Canada--not us. And Bermuda--we ,Jon't want it. 
62 ~. 
63 ~., 85. 
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'.\0 think too much of' Bermudal Bermuda is an Alnerican 
resort; Americans GO there because they like to be under 
anot~'ler flae when they travel. They wouldn t t enjoy Ber-
muda half so much if it was under our flag. It would 
lose its quaintness. 
Trinidad? No, thanks. '\Vhat a prob1elll you have 
t:l.ere' • What a scrrur.bled pupulationl Just cons!..der what 
hus~lappened to 'frinidad. The orie,inal Caribs, peaceful 
souls, were overrun, just before Columbus caLle, by war-
like savages from what is now Venezae1a, who murdered the 
lr,en and marr i.ed the WOl;len~ Then ca,:le ColU):abus wi th his 
Spaniards; then the conquistadors a.nd buccaneers from all 
the h'ledi terrane an world. 'fhen the Ent:;llsh took 'l'rinl-
dad and wi th them came a lot of Scotch and helsh •••• Mean-
whlle, a lot of slaves were being iiliported fro"a Africa. 
Just to add to the .t;lixture 4000 Prench and Creole refu-
;:,ees from liai ti fled the wrath of Toussant l' Ouverture, 
and as if t~lat woren't enou(;h yO'll. people broucht in 
50,000 Hindus in lbGO. ~,hat an etlmic potpourri you have 
t:'lerel No, thank you, Philip, you people just bO Ibn 
r~linG Trinidad. 64 
oosevelt's lecture to the Aobassador, although superfically 
Jocular, was intended to be serious. He wi she Ii to remove any bar-
rier to r;1Utual trust. Nevertheless, the Prh:~e l..dnlster was Grave-
1y concerned over it, for the British public would never consent 
65 
to the alienation of terri tory once under tm1r flag. 
On August 4, Lord Lothian outlined the situation to the 
Secrotary of State, Cordell Hull. He earnestly hoped that the 
Un1 ted States mii~ht do sometilinc; about the releasing of the 
64 Ibid., 86-87.- When ChUl"chlll came to Washln,::ton 1 
December, 1941, he still seemed a little uneasy about the q;J.ostlo 
of sovereie;njy. He asked the President if he would iilind lssuint; 
reassurrinc statement at his convenience. The President la'-lching-
1y replied, "Well, ~linston, l' va been sayinc that for a year and a 
half I but if it will ~:lake you feel any better It 11 say it at,;aln." 
65 Ibid., 67-88. 
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destroyers w-i thin the next few weeks. He informed the head of 
the state Department that Britain would bJ willinG to make avail-
able to the United Zjta tea rac i 1 i tl es for naval and alr basns in 
certain Bri tish islands adjacent to Central and :':'-outh AI:lerican 
and in Jermuda, a~'l well a.s airers. ft bases in liewfou.ndland. 66 
Cordell Hull agreed that such facilities would be for the benefi 
of all the American Republics. Such an arrangement would b e !tin 
keepinG with the understanding reached at Havana and at prior 
conferences; any acti on taken by the United Stu tas would b a in 
cooperation with the other American Hepublics." 67 
Nevertheless, there were legal difriculties in the way 
of the United States selling the destroyers. The Secretary of 
State told Lord Lothian that the United States' Statutos forbade 
the departure of vessels from American waters outfitted for crui 
ing aeainst a foreien nation with which it was at peace. 68 More-
over, the National Defense Act, approved June 28, ID40, l'orbade 
the sale of naval equipmont without the approval 0-:" tho Chief of' 
IJaval Operations, and the sale of military equipment wi thout the 
approval of the Chief of ... ,taft' of t e Arrny. G9 'ro moet tho wi 3hes 
66 Hull, ~emoirB, I, 832-833. 
68 ~. 
69 ~. 
71 
Bri tish Government an am.cndment to these laws would be of the 
necessary, and such procedure moved slowly. 
In this connection, the vecretary of Ctate sent the 
president a memorandum relative to~~h0 sale of w8.1"::;h:t!Js flnd nuxil 
lary vesse ls. I t contained a propused d r>al't of a lJi 11 to be 
offered to Congress which woultl specifically authorize such sale. 
On Jiscul38ing this d.r>aft with the Presid'':;:lt, Cor'lell Hull agreed 
that there might be two objections to ~fendinG it to Congress.. 111 
the first place, it would stir up considerable isolD.tionist an-
tagonismj secondly, many weeks of discus3ion would pass before 
it could b e adopted. 70 
On AUGust 6, IJord Lothian cabled Winston Churchill that 
the Prosident was anxious for an immediate reply about tho future 
of the fleet. He wished to be assured that if Britain were over-
run, the fleet would continue to fiGht for the Bmpire overseas 
and would not be either surrendered or sunk. Since the prospect 
of legislative action was steadily improving, such an arGument 
would have a favDrable effect on CDncres3 in the c;ueBtion of the 
destroyer transfer. 
Churchill expressed his own sentiment on such a possibi~ 
1ty to Lord Halifax, the 3ri tish ?oreiGn Secretary. There was 
no intention of the British surrendering their fleet, or of 
70 ~. 
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sinking it voluntarily. ~ngland should never get into a posi-
tion whereby the United States Government might say: ":;'/e think 
the time has come for you to send the fleet across the Atlantic 
1n accordance with our understanding or agreement when we gave 
yOU the destroyers." 'r'he Deal must be confined solely to the 
oolonia 1 leases. 
The Prime Minister cabled Lothian, August 7, that the 
fifty or sixty destroyers were desperately needed. l'he British 
Government was ready to offer the United States indefinite lease 
facilities for naval and air bases in the West Indies, "and to do 
this freely on grounds of inevitable common association of naval 
and military interests of Great Britain and the United States." 
But Churchill insisted that the transfer had nothing to do with 
any future disposition of the British fleet. 72 
In a telegram of August 15, Churchill told the Presi-
dent lithe worth of every destroyer that you can spare to us is 
measured in rubies. fI To reassure the American Congress, the 
Prime Minister repeated again that Great Britain intended to fig 
on to the end, and never surrender or scuttle the fleet. But 
most emphatically did he warn the President that in \W1.'1tever use 
he made of that assurance, it would have a disastrous effect from 
71 Churchlll, Finest ~, 404. 
72 ~., 405. 
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the nritish-polnt of view, ir the EnGlish people felt that the 
conquest of the British Isles ond its naval bases was ony other 
than an impossible contingency.73 7be Prime Minister agreed to 
Roosevelt's proposal that the naval and air bases be leased for 
ninety-nine years; it was easier for official England than out-
right purchase. 
The information concerning the British fleat was ta.ken 
1n Washineton to mean that a number of its capital ships would be 
based along the Canadian coast and the British possessions in the 
Western Hemisphere and would therefore authomatically serve as 
accessory to the United States Havy should the United ,states come 
into conflict with Germany.74 
In England, plans were immediately made to send British 
destroyer crews to lia lifax and Bermuda wi thout delay. For if' the 
orews were already waiting on the spot, it would help to i:nprosJ 
Congress with the urgency of the case. 75 
At a press conference on l"rlday, August 16, the Presiden 
announced that the United ~tates Government was negotiating 
directly with the British Government for the acquisition of naval 
and air bases in British possessions in the Western .Hs!1lisph:3re , 
73 Ibid., 406-407. 
-
74 !i!!.!.2.!:! .. :r~, A ugus t 16, 1940, p. 1 : 1. 
75 Churchill, Finest ~, 407. 
.. ' 
'1\'1 th partic~lar reforence to the defense of the Panama Canal. 76 
The President declined to admit tha t there was any connee tion 
between the negotla tions and the desire of the Bri tish Govornrnen 
to purchase fifty or sixty overaGe American destroyers. 77 Yet, 
he admitted that the conv~rsations were in proGress on a quid 
S!!2 basis.78 
to placate c(3rtain mombers of Congress and the A:nerican 
public, the transaction had to be presented In the Uni ted ...,tates 
so that the acquisition of bases would bo a hi-..:hly advantaGeous 
bargain for American defense and worth :nuch more Lhan a II few flo-
tillas of obsolete uest:rpyel's. II But thls ar'C;J.ment Vla8 Eot a C011-
verdent presentation for the i!.nClish people. Churchill f:lado it 
clear that deep feelings were aroused in .i:'arliament and the Gov-
ernment at the idea of leasins any part of British territory. 
The issue would have encountered vehement opposition if it had 
been presented as a naked trading away of British possessions for 
the sake of the fifty destI'oyers. Ther.'efore, with the approval 
of Pres ident Roosevel t, the Prime ;'i'! ini ster placed the transac tion 
on ahiCh leve179 On August 20, Churchill tolJ Parliament: 
76 ~ York 'l'imJs, AUGust 17, 1940, p. 1:1. 
77 l,lli. 
78 Ibid., p. 5:2. 
79 Churchill, ?inest Hour, 408. 
75 
.,. Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt 
in the United Statos about tlle air and mval defense of 
tlleir Atlantic seaboard and President Roosevelt ••• made it 
clear that he would lLee to J.isctlss wi th us and with tile 
DOHlinion of Canada and with Newfoundland, the develop,;lent 
of A'.erican naval and alI' faclli ties in Newfoundland and 
in the West Indios. There is, of course, no question of 
any transference of sovereignty ••• or of any actlon belns 
taken without the consent or a~ainst the wishes of the 
various Colonies concerned •••• 0 
However, the English' Cabinet decIded to offer the 
United states the naval and air facilities off t:le Atlantic Coast 
quite independently of the destroyers. "Our view is tl1ut we are 
two friends in danger helpinc each other as far as we can. tt 
Churchill told the President that he saw "dlfficu.l ties and even 
risks tf in aUrrllttinc, in any way, thatll'lhat tr.lO United States 
would send would be as a paY;:lent for the facilities, beoause the 
people on either side would contrast what was [,!.ven and what was 
reccHved. "The r:1oney value of the armaments would be computed an 
81 
set acainst the facilities •••• " Furthermore, each isla.nd in 
location was a case by itself. If thare was only one harbor or 
slta, how could it be divided 8.11d its advantages shared? In such 
a case, the British Govern::lent prepared to offer what 1 t consld-
ered best for both nations, rather than Ifer~:..bark upon a close-cut 
argument as to what ought to to delivered in return for value 
80 Parllalllentarl Debates, Commons, 3'lth 'Pal"l. ,5th Ses . 
Tuesday, August 20 .. Vol. 364, London, 1940, 1170. 
81 Churchill, Finest Hour, 409. 
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receive' • If the Pres ident would pr'epa re in Greater detai 1 what 
Vias des ired in the bases, the neceS:3ary technical and le;;a 1 ar-
rancements could he worked out by experts. 'l'heY'efore, any help 
forthco:ning from the United States would be a separate spontane-
ous act, arisin;; out of the tJnlteJ h.:,tates' understanding of the 
world strucsle and the interesbs of the United States in relation 
to it .82 
In "Nashington, Sumner i.elles, then Hcting Secretary of 
state, informed Lord L.othian that the A:11erican cO~'13tl tuti-mal 
positiDn nade it "utterly i:.p~)s.>ib1e" for the .iJl'osldent 'Cu send 
the destroyers as a spontaneous ;:;ift. A quid pro quo was abso-
lute1y necessary in the 1itSht of recent legislation, the National 
Defense Act of June, 1940.83 
Toward the end of August, 1940, the negotiations between 
the two countries reached a deadlock. Cordell Hull returned from 
his rest at White Sulphur SprinGs to find that Lord Lothian and 
Winston Churchill Showed no siens of yielding to the idea that 
the destroyers be ;:;iven as Gifts. 84 1'he President, at a Cabinet 
meeting, requested his Secretary of Sta te to do something about 
82 ~., 409-410. 
83 Neither the Chief of ~taff nor the General Board of 
the Navy was able to give certification that the ships wore not 
eSsential to national defense, except in return for h .J.ei'inite 
consideration vvhich they would ce:,tLf':r alLIed to tho sr:c:n~lt~T 0;'-
the Jnited ~tates. 
84 Hull, ~emoir3, 834. 
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Accordinely, Hull, undertaking the negotiations, determtned 
to push them to completion as promptly as pos:.>! ble. The Secre-
tary felt, since the negotiations were public property, that to 
drag them on much longer would prejudice an excellent psychologi-
cal reaction to be expected in E.'ur ope when the arrangements would 
be announced. a5 LOrd Lothian Dold Cordell Hull that the British 
Gov::rnment did not like the American proposal that the Oni ted 
states have exclusive authority to locate and select the bases 
needed. His Government objected also to t~he proposed exohange to 
be in the form of gifts baok and forth. If the bases were out-
right gifts, the British public would be less likely to scrutin~' 
them than if they were an oxchange, and less tempted to complain 
that Britain, in Giving away leases to valuable bases,' was not 
getting full value in the reoeipt of fifty old destroyers. S6 
There were dIfficulties on the American side also. Al-
though Attorney General Jackson had assumed that there was Legal 
authority for the President, a.s Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
and Navy, to sell the destroyers to 13ri tain, for the Pres ident to 
do so without special Congressional authority, the rollowing was 
necessary. 11e would have to satisfy Congress that, :tn return for 
the destroyers, the Unitld Jtates had obtained facilities to base 
Which would clearly give the country greater security than its 
85 Ibid. 
86 ~., 834-835. 
78 
of,tlla fifty destroyers. In addi tlon to this, accord-
legislation, the Chiof of Naval Operations, Ad-
Stark, would .have to satisfy himself that !:'he 
leases to Lhe bases would 30 increase Anerican sel.!Ul""lty that he 
could certify that keepinG tllO f l.fty J.~stroyers was not essential 
87 
to American national defense. . But far more seI'10us still was 
the fact that the President had no aLlthori ty to make a gift of 
govern..,"en t property. 
At the V'vhite House, soon after, Seoretary of' State riul 
emphasized once more to Lord Lothian, and for the first time to 
President Roosevelt, that the Chief Executive had no authority to 
88 
give away governr:lent property. But the Marquess, ignorinG that 
stateme!1t, presented to them the British proposal in the fornl of 
draft notes wh1 eh had already been approved by his Govern;:[lont. 
Lothian relt that delay and dispute would be avoided if a joint 
Anglo-American body of experts L:m1odiately proceeded to agree on 
the proper locations for the naval and air bases. But the Bri-
tish AIL1bassador maintained that Winston Churchill did not feel he 
could eive in return for fifty obsolete destroyers the riGht to 
obtain whatever air and naval bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the 
Bah8.l.;1&s, Jamaica, st.Lucia, Trinidad and Bri tlsh GLliana, the Vni-
ted i.nates i.lit,:;ht ehoose to ask for, "because the Brftish 
87 Ibid., 835. 
88 Ibid., 836. 
79 
.,. 
, .. lght Incur the charge of defaul tint:. on its share of 
toe barGain if it created difficulties about any particular thing 
United states Goverl1L1ent wanted. It Churchill felt tl.at Bri-the 
tiSh public opinion would not s~pport a bargain of that kind if 
it was presented as a contI·act. Such an arranGe[:lent would spoil 
hat would otherwise be a demonstration of mutual cood will be-
. 89 
tween the two coimtries. 
Once again, the Se cre tary of state told the Ambassador 
and Roosevelt tnat the President had no authority whatever to 
ake a cift of public property to any government or individual. 
t onee the President agreed. He said that a different arrange-
mont would be necessary to achieve the desired objectives. Ac-
cordingly, the President left it to Cordell Hull to work out a 
solution with Lord Lothian. 
The followini.; morning Hull discussed the s i tua tion wit 
the Legal Adviser of the State Department, Green H. Hackworth, 
and Judge Newman A. Townsend of the Department of Justice. Mr. 
Hackworth made the sUGgestion that a compromise r:light be obtained 
between Churchill's desire for reciprocal gifts and tle American 
legal 1,)osition that the President could not e;ive away the destroy 
90 
ers unloss somethinL: was obtained in return. Hackworth 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 837. 
80 
contended tbat the parcols could be divided. Tho first Group 
could comprise the bases of Newfoundland and 3errauda; these coul 
be an outright gift. The second could comprise the bases around 
the Caribbean, stragegically more valuable to the United States 
because of their nearness to the Panama Canal. 'I'hese could be 
leased in consideration of the. cession of the fifty destroyers. 
Hackworth and Townsend drafted proposals follow In::; this 
plan. The American draft began with an assurance from tho Bri ... 
tish Government that if the waters surroundine the British Isles 
became untenable for British warships, "the British fleet would 
in no event be surrendered or sunk, but would be sent to othi3r 
ports or the .Empire for continued defense of the &npire. u9l The 
Secretary of State de.sired such a formal repeti tion of this as-
surance beaause of the transfer of the destroyers to BrItain. He 
felt phat if the surrendered fleet included the fifty former ~ 
lean destroyers, the American position would be more dangerous, 
and the fire of the isolationists who were opposing the Adminis-
tration on selling the destroyers would be turned on the White 
House. 
On August 27, the President and certain cabinet members 
including Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, Secretary of War, 
Harry L. Stimson and the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, went 
over the draft carefully, made a few chan(;es in phraseology, and 
-
91 Ibid., 838. 
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approved it.· The draft was flanded to the Chief of Naval 
operatiuns, at that tiue h.dmir·al 8tark, since he would be called 
upon to [;1 ve a certificate under Act d' June 2:6, 1940, that 
the destroyers were not essentIal to American national defense. 
That sa.ne da;>r, the President received another lon<.:: 0001 
from the Prime Minis tel' of hnGl'and approvinL; the proposal. l,',ore-
over, Bnclish naval and all' experts had reached practically the 
same conclusion wi th one addition; they thoucht that AntiGua, in 
the Leeward Islands, miGht be useful as a base for flying 
93 
boats. Churchill was ready to eive the assurance that t:'le 3ri-
tish fleet would not be scuttled or surrendered, and this assur-
anee would be given in the form of a separate exchange of letters 
between Lothian and Cordell Hull. However, the Prime IHnister 
did not wIsh this exchange, published because he felt that it was 
much t:ore likely that the German Govern:llent would be the one to 
94 
surrender or scuttle its fleet or what was left of it. Immedi-
ate action on the destroyers was urged in view of :Wussolini t s men 
95 
ace to Greece. "Even the next forty-eit:ht hours are important. If 
The following draft, prepared for publication concer 
the bases, was also sent: 
92 Ibid. 
93 Churchill, F'inest Hour, 412. 
94 Hull, J:emoirs, 838. 
95 Churchill, !<'inest Hour, 412,. 
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Vie are prepared in friendship and Good will to 
:~ieet your representat:.ves forthwith in order to consider 
L~e lease for ninety-nine years of' areas for the estuUlish-
,~ient of naval and all' bases ::'n the followlnr: places 
Newf'oul1dland Antigua 
Bernmda st. Lucia 
Bahamas 'Jlrinidad 
,Jamaica Bri tisil ?tliantt6 
Subject to later settleIJents on point of deta~l ••• 
. 
The Prime ,,~inisteI' 8ucsested the following text of a 
telecram for publication which the President miJ1t send to s.llm 
97 
to elicit the assurance he desired, on condltion that the 
ain notes regarding the bases and destroyers should be made 
98 
public first. 
The Prime Minister of Greut Britain is reported 
to have stated on June 4, 1940, to Parliament, 1n effect, 
that if durinG the course of the present war in which 
Great Britadm and British Colonies are engaged, the waters 
sllI'roun<.iing the British Islas .hould become untenable for 
Brltish ships-of-war, a British Fleet would in no event 
be surrendered or sunk, but would be sent overseas for 
the defense of other parts of the J;~mpire. 
The Governrl1ent of the 'Jni ted States would 
respectfully inquire whether the foregc;inL statement rep-
resents the settled policy of the 131".1. tish Government. 
President Roosevelt accepted this version and Churchill 
sent him the followinl::; aGreed J!eply: 
You ask, Mr. Presldent, whether my statenent in 
Parliru;.ent on June 4, 1940, about Great BritaIn never 
surrender;i.n,. or scuttlinc her fleet represents the set-
tled policy of His Majesty' s Goverrli~ient. It certainly 
does. I r.;lUSt, !:lOwever, observe that the::e hypothetical 
96 Ibid., 414. 
97 Ibid., 
98 Hull Memoirs 841. 
83 
contingencies seem more likely to concern the German 
}'leet or what is left of it than our own. 99 
On August 29, the Secretary of State handed the British 
Ambassador an informal memorandum containing a further argument 
showing that it was the United States' point of view that the 
destroyers and bases should not, be dealt with as outright gifts. 
The American proposal whereby Britain would give the United State 
leases to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda and would exchange 
leases to the other bases for fifty American destroyers, in the 
main, spoke for itself. It would be unfortunate if the arrange-
ment should be made to appear in any other light such as that all 
the bases were to be turned over to the United States as an un-
qualified gift with no thought or expectation of receivinG fifty 
destroyer:l. If the 13ri tlsh Government desired to urop the l<lea 
acquirinS tho destroyers and to turn over the tases as an unqual-
ified gift, a different situation would be presented. 100 
That evening Lord Lothian presented the ~ecretary of 
State with his Government t s counterproposal. A few changes were 
made in the proposal with the approva.l of the President and the 
Ambassador. 
On August 27th, Attorney General Jackson submitted his 
legal opinion in which he maintained that the President had 
. 
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99 Churchill, Finest ~, 414. 
100 Hull, Memoirs, 839-840. 
84 
qualified power to exchange the fi:t'ty overage destroyer's for tl8 
ritish naval a. nd a.ir bases wi thou t the consent of the Senate .101 
his presidential power was based on the fact, first, that as 
ommander-in-Chief of the Army and l~avy, the Consti tution 
laced upon the Chief H:xecuti ve the respons ibili ty of using a 11 
onstitutional authority which he might possess to provide ade-
uate bases and stations for the utilization of the naval and air 
eapona of the United States at their highes t efficiency in Amer-
ican defense; second, that the conduct of foreign relations was 
vested in the President b;)r the Constitution as part of the execu-
tive function. 102 He gave further support to this executive furn-
tion by referring to a recent decision given by the Supreme Court 
in 1936, "that if serious embarrassment was to be avoided and'su6·. 
cess for our aims achieved, Congressional legislation which is to 
e made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the in-
ernational field must often accord to the President a degree of 
iscretion and freedom. 1t103 
MeanWhile, the State Department had drafted a messae;e 
President, with his approval, to send to Congress along 
101 :New York Ij:limes, September 4, 1940, p. 1: 5. The 
egal interpretation of the Uestroyer-Base Deal is treated in 
etail in Chapter IV. 
102 Shepardson and Scroggs, U. S. 1£ World Affairs, 2al 
103 Uni ted States of America v Curtiss-l:right Export 
orporation, 1936. 
..,. 
.,itl'). the exchanse 
85 
of note s be tween t:~le En,:;lis!l li.mbassadox· and the 
104 
of State. 
On Lionda.y evenin£:;, Septc;:lber 2, t!:1e f;,n.:lish ll.f:.bassador 
e.nd t:16 JiJaer ican Sa ere tary of sta. to siened and exchanGed t:1El note 
.,rev::o:.ls1y agreed upon confir:nlnc the Destroyer-Base transactions. 
I' 
The Uri tish Gover:unent f;ra:lted 'to the Unl ted ~)1:iates "freely and 
.1 tllO;.J.t c0l1s1deration tl leases for the establish;;,en t. of naval a.nd 
air bases in Newfoundland a.."ld Bermuda, thus attestlnc its desire 
"to cooperate offectively with tlle ot':ler nations of the Americas 
1n defense of the Western Iio~~iisphere •••• " In view of the desire 
of t:10 :Jnl ted states to obtain additional alI" and naval bases 1n 
the CarIbpean area, for the protection of the Pana,aa Canal, the 
Brl. tlsh Goverm:.ent, "in exchanc0 for l~dll tary and n.:wal eq:lipment 
and ;natertal" agreed to lease to the United States six other alI" 
and naval bases free of rent and subject only to the cOE:1pensation 
to be I)ald to the owner of :,Jrl va te property for losses due to ex-
propriation or danlages resulting from their establlshaent. 'rhose 
bases would be established 1n the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. LucIa, 
Trlntdad, Antigua, and Bri tish GuIana. All leases were to run 
105 
ninety-nine years. 
104 COPies of bhese documents will be found in Appendi • 
105 'fhe Depart;;.ent of State, Bulletlnl. ;jashinc.;ton D. G. 
III, September, 1940, 199~200. The entire text of these docu.;::ient 
is found in Appendilles II and III, 182-190. 
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On September 3, 1940, tho Secretary of State sent to 
White House the President's messa{;e to Congress which Roosevelt 
had signed and handed to Cordell Hull, the notes exchanged betw 
the Secretary of state and Lord Lothian, and the opinion of At-
torney General Jackson, for cOF~unication to Congress. 
That memorable day, \vhen t:1e famous transaction was 
announced in WashlnGton, the President was absent, havine; just de 
dlcated the ChickamaUGa Dam in 'fennessee. While riding by train 
toward the Capital, some distance from Charleston, West Virginia, 
Roosevelt told his Secretary, Stephen Early, to call the twenty-
three news correspondents aboard to the President's car, the Ro~ 
Amundsen. To that eager group, the President announced that he 
had a big story to impart and one that the correspondents need 
not wri to, for the story was to "break" in vVashington wl thin a 
106 
quarter of an hour. The President outlined the Destroyer-
Base trade, comparint; it to the Louisiana Purchase, both becaus 
it added greatly to the co,mtry's strategical resources and be-
cause he, like Thomas Jefferson, had concluded it under stress 0 
emerf;ency before informine Congress. Moreover, he declared that 
he looked upon the agreer.1ent as a l::eans of keepinc an enemy from 
107 
the country's door. 
106 Davis and Lindloy, ll2! ~~, 104-105. 
107 ~ ~ Times, September 4, 1940, p. 1:1. 
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In the President's special messaco to Concress, he do-
cle.red that thl;) lieal was in no sense inconsistent with peace a~d 
still les8 "a threat ag~ainst any nation. It was an epochal 
,e.s 
and far-reaching ac~ of preparation for continental defense in 
the face of era ve da.nger. nl08 
In London, Prime Minister Winston Churchill reported to 
the House of Com"ons that the frontiers of the United States had 
been advancinc alon~; a wide arc In the 1\ tlantic Ocean, "a move 
ene.blinG this country to take danger by the thrOB t while it is 
still hundreds of miles ['rom their homeland. ft 109 
The fifty destroyers traded to Great Britain in return 
for six naval bases werd part of 162 destroyers built between 
191'3 an::i 1922. Although they had not been used for ten years 
previous to 1939, at that time some of the;rl were reconJ.itionod 
for use in the Unl ted ;""ta tea ' waters .110 ~';n rO'Jte to ~h.whil:lC',Jon 
fro:u 'l\3nnessee the President told the rep'Jrters that SO~1e of t~10 
fifty des troyers were then on the ir way frOO1 !J:J.rnpton Roads, near 
Norfolk, VirGinia to j30ston andeventual delivery to England. lll 
186-187. 
108 A copy of the complete text is found in Appendix I, 
109 London Timos, Soptember 6, 1940, P. ~:3. 
110 ~ York 'rimes, Sopte:nber 4, 1940, p. ,1:2. 
111 Chicago Dutil Tribune, September 4, 1940, p. 4:4. 
Twel ve des tro"ers loft liarnpton Hoads for Bos ton on r,1onday, 
September 2, 1940. 
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ao~ever, the "President refused to di vulge any further informa tim 
on the movement of the destroyers. 
Although American crews could not take the de~3troyers 
112 
to England, they navigated them as far as Canada where the 
British took over. Six of tho Jestroyers were Joined to the 
Royal Canadian Navy. 'Ihe first'destroyors to reach En,::;land were 
renamed Churchill, Caldwell, Camerson, Cas tel ton, Che lsea, 
Chesterfield, Clare, Chambeltown. Churchill told the House of 
commons thut the other destroyers would be renamed places common 
to the United Kingdom and the United States. 113 
As soon as the Destroyer-Base Deal was announced, the 
United ::::tates Joard of Inspectlon, :"Ilade up of ten :Tien under the 
leadership of Rear Admiral John ,t. Greenslade, was sent im::lodi-
ately to Bermuda aboard the cruiser Saint Louis to begin the 
selection of the exact sites. 114 
'I'he need for American bases along the Atlantic had been 
recoGnized by naval experts for some Y9ars. In March, 1920, 
~~1l1iam G. McAdoo, former Secretary of the (l'reasury, had sponsore 
a suCSes tion that Great Bri tain should wipe out part of her war 
debt to the United ~)tates by selling her the ~~est Indies. It was 
recocnized that these island sites would be most valuable to the 
ut ion :Jo. 
112 This was forbiJJen by Section 3 of Public Resol-
54, aprroved November 1, 1939, 76 Congress, 3 Session. 
t' 
,:onJay, 113 Parliamentary iJebates, Cor"nons, ()'7 r'arl" 5 L;f)3~~., :optombor 17, r940, Vol. 3G5, IlB. 
114 Chica7Q Dailx~, September 4, 1940, p. 1:3. 
!' 
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united ~tates 'since it had developed the Panama Cnnal. 115 This 
subject was ,discussed again when Prime ~::inister Ha~n3ey Macl;onald 
vis1 ted this country during President lierbert Hoover'.3 Adl'ninis-
tratlon. It was agreed that Britain miGht tr de some of her nunl-
erous islands scattered along the United States' Atlantic coast t 
the united States in exchange for Americ;{'s cancellation of the 
war debt amounting at that time to approxim:.ltely '1?4,368,000,000. 
It was even reported that an aGreement was roached, but pr iJfila ture 
publiclty and political dissatisfaction on both s ides of the j".t-
lantic spoiled the deal. 116 
In the early spring of 1940, Senator Robert Reynolds of 
North Carolina offered a resolution authorizinG the President of 
the United States to enter into negotiations with the British 
I 
Government wi th a view toward ac(~uirinG cert:dn islands in the 
Caribbean, Bermuda Hnd British Honduras. 117 ~enator Reynolds re-
peated the same proposal on April 11, 1940. He was desirous of 
the United States' acquirinG islands in Lhe Caribbean, so that 
the cov\)['nmont could more secur(}ly protect the eastern entrance to 
115 U. 0. Concress, ~enate, Congressional Record, 76th 
ConG_, 3rd .ses~). , 'Thursday, Apri 1 11, 194:0, Vol. 86; Pt • IV, Wash 
ington, 1940, 4654. 
116 "UnitoJ. States-.:Jrltain vestroyer-l:aval Base Doal 
~nd Ti'ar J:.:astern Hepercuss ions," China ',Veekly Review, XCIV, 
uepte'1ber 14, 1940, 42. 
4352. 
117 Congressional Record, 76 Conl3., 3 ,sess., 1~j40, 
Ii 
I 
I 
I 
! I 
i 
i I 
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4t 
tue Panama Canal, which could be strengthened by the Peaceful ec-
quis1 t~~0n of the Dri tish and French Islands in the Caribb,;an fl""Om 
the port of Spain nor thward to Berr:luda. He displayed a map on 
wuich were shown six American flags representinG the sparsely 
scattered American strongholds throughout the broad Caribbean. 
If sllch purchase were made, a ring of steel would be forged a-
118 
round P anarr ... a. 
A plaJl re cO~:J1lended to the Sena to by members of the 
Naval Affairs Committee was embodied in a cOLlpreb.ensive report 
119 
acco;;lpanying the new Naval r'::xpansion Bill. Its supportera i 
sisted that theLeeward and Windward Islands and Bermuda were 
possessions for which the British Empire had no earthly use,and 
t~Hl.t although they would be an economic liability, the Uni ted 
120 
States needed them for defense. 
Toward the close of August, when it was known that the 
Uni ted States was negotiating with Great Bri til in, the Sena to 
Naval Committee asserted that it preferred absolute sovereignty 
over the islands to leases. "They are American islands and they 
ought to be in the possession of the United States and under the 
flag of the Uni ted States ••• not by any ninety-nine year lease on 
118 Ibid., 4354. 
119 confressional Record, Appendix, 76 Cong.,3 Sess., 
Thursday, May lS, 940, Vol. 86, Pt.XV, 2D9C-2997. 
120 Congressional l}e cord, 76 Cong., ~) Sess., 1940, 
9606-9507. 
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property of the BrItish .Empire," declared Senator ~rnest Lundeen 
of ~; in11e S ota. 
'l'he new sites leased from Great Britain, which extended 
the field of ;\mE::rican naval defense a ction by almost 1000 miles, 
remedied a significant weakness in tho stralebic position of hhe 
United -:;·tatos. Owinr; to /"rr.erica t s insular posl tion, the navy was 
the firs t instrument of United States defonse, and American se-
curity was initially dependent on adequato baseD ~o sup~ort the 
fleet. 121 Vibilo this country's policy was fundamentally de1'onsiv 
the armed forces had to pr(3pare for offensive action by the Bures 
means of discouraGinc attack. Any potential enemy country had to 
be shown that in attacking the United States, It would risk the 
loss of its torces before they could approach American shores. 
This factor, in the long run, might determine the outcome of the 
conflict. The most effective use of American naval forces made 
necessary outlying bases, 30 that the fleet miGht safely operata 
beyond A:llerican shores. At; the same time, it was im.portant that 
an enemy bo kept from acquirins available sites for bases in the 
,iestern Hemisphere .122 
A fleet and air force, supported by adequate bases, 
could operate successfully in a civan theater of war with fewer 
-
the 121 A:.~ Randle ,;::.l~iot!_ "United States StratoGic Bases :t 
Atlantic," l<oreii~n POI1CY !ieports, XVI, Janw;i.ry 1.S, 1:;'11, 26 
122 Ibid., 260. 
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combat units than would bl needed without such support. 1he ac-
qllisition of outlying bases enhanced the value oC existing vessels 
IUld naval air crart without mH.terially increasing the tasks as-
signed to them. Bascs WCT'S :l1ore esuentia1 for the ~;I~p:)r)rt of U10 
fl 09t than the fleet for the protection of the b aS6s. 123 
The eS8cntial requisites for a Cood naval base are po-
sition, resources und s treneth. A site's posl tion carl be de-
termined only by na ture; its stra tegic value c::<.~:, be increased or 
decreased as the c ondi t ions of warfare chant:;e. In view of the 
combat condItions of ·'·~orld:·ar II and the possible operatinL; range 
of modern warships, the outlyin3 bases of the United States were 
Irell placed. 124 These bases formed a protect! ve screen around the 
entire country, and could be supplied from the United States alone 
interior lines of commll..11.ication, even in time of war. 'They mot 
the immediate needs of Amerlcannnval vessels and pianos. 
newfoundland and Bermuda were expected to be most use-
ful for the protection of the vital, thickly populated industrial 
areas I) lon:3 tho eas tern seaboard. 2;1rot:1 those i elands, :) lnnos 
could patrol the major sea lanos betwoon the United Jtatos ~nd 
Europe, while ships station3d thore Gould larDely control access 
~ th~ American Atlantic coast. Since 00th islands wero within 
effec ti VIJ bombing ranEe of' larGe 0[1 stern cities, an cnomy could 
-
123 l!21d. 
124 ~. 
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'ounly menace tho United States by establishin~ control over sa!'.!. ., ~ 
outposts. tb6 S8 As the onl~r islands 3uitable for bases near the 
North ,; tlantic seaboard, they were 0[' ~) tra teJ-.lc value for Un! ted 
states defense. Planes, ~ubmarines and cruising warships, based 
in ~Iewf'oundland less than 1,000 miles fr-om the sOLlthern tip of 
Gr8ondlano., closed 11 possi~)le !'t1ute foT' invasIon of' tIl0 Untted 
states by way of southern Greenland, Newfoundland or CanaJa. 125 
In southeastern J.lewfoundl<md, tho Un! teu ~ta tes iOIilS Granted r1311 
for thf1 establishment of an HiI' base and an army training eround 
on the Argentia Peninsula, and a plot two miles square south of 
Little Placentia Harbor. This harbor, generally ice-free for 
eleven months of the year, proved useful for land planes whenever 
the weather permitted flying. An army traininG iSround was eutab-
lished on the southern shore of Li ttle Pl!:l.centia Harbor and an 
army defensive force was garrisoned ut t::e barracks built ne'l.r 
Saint John. 126 'rhe naval baso site of about twenty-two a.cres, 
located on the southern side of 0aint John's Harbor, includod 
about 1,250 f'rJst of warfaGs for ha.ndline supply .:.:;tor'JS ;"nd equlp-
mente 'Ille small slze and 3xtreme narrowness of 0alnt John's Har-
bar procluJed its develop:r!ont 2.3 n :::uJor ':1av~?l 1)U80, :''.It tt was 
very u.seful for naval sup;lly and r'epairs in northern waters. It 
-
125 l£i£., 261. 
S 126 Ill'he Crui ser No. val Base Dea 1 Between the Unl ted 
tates and Great Britain," Congressional Digest, Washington, D. 
C., XX, January, 1941, 17. 
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.,a.s deep enouGh to accommodate a capital ship and was rarely 
frozen over in winter. 
Bermuda Is loss than 1,000 miles from every large port 
on the Atlantic coast of both the United ~tates anQ Canada. ~or 
many yoa rs the urea t .:.;;ound of Bermuda, \IV 1 th doc kini.; and other re-
pa.ir facilities on Ireland Island, was the home station of the 
3ri tish l'~a vy t s American :ind;. es t Indies Fleet .127 Bermuda lies 
in a reGion of mild warmth and rain. Naval anchora,..;e in the Groa 
sound and north of Castle Harbor are protected by coral reefs, 
about fifty miles in circumference. 128 The United States has 
built a major operating base for war-ships, seaplanes and land 
planes at Castle Harbor, on the eastern purt of the island. This 
circular harbor, which is over two miles in cliametor,' is entered 
ai tho I' from ins ide the Bermuda cora 1 breakwater or from the open 
sea. Although the water was already sufficiently deep and shel'te,'r. 
ad for seaplanes, the width and depth of the entrances were ex-
tended and the harbor dredged to accommodate deep-draft vessels t2~ 
Flunt; across the entrances to the Caribbean and tLe ap-
proaches to the Pa,nmna \.;anal o.re the island of tho v'iest Indies 
127 l!!lliot, U. !:; • .:;trategic Bases in the Atlantic," 
fore If/l Pol icy Heports, XVI, 2G2. 
128 tithe IsLtnd :::'i tes, 'I I£2, l1..lli Century and After, 
London, CXXIX, .~pri 1, 1941, 337. 
129 Elliot, flU. S. ;:;tratecic Bases in the Atlantic," 
.E2 r Gign Policy Hep.)rt.s, XVI, 262. 
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,tretching from the Strait of Florida to Venezuela and British 
Guiana. They are u na tural screen for the Panama Canal, the erea 
midcontinent artery of the Mississippi, the Gulf of Mexico and 
all American shipping routes in that area. i.1 th the sinGle ex-
ception of Trinidad, which was projected as an operating base, 
all the American bases in the Caribbean area were established to 
prevent hostile powers from using these islands as a hidden 
source of supplies, or as centers for raids by small destroyers, 
tender based seaplanes, or submarines. 130 
'l'he Bahamas contain twenty-nine principal '_s lands, wi th 
hundreds of reefs and rocks, most of which are surrounded by shal 
loW seas, stretching northeas terly from the coas t of Ji'lorida be-
yond Haiti. 'l'he United States Government received the use of the 
waters of Abraham Bay and a small area of land adjacent to it on 
Mayuguana Island. This island lies about ~60 miles north of the 
important Windward PassaGe between the Atlantic and the Caribbean t 
Abraham Bay is a large bight with adequate depth for seaplanes ane 
small vessels, but Its entrance is obstructed by a dangerous 
reef .131 
On the southern coast of Jamaica, the lease provided fo] 
a United States fleet anchorage at Portland Bight, 594 miles from 
~e Panama Canal and about 180 miles south of the United States' 
-
130 .!.£.!s1. 
131 Ibid. 
-
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naval station at Guantana!no Bay, Cuba. De.:. ... ense batteries wero 
located on the shore around the bight and on Pigeon Island. The 
British and the American forces shared the use of military air-
field and the British dockyard at Port Royal. Although there 
were no landing fields on the island, the United States received 
tbe right to build an emergencY'airfield five miles south of May-
pen near Portland Bight. In addition to its role as a watch 
station on the naval lifeline between the Atlantic and the 
Pacific, this new outpost was centrally located between the Pan-
ama Canal, other bases, and the United States. 132 
The new bases along the eastern rim of the Caribbean 
helped eliminate the great.at gap in Amerioan control over ap-
proaches to the PC-lOama Canal from the Atlantic. Before September 
1940, the United States controlled acceSB to the Caribbean from 
the north, but not from the southeast, where there was a much USO( 
passage between Tobago and Trinidad on the direct route from the 
South Atlantic to Panama 518 miles from the easternmost defense 
outpost of the United Statea. 
Sweeping in a giant crescent around the northern and 
eastern boundary of the Caribbean 1 ie the romantic "Vest Indies. 
loe Lesser Antilles include many of' the smaller islands of' this 
region, especially the Leeward and the ,~'inclward groups, In the 
-
132 ~., 262. 
-
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Leewards is" the is land of AntiGua and its ,lependencies .133 The 
si te for the new seaplane base was on the northeastern side of 
the island of AntiGua at Parham Sound, 19? miles southeast of 
Saint fhomas in the Virgin Islands. Since the sound had good 
holdinG ground for anchorage and could receive af'ew vessels of 
deep draft, it was converted in'to a seaplane base. 
The ~7indward Islands incLude Grenada, St. VincGnt, St. 
Lucia and Dominica. St. Lucia, with an area of' 233 square miles, 
is the second largest in the "vdndward group.134 Gros Islet Bay, 
at the northeast point of the island, offerod a good strategic w 
bore A seaplane base was built there which advanced the United 
States' chain of Guard ata tlons another 210 miles. not ther Parham 
Sound, Antigua, nor Gros Islet Bay, in St. Lucia, was large enougl 
for extensive development, but the strategy of the American de-
fense required onl:r patrol stations rather than operating bases 
at these intermediate points. 'Jlhe United ;States was also granted 
use of' a large land area for a heavy bomber patrol station in 
Vieux Fort, on the southern tip of St. Lucia. 135 
Trinldad, the rd . .::hest island of the Brl tish iiest Indies, 
13~> Anne R. Langley, "British ,lest Indian Interlude, fl 
National Geog~aphic Magazine, CLXXIX, January, 1941, ,1. 
134 Clenden Hayes Mason and Lavid A. Hepburn. "St. 
LUCia, '1\) Have and '1'0 Hold, It Christian Science Monitor, ";'I'eakly 
Magazine, December 28, 1940, 2. 
135 Elliot, ItU. S. Strategic Bases in the Atlantic," ~reign Poliel Reports, XVI, 262. 
""" 
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with its famoUs piGch lake at La Brea, is a det~chod portion of 
tts V,)nozuelan mainland. A major air and navlOtl baso was projected 
for the island, 231 miles south of St. Lucia. The September 
arrancemont callod for a base on tithe west coast of Trinidad in 
the crulf of Paria. It A veratjint3 about eighty mi les lone; Bnd forty 
miles wide, the Gulf is ablOst lanJlocked and contains a number 
of sheltered anchorages. 
IJ.'he southernmost defense outposts wero set up in Bri-
tish Guiana., on the northeastern coast of 00uth i~merica, :515 
miles beyond 'I'rinidad. A aeaplane base was maintained a.t the 
mouth of the Bssequebo River, while a base for land pianos was 
constructed on the bank of tho ~emerara River, twenty-rive miles 
south of' GeorGotown. Tho 13y·1. tish Guiana air base extondod the 
range of United States patrol planes southwest to the mouth of 
the Amazon River, within 1,000 miles of Natal. l36 
136 ~. 
CHAP'I'ER IV 
LEGAL OPINION 
A wide divergence of op'nion was expressed by the Uni~ 
::Jta tea C onGross towar~d the Des troyer-Base transact; lon. 'J'he c Ofl1-
ments, however, did not follow party lines, ror nu.:nero us Demo-
c~ts opposod the Deal, while some Republicans def9n~ed it. 
who criticized the arrancement generally took the position that 
would lead to war, that it was unconstitutional, a tragic rnistake 
and a surrender of America's first line of defense. On the other 
hand, proponents of the 1-eal considered the acquisi tion of the 
bases timely insurance a~~ainst pos:~lble enE3myattac1c. Others fel 
that the President should have gone further and acc1uired outriGht 
ownership of the bases insteud of ninety-nine y,)ar leases. 
Toward the mid·J.le of Augus t, 1940, when it w as revealed 
that President Roosevelt was negotiating with Great Britain in re 
gard to the acquisition of naval bases, Senator ~heeler, a Demo-
crat of Montana, indicated that he favored such an arrangement, 
althOUGh a t times he had been hiehly crt tical of the Administra-
tion's efforts to assist Great Britain. It was suggested at the 
time that tbe naval bases should be made available tb the United 
99 
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states in part payment of the British war debt. This could not b 
regarded as a belliGerent act, Senator 'i,'heeler fel t, since it 
\\'ould involve only the strenGthening of American defense. 1 About 
the same time, Senator Josh Lee, a Democrat of Oklahoma, was sure 
that the transfer could be effectGu without Congressi)nal approva 
He said that if the problem was banded over to the ~enate, that 
body would debate the question until Chrlstrnas. 2 Senator Alben W 
Barkley of Kentucky,with his characteristic loyalty to the 1\dm1n-
istration, vigorously maintained that if the President hal Jane 
one :;h1n2 durinG those troubled tL;,es which in his judGment the 
American people would overwhelminGly approve, 1 t was the proposal 
of the transfer under the terms wb.ich were part of the agreement. 
Barkley claimed that the President's course was Y1Se becauso the 
war misht be over before Consress should arr.t va at a. c onc lusion. 
When the Deal was announced to Congress, ~}ena tor Key 
Pittman of Nevada, Chairman of the Foretgn Relations Committee, 
to;)k the view that the transfer was entirely in accordance with 
the terms of interna tional law. He said, 
-
The sale of vesse is for gold would he ve been 
contrary to international law, but becau.~1e 601d is not 
.neces8ary r'or national defense the transfer as 
1 New York 'Times, AUGust 18, 1940, p. l:.~ 
-
2 Chica;;o Daily, T'ri bune, ,)eptember 5, 1940, p. 2:1. 
3 Congressional Record, 0enate, 76 Cone_ , 3 ~)ess ., 
Vol. [i6 pt. XI, 1940, 12387. 
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accompllahed fulfills all l'equirements of the united 
.:.itates. .,hile a neutral country may not u.id a ~)el­
ligerent, a neutral country may acquire anything for its 
defense and no matter how it benefits a belligerent, 
i tis law fu 1. 
Sana tor Pi ttman fel t that bases were immeasurably more valuable 
to the United States than destroyers. 4 
Many shades of oplnioh were re~lstered by Concressmen 
the 1ay the Deal was officially announced. 'The followil1i" are ,-, 
some of their favorable opinions. Representative ~ewis, a Domo-
erat of Colorado, admi tted he was v3ry :nuch pleased, and adv lsed, 
also, the purchase of islands in the Pacific for bases. Hepre-
sentative Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Com-
mittee, considered it a forward step in total American dofense. 5 
The majority leader of' the Houso, 1Hr. Hayburn of rfexas, thouCht 
it was a creat thlns, :or it g:1ve the lTnitod State:l bases in the 
Atlantic which were vitally essential to national :lefense. Rep-
resen ta ti ve ~)ol Bloom of Hew York, Chairman of the Foreign Af-
fairs Committee, and Representative Andrew J. May of Kentucky, 
Chairman of the M.ilitary Affairs Committee, aGreed. that the Uni-
ted States needed the bases far more than the destroyers. An-
other member of the ForeiGn Affairs Committee, >~r. Stearns~ a 
Republican of New l1ampshire, said that he believed there wa.s 
4 ~ York Times, September -1:, 1940, p. 17:6. 
5 l£1£., p. 16:1. 
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"Bood legal 'opinion that it was not a violation of the Neutral-
ity Act.,,6 The following Democrats expressed favorable opinions 
Representative Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois, Chairman of the 
Fiules Com:ni ttee, characterized it as a II sp l endid deal." Fred 
ClLrnmines of Colorado said he would not have favored the transfer 
thirty days before, but in September it looked as though Bngland 
:niGht hold out. 7 Representative .Lex Green of Florida advlsed, 
"I think we ought to negotia te to take over the 'j'Jestern Hemi-
sphere possessions of those nations which are in debt to us." 
Represents ti ve F'rank Whelchel of Georgia admitted that he was 
opposed to disposing of essential war equipmont, yet he tempered 
hin attitude since he felt that the United ~tates neoded air 
bases. Hepresentatives Joseph B. Bates of Kentucky and ',.illium 
H. Larrabee of Indiana considered ita fair deal. 'l'hey were in 
favor of givinG .c,;neland anything she wanted except !!our YO\j!lg 
men. uS Representatlve Edward 'iv. Creal of Kentucky said that al-
thOUGh he did not know who was respons 1ble for the Leal, Itwhoeve 
did i t,:lid a blamed, good job. II Luther Patrick of Alabama main 
tained that Congress shouLl at least have given the President 
credit for obtaining the opinion of tho Attorney General and the 
6 Ibid., p. 16:2. 
-
7 Chicago Daily Tribune, :"'eptember 4, 1940, p. 6:2. 
8 l£!£., p. 6:3. 
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legal department of the l~a.vy before he acted. 9 Senator Joseph P 
Guffey of Pennsylvania predicted that the public would Give thei 
"full approval," but there would be considerable criticism from 
the isolationists. Senator Tbm Connolly of Texas gava his ap-
proval, provided the certification by Admiral Stark was sound. 
Senators Harry Schwartz of ~yoming, Sherman Minton of Indiana, 
and .c:lbert 'l'homas of Utah considered tha t bases were needed for 
American defense. "I think he did a good job," said Senator 
Henry F. Ashurst of Arizona. "Leaders of nations cannot be 
stopped by obscure cobwebs when a matter of defending the people 
is invollved. II 
Among the most articulate opponents to the Destroyer-
Base Deal was ,senator David I. Walsh of T:assachusetts, Chaiman 
of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, and considGred by some 
at that time the foremost expert on the .senate floor on the Amer 
lean Navy. During a speech given toward the end of August over 
the American Forum of the Air, the Senator admitted that there 
was a strong emotional appeal in the proposal that the United 
States help Bngland in her present extremity by putting about 
fifty destroyers at her disposal. 10 Those who advocated this 
step, he continued, sought to justify it on the ground that in 
9 con~ressional Record, 76 Cong., 3 Jess., Vol. 86, 
Pt. A, 1940,' 11 14. 
10 ConE>ressional Record, Appendix, Senate, 76 Cong., 
3 3ess., Vol. 86, Pt. XVII, 1940, 5225. 
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assisting the British Navy, America would be really helping her-
self, and that i1" Bri tish sea power was maintained wi th American 
aid, the danger 0 r attack upon the Uni ted ~tates from overseas 
would be averted. Even if Britain should be defeated and her 
navy destroyed, if American ships served to postpone the catas-
trophe, thereby giving America'more time to prepare American de-
fense, then the loss of these ships would not be in vain. 
Such a proposal, the Senator maintained, did credit to 
the hearts of its sponsors, but not to their heads. Viewed from 
the standpointof American security and avoidance of war, the 
suggested disposal was not the best, but the worst thing for the 
United States to do. Any realistic examination of the facts and 
appraisal of the consequences must ~ad to this conclusion. Sen 
ator Walsh did not underestimate the importance to the United 
States of British soapower, but he JIJ not favor Goine to war 
with Germany on that account, nor did he favor a piecemeal dis-
posal of tbe American l~avy.ll He insisted that the United State 
had no surplus in the des troyer class. 'l'be 300 or more Ameri-
can overage and once decommissioned destroyers had been put back 
into service as fast mine layers, aircraft tenders and anti-air-
cra.t't vessels. Many of the so-called obsolete destroyers were 
performing invaluable service on neutrality patrol.' Therefore, 
all American destroyers were needed for defense. 
11 Ibid. 
-
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The Clll.air~:~an of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee felt 
transaction made a mockery of America's declared policy 
of neutral! ty and nonintervention. laoreover lit was an act of 
belll,-~ereacy. "It is not a measure short of war. I t is an act 
of war .. II he said. But if the Unl ted States accepted tl:.o prom.ise 
that by aiding tho British fleet slle was savini.:: herself, then t;:e 
entire American fleet Silould be sent to hn[;land to insilre victory. 
There was no middle course .. he asserted .. no halfway point. But 
the Civing; of the destroyers was no assurance that a British 'Vic .. 
tory would lJO insured. I t might only tilt the scale s in Sri taln'f 
favor. 
Senator Walsh pointed out that the United States fleet 
was the only force in the world that could prevent aircraft from 
beyond the sea from bombinc America's large cities, industrial 
areas and c1 villan population. He quoted.. vorbatim.. t ... e report 
submi tted to the Senate in May by the Haval Affairs Co:n.mi ttee in 
12 
conrlection wIth the Naval Expansion Bill. 
-
-. 
o Our naval and air fore as should be presex'ved 
for our own def'ense, if and when needed. We are not 
pl'epared to participate in the European war •••• The as-
su.mption~:tat British sea power may be destroyed h'1-
plies tilat we should take our stand in the Western Hem-
isphere. It iwplies that our Navy should be retained 
intact to prevent ship-borne aircraft frol': dlrectlnc 
attacl{s a~:;ainst our cities and industrial areas and pre .. 
vent an enemy from establishlnC naval .. air or sub bases 
in this hemisphere which wOclltl threaten Oi..l-I' seci.lrity by 
attacking in any ;r,anner our -~ital sea cO:ilL'1uuications or' 
12 Ibid., 522G. 
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our lnmeland. 
Although. he recoGnized hncland's critical situation, at the game 
tlme he considered America's foars more critical. SUcll knowledJl 
be claimed, should serve to reinforce and underscore ou.r deter-
ation to keep out of war and keep all America's fleet for home 
defense. 
On August 25, the proposed Destroyer-Base Deal was de-
bated over the American Forum of the Air by Senator Claude Pepper. 
a Jemocrat of Florida; two Republican Senators, Gerald P.Nye of 
North Dakota and John A. Danaher of Connecticut, and Colonel Ii;) 
Brecldnridge, forrXl.er Assistant Secretary of V'ar. Senator Pepper 
favored the transaction. He said that Americans should rise \.lp 
as a united people and make their country's independence and the 
great inheritance of constltutional liaerty secure. 
those men misguided who argued that the United states was endang 
erlnL its safety by abandoning vessels necessary to America 
13 
built solely to keep enemies from Ar.:ierican shores. 
stroyers ·yo,ere given to England, they would serve to maintain her 
naval su.premacy. He pointed out that the Un1 ted ~)tates had not 
had to defend its M.onroe Doctrine for over a hWldred years beca 
no enemy had been able to get through the British Navy to the 
'\~ie8tern Her:.isphere. rlloreover, the American continent could not 
13 Ibid., 5659. 
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defended by one navy of less than colossal proportions, since 
there were 43,000 miles of coastline ar ound the Western Hemisph 
from Iceland by Cape Horn to Alaska. 14 
Senator John A. Danaher of Connecticut agreed that Amer 
tea should send the destroyers if the country wished to engage in 
He affirmed that it would 'be an act of war for the United 
states to supply war vessels to another nation at war. England 
kneW this, and that is why she desired a political commitment rr 
the United States, not the old destroyers. He pOinted out that 
the gi ving of the destroyers to England would be unlawful since 
was :forbidden by the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 and the Na-
tional Defense Act of June 28, 1940. It would also" he said, be 
a breach of international law, contrary to the ruling of the 
Thirteenth Hague Convention, Artiole 6, Moreover, t fa United 
States had uniformly condemned those nations which had broken 
their treaties, and American foreign policy should demand a large 
view of world affairs than would be found in the advocation of a 
breach of our treaties and conventions. "In our own national in-
terest, It he concluded, "the United States of America must regard 
prinCiple even if she is the only nation in the world doing so. III 
Colonel Henry Breckinridge asserted that for a hundred 
years the people of the Western Hemisphere had built'their policy 
-
14 Ibid. 
-
15 Ibid., 5659-5660. 
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and their armament m the faot that the Atlantic was controlled b 
the Brt tish fleet. He cons idered the war in Europe a brutal con-
test of annihilation. Hitler and Mussolini were on the march to 
destroy free civilization. If America, confused by a babel of 
tongues, divided by fallacy and sophistry, eailed to act, it wouls: 
court and suffer oalamity.16 
Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota characterized the 
transfer of the destroyers as an act of war. He claimed that all 
the discussion a bout the danger to the British Navy was a campaig 
of fear to push the United States into the conflict. The fifty 
destro yers would not save Britain. 'Ilhere was no "rhyme or reason 
to a program that makes available to Germany our own ships to use 
17 
agal net us when she takes over the British fleet. n 
Another debate on the same topic was broadcast Septembe 
1, 1940. Senator Edwin C. Johnson, a Democrat of Colorado, said 
that the proposal was neither legal, logical nor safe. It was noi 
good military strategy; it would constutite an act of war. rjocto~ 
Frederick J. Libby, founder and head of the National Council for 
the Prevention of 'iiar, agreed wi th the Senator. He declared that 
the United ~tates should give all material aid to Great Britain 
conals tent wi th law and not incons istent with the interes ts of 
American defense. But by America t s own principles and those on 
-
16 Ibid., 5660. 
-
17 Ibid. 
-
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ftthlch t ,.Ls "tcountry won the Alabarna clair;ls, it was forbidden to 
", 18 
IIlake tie transfer. On the sa:r\e proLram, J::;di.~ar Ansel l:;aurer, 
notod nowspaper correspondent, insisted tllat if Britain were de-
feated, nothincwould re;aain to prevent Hitler from striking at 
19 
the ;;~estern He!:1isphere. 
AlthouGh the Senate ,was not in session when tile 1)eal 
was announced, noninterventionist Senators denounced the Presi-
dent's action as an overt act of war. They declared that t:.18 De 
stroyer Deal was by far the longest step taken by the Roosevelt 
Administration toward full belligerent participation in Great 
20 
Britain's war with C7ermany. Th.ey predicted that the co.mtry 
would hear froIl the Senate, and especially from the Naval Af-
fairs Cor:ilni ttee headed by Senator David 1. Walsh, who would in-
vestiLate the President I s action. 
These Democrats opposed the Deal. Senator Homor T. 
Bone of V!ashlngton considered jt a traGic raistake to deprive the 
United States of some of its most valuable ships. Senator Carl 
Batch of New M.exico, declared that if Congress had a,t)pr'.ived the 
Deal, such approval would have been tanta~mount to a declaration 
of war. Senator ~e';orth Clark of Idaho insisted that it was one 
more step on tile road to war. The Act was a violation of Ameri 
18 ~., 5664-5665. 
19 Ibid., 5664. 
20 Chicago Dailil Tribt.lne, September 4, 1940, p.l:8. 
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treaties and'statutes. 
The following Republicans pl"esented unfavorable opin-
ions. Hepresentative Jacob Thorkelson of Montana forcibly as-
serted that it was the most atrocious and tU1constitutional aot al 
president could have committed under the Constitution. 21 Repre-
sentatives Charles Hawks of 1fiisoonsin and Oscar Yaurgdahl re-
garded the act as a serious usurpation of contressional power and 
one of the most serious threats to Amerioan democracy. Represen-
ta~lve Carl Curtiss of Nebraska demanded that the President re-
veal all the res t of the secret war oomml tments he had made. 
Representative Hamilton Fish of New York declared that the aot of 
the President usurped the power of Congress. It violated the 1 
of the United States, international law, and was virtually an act 
of war.22 Howover, Fish did not believe that Germany would con-
sider it such, simply because it did not suit her present conven 
enee. Regardless of whether the Presidentts act was humanitarian 
or in the interest of the United States, it was an open defiance 
of the Constitution which gave Congress the sole right to declare 
war. Moreover, the United States had always preached that 
treaties are sacred covenants to be fai thfully kept. "It is high 
time we practice what we preach, fI and the Congressman continued 
-
21 !E!£., p. 6:2. 
22 Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 1940, 
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bestedly, 
No man is better than his word. 'I'he same is 
tr '..(e 01.' any nation. 'l'his Government has violated ••• inter-
national prudence and e very rule of fair playas it ap-
plies to all nations; it has violated positive statutory 
laws passed by this Congross.23 
Representative Michener asked how the I'roaident could certify, 
a8 he did, that the destroyers 'wc;re obsolete and of no value to 
the navy, since these same des troyers we re reconditioned and put 
into serVice, and had been plying the seas on patrol duty as part 
ot national de1.'ense. Representative Clare E. Hoffman inquired 
it the Deal was another of President Roosevelt' a recklessly made, 
quiokly violated promises, since only a short time before he had 
promised to keep the United States out of war. Representative 
Jesse C. Walcott of Michigan declared that he c,ould not reconcile 
Attorney C'16neral Jackson t s oplnion with the prinoiples of dem-
ocracy as he understood them. If the Attorney General t s opinion 
was oar~ied to its logical conclusion, the President could be 
authori zed to sell the whole navy. Following thIs same reasoning 
Represedtative John Robsion of Kentucky pointed out that i1.' the 
President could dispose of fifty destroyers, he could dispose of 
the entire American Navy. "Congress has been a rubber stamp so 
him, that he now ignores the Congress, the representa. 
the American pecple, altogether," concluded Robsion. 
L. Sweeney, a Democrat of Ohio, said he wanted to tell the 
23 Ibid., 11364. 
-
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of America that if they knew what was going on behind the 
,oenes in Washington, their capital, "they would 3 tart a rovolu-
not to oV611throw, but to preserve dernocracy.1t24 Representa-
Harness of Indiana launched an attack on Roosevelt because 
be considered the President's action contrary to Section 120 of 
National Defense Act of Jun~ 28, 1940. 'l'his law, based upon 
experiences of World War I, was deSigned to provide ample g 
that American manufacturing facilities should be directed 
2t': purpose of national defense. D Just twenty-four hours ba-
fore, the Congressman asserted, the United States hl1 d witnessed 
the most spectacular example in a whole line of startling, prece-
dent shattering proofs that the President was dete rrnined to drag 
into the quarrels of Europe. l1'he Congressman asserted 
was futile to argue; the President was guilty of direct 
violation of law, a violation of a statute which bore his own sig 
There could be no doubt on the part of the Administratio 
the intention of Congress had been when it enacted the law 0 
28, 1940, But the Attorney General had tortured the meaning 
or that Act and throtlgh legal sophistry and subterfuge had issued 
specific directions to the Chief of Naval Operations to give per-
for the release of the Arne rican des troyers. Represents. tiv 
24 Ibid., 11414. 
-
25 Ibid. 
-
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concluded: 
If you should ask how this course culminated in 
the outright trade of these des troyers, you ,would get no 
better answer than that international law is a thing of 
the pas t •••• Since the rules of decency have- been dis-
carded by dictator nations, we should divest ourselves 
of stuffy moral and ethical principles by which we have 
always operated as a dignified nation. 26 
'l'he tremendous cost o'f maintaining the bases was dis-
cussed by Representative 1'horkelson. He questioned the wisdom 
the United Stat.es constructing bases on foreign territory when 
country's national debt was already $65,000,000,000. 27 He 
foolhardy venture to borrow money at the expense of 
American taxpayers in order to fortify English co10ni88. He 
tained that the President did not have the power to acquire the 
aites on sole executive authority. Even as Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army and Navy, the President was only an officer; all mili ta 
bodies were under the absolute control of Congress in peace time 
war. Therefore, Congress alone was responsible to tro 
national security and public welfare. It was treason-
able for the President to hand over a part of the United States 
Navy. IUs act of September 3 wea.kened the United States t first 
of defense, and could only be considored an enemy act. It 
26 ~., 11429. 
27 ~., 11477. 
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sufficient cause for his dismissal from office. 28 Senator 
Alva. 5. Adams, a Democrat of Colorado, declared that the Attorne 
General's m~morandum was an "attenuated argument" rather than a 
lega.l opinion. Othor Senators insis ted that it was utterly im-
possible to reconcile Jackson's opinion that it would be unlawf 
the Espionage Ac t of 191'1, to releass the liavy t s mosquito 
to a belligerent country, but parfec tlj' lawful to release 
one-fourth of the Navy's des troyers or one-seventh of its 350 c 
bat ships.29 In the House, on September 9 the Republivan, Earl 
said that he disagreed with the opinion of the At 
torney General that the President had final authority under the 
law for such an exchan£e. There was no authority of law I Lewis 
claimed, for the sale of any ship of the United States Navy the 
name of which was on the Navy Hegister at the time of such sale. 
Furthermore I all of tho S o-oalle d overage des troyer's we re regis-
ships of the Navy. Referring to the law, he 
ahowed that the only authority for tho sale or disposal of ships 
of the United Sta.tes Navy was that conferred by tho Uni ted States 
Code. It limited such sale or disposal to ships whose names had 
been stricken from the Navy Register of active coml'j,issioned 
28 Ibid., 11478. 
-
29 Chicar;o Daily: Tribune, Septemb~r 5, 1940, p. 1:8. 
30 Congressional Record, House, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 
1940, 11827. 
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thermore, Section 491 directed the Secretary of the Navy to 
all naval vessels to be examined as often us once in three 
by a competent board of officers who should I'eport what 
vessels were unfit for continued service. 'l'herefore, he argued, 
onlY those ships whose names had been removed from the l~avy Reg-
iSter could be sold, and the power of the president conferred by 
statute rolated only to the price and the manner of sale. 
statute did not, either by express terms or by implication, 
give the president the right to extend the category of sblps to 
beyond those whose names were stricken from the Navy Reg-
Therefore, the Congressman continued, there was no legal 
for the Attorney General's statement that he found nothing 
that would indioate that Congress had tried to limit the Presi-
dent t s plenary powers to vessels already stricken from the Navy 
Register. In this conneotion, Representatl¥,e Lewis considered 
the Attorney General's inter-pretation of the "pleDary powers" of 
the president dangerous to democratic idealism. It contained 
an indirect intimation that under such powers the President had 
the right, in the name of public interest, to transfer the ships 
without respect to any statutory limitations.31 
On September 24, Representative Eugene Cox, a Democrat 
of Georgia, presented a lengthy discussion in defense of the Pre 
1dent's agreement accomplished without Congressional action. At 
-
31 .!2!,g. 
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the outset, he summarized the unfavorable accusations hurled at 
32 president Roosevelt. He then presented a. resolution for the 
ratification of the President's arrangement with Great Britain, 
and in its support, submitted the provision of the l)onstitution 
.ith respect to the treaty making power. This provision, Section 
2, Article 2 reads, the President "shall have power by and with 
the advice a nd consent of the Sena te to make tree. ties, provided 
two-thirds of the Senators present concur." The speaker explaine 
that the framer's of the Constitution had recognized the importanc ~ 
of conferring upon the president large powers in the conduct of 
Mncrican relations with foreign states. Moreover, they had re-
cognized that no other department of the government could proceed 
so effectively in negotiations with foreign states. John Jay, on. 
of the framers of the Constitution, had expressed that sentiment 
when he wrote, "perfec t secrecy and immediate dispatch are some-
times requisite." 
Representative Cox pointed out that since the American 
constitutional proviSions relating to the treaty making power weI' 
so meager, the government was compelled to have recourse to the 
pl"eeedents es tablished in the conduct of American foreign rela-
tions. lNhatever meaning might be attached to the terms ftadvice" 
and consent," precedent had es tablished the principl'e that in the 
negotIations of treaties, the President was not required to 
-
32 Ibid., 12570. 
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nBult the Senate. Moreover, tho extent to which the Senate cO 
JI11ght advise and consent had never been defined. Nor was there 
an'! aX~)I'ess constitutional limitations upon the President in the 
t~aty making power, even though approval by the Senate was 
necessary. Cox concluded that the Jenate had no right to demand 
that the President 
unfold to the world or to it, even in executive 
session, his instructions, on the prospect or progress 
of the negotiations ••• under the Constitution the ab-
solute power of negotiation is in the president and the 
means of negotiation subject wholly to his will, his 
Judgment. lbe president ia ••• supreme under the Con-
stitution in the matter of treaties.33 
In addition to Congressional opinion, eminent lawyers 
and professors of international law expressod their legal inter-
pretation of the Dostroyer-Naval Base Deal. On Sunday, August 11 
1940, the ~ York 'I'imes printed a legal statement submitted by 
four eminent lawyers who favored tho release of tho fifty destroy 
era to Great Britain. These Jurists, Charles C. Burlinghar.l, 
Thomas D. Thacker, George Rubles and Dean Acheson considered that 
the policy of the United States to aid nations reSisting age::res-
s10n was not based on sentiment alone, but was rooted in the real 
material interests of the United States.34 On the premise that 
-
33 Ibid., 12570-12572. Mention has not been made of 
all the Senators-ind Representatives who gave their opinion of the 
~stpoyer -Base Deal because their intorpretations wure similar 
to those already recorded. 
34 Congressional Record, Appendix, 76 Cong., 3 Seas., 
1940, 4923-4925. 
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sGa power was of inestimable value to the United States 
1n terms of national defense, the four lawyers d~clared that it 
,as of vital importance that the destroyers be released to Great 
Britain. By such aSSistance, Great Britain would be able to re-
sist German aggression and American danger from Germany would be 
enormously reduced. They did not Sll[;,::;ost Executive action with-
out Congressional approval if it were clear that a majority of 
Congress WHS opposed to such a procedure. But since the pI'epond 
erating opinion, both in and out of Congress, favored such actio 
thoy felt that pI'eceious time would be lost securing authority 
, 
'hich already existed. 
I-t will be recalled that during the Ba ttla of France 
tho Navy Department had transferred certain planes to the nar De-
under the authority of an Act of July 11, 1919.35 The 
secretary of War, in turn, had released these planes to private 
manufacturers, who at once sold them to the Allies. 36 The law-
yers considered that the authority of the Secretary of War to m 
iriter-departmental- exchanges of war goods had. been further broad-
ened by an ac t of June 2, 1940, so as to include every type of 
35 eh 9, 41 Stat 132, U. D. e., title la, sec 1274. 
36 The provisions of the Act of July 9, 1918 (ch 132, 
40 Stat 849, U. s. C., title 10, seo 1272) provided that oertain 
types of motor-propelled vehicles could be exchanged in part pay-
ment for new equ:i.pment to be used for the same . urposes as those 
proposed to be exchanged. 
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~ 37 
will tary and naval equipr;.ent. However, as a safeguard against 
such equ.iprr~ent leaving the country wi thout Good reason, they 'held 
that th.e National Defense Act of June 28, 1940, [;ave t;le technical 
heads of the Army and Navy veto power over the reloase of ships, 
38 
equiprrlont, or supplies deemed essential to American safety. 
They pointed out that when eff~rts were made to place further r'e-
strictions on the executi \,0 au. thor! ty in the Naval Act of July 
19, 1940, Congress had deliberately refrained from boing ft.lrther 
than providinG thut tl no vessel, ship or boat not 1n the United 
states Navt or' beinG built or hereafter built therefor, shall be 
disposed of by sale or otherwise or be chartered or scrapped ox-
39 
cept as now provided by law." Therefore, since Congress pro-
vided for tho free interohanGe of s;J,pplics and equip::~ellt between 
the l\rr;;.y and Navy, there was no reason to suppose that Congress 
intended stricter rules to be applied to tb,e release of naval 
supplies and equlp~nent. To these Jurists it se8lliod true, in view 
of the accepted leca11 ty of the naval plane exc;lanee and release, 
that ConGress chose to increase mther than diminish the authori t~ 
of the Secretary of War to enter into contracts for tlw exchange 
of obsolescent for new equipUH3nt, and conditioned the exercise 
37 H. R. 9850, Public, No. 703. 
38 H. H. 9822, :fublic No. 671 Sec 14 (a). Refer to 
Chapter III, 'I)and Chapter IV,131. 
39 H. R. 10100 Public No. 757. 
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tor such authority solely upon the certification of the appropri-
ate staff officer. They declared that the appropriate staff of-
both armed serviced WeN) correct in the opinion that 
American national defense would be served rather than be hurt by 
release of overage destroyers to the British. 
Furthermore, it was their judgment that the statutory 
provisions of Section 3, Title 5 of the Espionage Act of June 
15, 1917, did not block the release of the destroyers as some had 
claimed, since they were not built or completed on the order of a 
belligerent. 40 Nor did Section 23, Title 18 of the same Act 
limit the release, since the sh1.ps were neither built nor equlppe 
enter the service of a belligerent power. This seotion reads 
follows: 
Whoever within the territory or jurisdiction 
of the United States, fits out and arms or attempts to 
f1 t out and arm or procures to be fitted out and armed, 
or knowingly 1s concerned in the furnishing, fitting 
out, or arming of any vessel with intent that such 
vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign 
prince or state or of any colony, district or people to 
cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, 
ci tizens or property of any foreign prince or state, or 
any colony, district or people with whom the United 
S ta tes is at poace, 01~ whoeve r iss ues, or de li ve rs a 
commission within the territory or jurisdiction of tl~ 
United States for any vessel, to the intent that she 
may be so employed, shall be fined not more than 
'li'lO,OOO or imprisoned not more than three years •••• 41 
40 Refer to Appendix IV,198. 
41 Congressional Record, Appondix, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 
4924. 
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In the Santissima Trinidad Case, the United States Supreme Court 
bad held that this statute did not apply to the commercial sale oj 
an armed vessel to a belligerent when there was no evidence that 
it was originall,- outfitted contrary to law. 42 
It was also the opinion of the four lawyers tra t Sec-
tion 3, Title 5 of the Espionage Act of 1917 was inapplicable 
to armed vessels like the old destroyers since they were not 
b~lt, armed or equipped as, or converted into vessels of war 
with the intention that they should enter the service of a belli .. 
gerent. 43 That section should, they said, be read in oonjunotion 
with the seotion whioh preoeded it, and in the light of the rules 
of international law whioh both theAttorney General at thut time, 
T. W. Gregory, and the sixty-fifth Congress stated the statute 
taS aimed to fulfill. Moreover, Seotion 2, Ti tIe 6 of this E'xpion 
age Act44 recognized the right of Americans and foreign oi tizens 
to take armed vessels out of the jurisdiction of the United 
States for sale to belligerents, proviJed tha.t assurance was 
given when the clearance was applied for and that the sale and de. 
livery would not take place within the jurisdiction of the United 
-
42 7 ~Vhea t 283. 
43 U, S. C. title lu, sec 33. 
44 eh 30, 50 Stat 221, U. S. C., title 18, sec 32. 
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states or on the high seas. 45 Sec tion 3 of the same Ac t enforced 
the obligation under international law of a neutral state's using 
due diligence to prevent the bui lding or arming of vesse 1s of war 
to the order of or for dallvel"Y to a belligerent. It was the 
l~yerst opinion that the correct construction of this section 
provided that the vessels built,· ti.rmed or equipped as vessels of 
war, with the intention or under any agreement to deliver them to 
belligerents or with reasonable cause to believe that they would 
be so delivered, could not be sent out of the jurisdiction of the 
United States. It did not mean that no vessel of war could thus 
be sent out wi th a like intention or under such agreement for the 
following two reasons. 
In the first place, so the jurists held, any other coo-
elus ion nullified that portion of the preceding sec tion of the 
Act which limited the President t s authorl ty to detain armed ves-
ales owned by American or foreign citizens applying for clearance 
until such time as he was assured that they would not be used by 
such owners for hostile purposes, and that they would not be sold 
or delivered to a bellil;;erent while within 
Un! ted States or on the hieh seas. '1.'he Pres ident had no authorit 
under the statue provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1939 to de-
tain vessels ir assured that their sale and delivery' to a 
45 Coosressional Record, Appendix, 76 Cone., 3 Sess., 
1910, 4924. 
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belligerent were to take place in a belligerent or neutral portiS 
In the second place, the language invoked in the Es-
Act of 19l~ had been drafted by Attorney General T. W. 
Gregory, who indicated in his annual report of 19lG that the 
seo tion was drafted in accordance with the rules of international 
set forth in the Treaty of INashington. '.I.'his section re-
that a neutral country shoul\l use due diliGence to prevent 
the fitting out, arming or equipping within its jurisdiction of 
any vessel which it had reasonable grounds to believe was in-
tended to carryon war agains t a power with which it wa.s at 
According to the lawyers, neither the Attorney General 
sixty-fifth Jongress had indicated in any way that the 
was intended to GO beyond fulfillment of the rule of in-
ternatIonal la.w. To interpret Section 3 of the Espionage Act, as 
forb1.dding a sale of war vessels to belligerents would impose re-
strictions upon the citizons of neutral states not required by 
ternational 1aw.48 The four lawyers believed that since the de-
stroyers wore not built, armed, or equipped on the order of any 
bellicerent, they could be released to private constractor wlth-
out any legal barrier preventing it. 
-
Finally, they deolared that when the na.tional defense, 
46 ~., 4924-4925. 
47 Ibid., 4925. 
-
48 Ibid. 
-
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t110 vital interest of the United States, was at stake, the Gov-
hesitate to use its powers under existing law. 
ere was no reason to put a strained interpr'otation on such 
tatutes to the detriment of the United States, nor extend them 
the limits generally accepted by other nations",49 
On August 20, Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts pre-
the opinion of Herbert Briggs, Professor of International 
aw, Cornell University, in r~gard to the interpretation by the 
orementi'oned lawyers of the legality of the release of the 
Professor Briggs declared, so the Senator reported, 
hat they suppressed pertinent information of Section 14 of the 
ct of June 2d, 1940, Briggs eXllained that the actual purpose 0 
his section and of Sec tion 7 of the Ac t of July 19, 1940, was no 
o facilitate the transfer of ships from the United states Navy 
foreign nation, but to prevent the President from takint; such 
After it had become known that the President was !pla.n-
ing to release torpedo boats to Britain through privu to hand,.J, on 
he assertion that the vessels were S \lrplus, Conuress had decided 
o establish a prerequisite for any such action. This provided 
hat the technical heads of the Army and Navy might have the op-
vetoing such transfer, and thus prevent the President 
49 Ibid. 
-
0560. 
50 Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 3 Sess~, 1940, 
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frOW. arbitrarily orderin~ his 3uborbinates to approv~ the release 
of \'eSS(~ Is considered "not esse~t.ial to the o.efense of the Uni ted 
II 
states. 
The professor pointed out that Section 14 (c) of t!.:.e Ac i 
of June 28, which was omitted in the opinion written by the four 
laWyers, provided that nothtnc therein should be construed to 1'0-
peal or change Sections 3 and 6, Title 5 of' the Act of June 15, 
1917. The nub of the leGal issue was Sectlon 3 of tho Act of 
1917, Wh.:lCh made it unlawful, during a war in whi(~h the Uni ted 
states was neutral, .:'01' a.ny vessel to be sent ou.t ::>.f the juris-
diction of tho United States built, armed, or equipped as a vea-
sel of' war. f1'he jurists had interpreted Sectlon :3 of the Act of 
1917 as forbidding nothing more than the sendinG out from the 
jurisdiction of the Uniteu States a vessel built upon the order 
of a belligerent~r its use. This conclusion could only be reach 
ad by improperly readin3 Section 2 Into Section 3. Section 2 
provided that armed vessels "manifestly built for warlike pur ... 
poses against any state with which the United states was at 
51 
peace. 
Section 3, on the other hand, provided that when the 
United States was neutral, tlit shall be unlawful to send out of 
the jurisdiction of' the United States any vessel b'a.ilt, armed or 
equipped as a vessel of war. ft Herbert Brigcs claimed that this 
51 Ibid. 
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olosed any possible gap in Section 2. Moreover, Section 3 was 
based on the firs t rule of the '.L'ree. ty of Washington, which pro-
vided two things. First, tha.t due diligence be used to prevent 
the fi tting out of vessels for bellicerent use. And second, tha 
a nation "use like diligenco to pr'event the departure from its 
jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carryon war. n 
arir;gs cla.imed that the la.wyers' interpretation was a sort of de 
ception since it 'omitted the above vital clause. 
Fi~lly, Professor Briggs concluded that the jurists ha 
failed to mention Article 6 of the Thirteenth Hague Coveution of 
1907, to the effeot that If the supply 1n any manner directly or i .. 
directly by a neutral power to a belligerent of warahips, ammuni 
tion or war material of any kind whatever is forbidden." There-
fore, even were the United 3tates Statutes referring to such as-
sistance repealed, the destroyers could not be legally tl'ans-
farred to Britain. it would be a vIolation of international law. 
Professor Quincy Wright, of Chicago University, observe 
that it was doubtful whether or not the Attorney General t s con-
struction of the Act of June, 1917 was correct. 52 But the Act 
was irrelevant to the ,;a8e, since the destroyers were sent out 0 
-------
52 The legal opinion of Attorney General Jackson 
Destr'oyer-B&S6 Deal is found in Appendix IV,19l-200. 
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United States by the Government itself. 53 The Act of 1917 tbe 
,as a criminal statute, presumably dealing with acts of indivi-
duals, not with those of the Government. Regardless of the gen-
eral terms used in Section 3, he reasoned, it could not have bee 
intended as a check upon the freedom of the President f s disposi-
tion of vessels of the navy. l'tloreover, the Act was applicable 
only during a war in whioh the United States was a neutral na-
tlon. 
Mr. Wright questioned whether the United States still 
enjoyed the status of a neutral 1 n relation to the European hos-
tilities. However, since presidential proclamation had inyoked 
the general neutrality legislation of the United States 
tar of municipal 1&.,54 privHte persons should have been guided 
by that legislation. But the destroyer transfer was not 
action by private persons; therefore, the Act of 1917 was not 
p1icable, and the President had the authority to effect the 
transfer under the law of the United States. 
Concerning international law and the status of the Uni-
ted States in its relation to .European countries, he explained 
that if the Unitod States had truly been a neutral, the Lestroy 
53 Qui ncy Wright, It'The Transfer of the testroyers to 
Great Britain, fl ,{merican Journal .2! International ~, ltew York, 
XXXIV, Octobor, i940, 684. 
54 Among lawyers, municipal law pertains to internal 
governmental affairs of a state, kingdom or nation. 
I 
,! 
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Base :J&al "oLtld have been difficult to justify. But the United 
states, he insisted, was not a neutral. It had, rather, the sta 
tllS of a ftsupporting state," that is, one which assisted a daren 
ing state without armod force. 55 A supporting state acquired 
right to discriminate against the aggressor, but it could not 
cor.mll t any act to the d.etriment of states other than the aggres-
sor unless s \1.ch ac t \vould be ]a wful if done by a defanding or co 
"fending state. Against an aggressor, a supporting state had 
rights which, if it were neutral, it would have against a bel-
ligerent. He declared that such a conditi on was recognized by 
the International Law Association in the Budapest Articles of In 
terpreta tion which, referring to the Pact of' i-aris, declared: 
In the event of a viola tioll r£ the Pao t by a 
resort to armed force or war by one signatory state 
against another, the other states may without thereby 
committing a breach of the Pact or of any rule of inter-
national law do all or any of the following thing" 
••• W]ecline to observe toward the state violating the 
Pact the duties prescribed by international law, apart 
from the Pact, for a neutral in relation to a bel-
ligerent. Supply the state attacked, with financial or 
material assistance including munitions of war. 56 
These articles wer'e accepted by the British Government and by Sec 
retary of State Henry L. Stimson as the proper construct Lon of' 
the Pact in 1932. 
Such an interpretation, Professor Wright continued, 
. 
55 Wright" "The Transfer of the Destroyers to Great 
Bri tain, U Amorican :tourna1 of International Law, X .xIV, 685. 
- -
56 Ibid., 685-686. 
-
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IDOant that when a state haJ initiated hostilities in violation of 
its obligations, other a tatea were under no obligation to observe 
toward that hostile state the duties of neutrals. 'l'hls interpre-
tation had been accepted by the United States and other countries 
when Japan invaded \Jhina, and when H.usaia marched into ''[?'lnland. 
Fruthermore, it had boen accep'bed by the members of the L~jague of 
Nations when Italy invaded Ethio[>:'.t... 57 Germany and Italy had ac-
cepted the Pact of Paris, as did all the other countries they in-
vaded. While the United States had proclaimed neutrality on these 
occasions, t.his fact had not pl~evented the Govornment from aubse-
quently recognizing the situation as one of aggression. A.nd al-
though the Prosident had not withdrawn the Proclamation of Neu-
trali ty of September ;), 1939, nevertheless, pres idential proc la-
mations we're measures of municipal law. II'ha invocation and applJr 
cat:i.on of them was not conclusive to the status of the United 
states under international law. lberefore, Quincy Wrieht oon-
cluded, the Untted Stutes had a cumplete answer to any challenge 
to the propriety of the £ostroyer-Base trade under international 
law. Since Germany had initiated hos tili tIes in violation of its 
international obligations under the Paot of Pbr is, she was not a 
lawful belligerent, and parties to the Pact were not obli~ed 
under international law to observe toward Garmany and her Allies 
-
57 Ibid., 687. 
-
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the ulltles of a neutral. 
After the Destroyer-Dase Deal was announced, Herbert 
arii;gs attacked the opinion of the Attorney General. To l'rofes-
sor Bric(:;s, certain legal aspects of tho transfer of naval ves-
sels from a neutral to a bellieerent had received inadequate at-
tention from Jackson. Attorney General JaCKson had written that 
section 14 (a) of the Act of June 28, 1940, recognized the aut1 
ity of the Government to make transfers, and SOUGht only to im-
pose certain restrictions to such transfers. Briggs presented 
leCal observations based on the history of the National Defense 
Act of June 1, 1940, which were contrary to the interpretation 
59 
given by the Attol'ney General. Toward the middle of June,1940, 
the Senate Naval Affairs Coromi ttee, which had been drafting new 
legislation to enlaree the Uni ted States Navy and to hasten ship 
building, had been informed that the Administration was seekinc 
to transfer destroyers to a foreign power. David Walsh, Chairma 
of t::l0 Naval Affairs Conuni ttee, vehemently de clared that the Nav 
woald never giv~ up its destroyers" for two years would elapse 
before it could be properly eq;J.ipped for war. Shortly afterwards 
tile proposed release of the l;J.osquito fleet by the Ad.mlnistratlon 
58 Ibid., 689. 
59 Herbert Briggs" "Neglected Aspects of the Destroye 
Deal,n American J'ournal.2f. International Law, XXXIV,October, 
1940, 569. 
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flas made known. 60 When the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Le1.-is 
Compton, was quostioned by the ,;;)enate N8,val Com;,:ittee, he de-
clured that the 11avy Department could modify contrac ts under gen-
eral legislation passed by \·;ongress. Mention haa already been 
made of the blocking of tho release of the torpedo boats because 
of lUlfavorable publicity and the opinion of the Attorney General. 
It was to f'orestallthe transfer of othor naval vessels thut the 
senate Navel Affairs Committee introduced legislation resulting 
in Sec tioll 14 (a) of the Ac t of June 28, 1940, which reads: 
Notwithstanding the provision of any other law, 
no military, or naval weapon, shOp, boat, ai~oraftt, muni-
tions, sUP1)1:tes or equipment, to which the United .:;;tates 
has title, in whole or in part, or which has been con-
tracted for, shall hereafter be transferrred .. exchanged, 
sold or other~ise disposed of 1n any manner Whatsoever, 
unless the Chief of ;Iava.l Operations in the case of naval 
material, and the Chief of Staff of the Army in the case 
of military material, shall first certify that such materS1 lal is not essential to the defense of the United States. 
During the discussions on this legislation, Senator Walsh had 
read to the Senate Sections 3 and 6, 'l'itle 5 of the Act of June 
14, 1917, and had explained to the Senate that the meelsure made 
"unlawful to send out of the jurisdiction of the Unl ted States 
any vessel built, armed or equipped as a vessel of war, rt while 
the United States was a neutral.62 As first submitted to the 
60 Reter to Chapter 11I,60. 
61 Funk, Roosevelt's Foreign Policl, G79. 
q2 BI'lggs, "Ueglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal," 
A!nerica~ ~ournal .2f. Intenational Law, XXXIV, 571-572. 
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senate, the words nand ca.nnot be used in the last clause of' 3ec-
tion l-Ha) after the words, "not essential to the defense of the 
united States. " Senator Hale had objected to all of Section 14 
(a) because he claimed that it would prevent the supply to the 
Allies of any planes :.;y deferring contract deliver1es. Senator 
Barkley feared that the section would interfere with the turning 
back to manufacturers of certain surplus or used airplanes, en-
glnes, and motor vehicles. To both, Senator Walsh gave assur-
ance that Subsection l4{a) only required certification that mat-
erials concerned were not needed for American defense. Senator 
Hill felt that the words then in Section l4(a.) "cannot be used i 
the defense of the Uni ted States tt required too much, for even 
obsolete old muskets could be used for defense. Senator Walsh 
agreod IV i th him, a.nd the phrase "cannot be used" was deleted. 
However', there is no evidence that the deletion of the phrase, 
"cannot be used," was made by the Senate so that naval vessels 
could be branded as obsolete and transferred to a foreign Power. 
Briggs asserted also that Section l4(a) was never in-
tended by Congress as an authorization f or tho transfer of any 
naval vessels to a foreign Power. Rather, it referred back to 
already existing laws on the disposal of surplus or obsolete 
equipment. Professor Briggs pointed out that tho Attorney Gener 
al was careful not to say that Section 14(a) did give additional 
authorization for the disposal of military equipment; rather, he 
I 
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preferred to interpret the s ubsec tion as requiring the Chief of 
Naval Operations to certify that if, in his opinion the naval 
bases to De gained balanced the loss of the vessels, tho des troy-
eI'S were not essential to the defense of tho United Jtates. In 
hiS certification for the release of the destr(~yers, Admiral 
Stark strongly indicated that he was allowing the destroyers to 
be released because the Attorney General's interpretatlon of 
section 14(a) virtually required it of him. 30 it ap~ar~r;hat 
what Congress had attempted to prevent in Section 14, the Attor-
ney General had authorized bJ his opinion.83 Briggs pointed to 
two other statements of the Attorney General in this connection 
that did not seem to be correct in interpretation~ l"irst, he 
called attention to Jackson's statement that ttthere is no reason 
whatever for holding that sales may not be made to or exchange 
made with a foreign government •••• " Second, he reminded his 
readers of Jackson's statement that Section 14{a) "was enacted 
by the Congl~ss in full contemplation of transfers for ultimate 
delivery to foreign belligerentnations. n64 Briggs explained 
that the clear answer to those statements was contained 1n para-
gra.ph (c) of Section 14 to the effect that it was the intention 
of Congress to restate the prilhibition a.gainst the sending out ot 
63 .!!?1.s!., 574. 
64 Ibid. 
-
134 
~ 
\fa:" vesselsi'or belligerent use or for delivery to a belligerent 
which wa.s expressed in Section 3, '1'1 tle 5 of tho Act of June 15, 
1917. 
Admi ttins that 1 t was conceivable that Congress, thr'ough 
a misunderstanding, could h!lve failed to enact into law its in-
tention, Briggs procoeded to exa;uine tho i~ct of June lS, 1917.65 
1be interpretation of' Section 3 of this Act was open to question. 
It was not clear whether it male illeGal tho delivery of any war 
vessel to a belligerent, or only of' a vessel specifically built 
for such delivery. 
Attorney General T. '.'J. Gregory had declared in hIs an-
nual report of 1916 the laws concerned with American neut rality 
woro at that time defective. In some caaes, ther'e were no stu-
tutory provia ions made I'or tho· observance of obliga tiona imposed 
by intornational law upon the United States, while :!.n others, 
there were adequate provisions.66 Consequently, he submittod re .. 
COl1'!!1len :.ations for new legislation which was required "for fulfill .. 
mont of' tho duty owed by the United States to other nations with 
which it is at poace." One such recorr"mendatlon which was enacted 
into law as Section 11 of the Penal Code forbade me rely the fi t-
ting out or 
for sale to 
-
65 
66 
arm:1.ng, not the 
a belligerent. 
Ibid. , 
-
57[;. 
Ibid. , 
-
576. 
bull dint,;; or dispatc:hing of war vesse~ 
In this con:ioction, Gregory had. 
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}'llld declared that Hule 1 of the Treaty of \\f,ishin,:ton of l87l,and 
Article 8 of the Thirteenth Ha~~ue Convention of 1907 did n'.)t im-
pose on a neutral {~overnDlent any oblication to prevent the de-
parture from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to e:a~.,ase in 
bell1 ;::erent operations, provided the vessel was specially adapted 
to warlike use wi thin the neutral's jurisdi ction. Unlike th.ese 
provisions, neutral ;!overnments were bound by two general oblig;a-
tions. The first of these was an obliGation to take measures to 
prevent the fi ttil1i~ out or armini:; of vessels which a neutI~al te ... 
lieved was intended for belligerent use. This obligation haJ 
been recosnized by the municipal law of the United states since 
1794. trhe second was the oblie;atlon to take measures to prew3nt 
the departure from the neutral f s ports of war vessels intended 
for use by a belligerent. 'rhis requirement was not covered by 811 
statutory provision of' the United States, and new lee:;islation was 
necessary so that the nation mi ... :ht fulfill its treaty obliCa -
67 
tions. 
There had been no debate in Congress in 1917 about Sec-
tion 3, Title 5 of the Act of June 15, 1917. H.owever, Attorney 
General Jackson asserted that in his opinion it was at that time 
the intention to implement the rules of international law. To 
support hi s contention, Jac~{son quoted Gregory's re'ason for trans 
mitting his recommendations. r'rom th.e evidence given concernln; 
67 Ibid., G77. 
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Attorney General GreGory's recommenda tiona, it seer:led clear to 
Jackson that the drafters of Section 3 had intended to;.i;J{e it un 
lawfu.l for tho United States, as a neutral, to send out any war 
vessels,ei tho I' which were intended for delivery to a belligerent 
or w:;.ich, there was cause to "!)elie'liO, ~;.ilght eventually i.)ass into 
belliGerent hands. Section 3 'did not prohibi t tb.o buildinL, Oc.l.t 
the se;:-ldin[: out of war vessels to a bellIGerent. '1111.1s in.terpreta 
tion, it seemed, was perfectly consistent with the la.ngua~e and 
the declared p',.lrpose of the section and the only interpre tation 
w;lich was cansistent wi th the requirel:.iOnts of international law. 
Therofore, Attorney General Jackson guestioned whether interna-
tioav.l law reqt.,;,ired a neutral state to forbid the sendin" out of 
vessels, such as the overace destroyers, which were not "built, 
ar~:"ed or equipped as or converted into vessels of war, with the 
intent.ion that they should enter the service of a belli~erent. n 
Professor BriGgs explained that the late eighteenth an 
early nineteenth centuries, there had existed on the part of neu 
tral ,~overru:lents the obliGation t> prevent the.; depart~re of those 
war vessels alone which wer'e arr.led or fitted out with the in-
tention that they ':)0 used by an ex1stin,~ belligerent. ReferI'lab 
to the Santissimu Trinidad Case, Bribgs asserted that Chief Jus-
tice Story had said that there was no thin;; in tl'lO l'aws of t:10 
1Jni ted States or in the laws of nations to forbld Ar.lerlcan c1-
tizens from sending armed vessels to foreiGn ports for 
I 
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Such an act wus recocnized as a coc~ercial venture,and 
it exposed such persons us w,re encs[;od in it to the penalty of 
Story did not say that a neutral Lovernrr.ont could 
sell or transfer warships to a belligerent. His opinion was con 
earned wi th the fact that a ne-ltral Loverrunent was not obli£,ated 
to pl"event its citizens frou t.radinC in warships which were not 
intended and prepared for we by a ballit:.erent. '1'h1s decis.lon, 
however, had baen generally rejected as obsolete. If any doubtl 
roained on this point, it was d sSipated at the Second Hague Con-
ferenca of 1907 wJ11ch covered the principle in Arti cle 8 of the 
Thirteenth Convention. Soma declared that t!'lisr'..lle was not sp-
plicable as international law bacsu.se of the stipulation that 
lithe provisions of the present Convention do not apply except to 
the contracting powers and then only if all the belliGerents are 
parties to the Convention. tt However, this assur:tption Qverlool{ed 
the :Z'act that Article 8 was generally recarded as declaratory or 
the l'ules of internatlonal law WIlich v,rere independently bindlnG 
on states whettler or not they ratified tli6 'l'hirteenth Convention 
and whether or not all the bellicerents were sicnatorles to tile 
(69 
troa ty. 
Robert Jackson had written that Section 3, rritle 5 of 
68 ~., 579. 
69 Ibid., 581. 
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tll8 Act of 1917 should be lnterpre ted in the light of the tradi-
tional rules of international law, and that he regarded his par-
tiCular interpretation to be in keeping with those rules. or 
section 3, he said: 
this section must be read in the light of Section 2 of 
the sarr~ aot and the ~~les of international law whlch the 
Congress states that it was its intention to iLlplement. 
So read, it is clear that it is inapplicable to vessels 
like the overage destroyers, which were not built, armed, 
equipped as, or converted into vessels of war with the 
intent that they should enter the service of a belligerent. 
If the seotion were ;:.ot so construed, he continued, it would r6n-
dar meaningless Seotion 2 of the Act whlch authorized the Presi-
dent to deliver any armed vessel until he was satisfied that it 
would not engage in hostile operations before it reached a neutr 
or belligerent port. The two sections were intelligible and rec-
oncilable only if read in the light of the t~aditional rules of 
international law. Such an interpretation was clearly stated by 
Lassa Franois Oppenheim When he said that Ita neutral government 1 
not obliged to prevent its subjeots from selling armed vessels to 
belligerents as contraband, but must forbid their building them 
to the order of a belligerent. u70 
Moreover, the Attorney General declared that there was 
'presidential power n to transfer the destroyers upon oertifica.t 
by the appropriate staff officers, and that there WQS no legal 
-
70 Attorney General Jackson quoted from Lassa F. 
Oppe nhe im, .;;I;,;;;n;.;t..;;;e.;;.rl1.;;.;..;9.;..;t.;;;l.;;;o,;;.;n;.;;9.;:;.l .&!!, 5 th e d., Vol, II, 574-576. 
I,,' 
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obstacle to the cons\1;cmation of the transaction in accordance 
the applicable provisions of the Neutrality Act concerning deli-
very. He stated that if Section 3 had not been so construed, 8e 
tlon 2 would have been meaningless. The argument seemed to be 
that Section 2 authorized or at least did not forbid tho sending 
out of certain war vessels. If Section 3 were interpreted to 
forbid the sendIng out of any war vessel for deli very to a bel-
llgerent, it would render Section 2 meaningless. Actually, Sec-
tion 3 forbade the sending out. Section 2 authorized detention 
until proof against sale or delivery was furnished. In his dis-
cussion of this issue, Professor Briggs showed that Attorney Gen ... 
eral Gregory had stated the purpose of ,Section 2 clearly in sub ... 
1'1i tting his re commendation to Congress. In his opinion, the pur-
pose ot Section 2 was to permi t detention of certain vessels un ... 
til proof was furnished that they would not be sold or delivered 
to belligerents (fatter leaving port, not merely on the hieh seas, 
but even in foreign ports. 11 
As drafted and enacted by Congress, a technical loop-
hole n<)t to forbid dell very or sale in a foreign port appeared in 
this seotion. There was no trace of evidence that Congress in-
tended to authorize or permit such a violation of American inter-
nath;nal obligations. In any case, the technical f'law in Section 
2 is correoted by a proper reading of Section 3 whioh forbids the 
8ending out of any war vessel with the intention of its delivery 
I 
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to a belllger>ent. The interpretation which Jackson appeared to 
regard as the sale purpose of Section 2 was that it really coun-
tenanced a violation of lnternatIona.l law. 'rherefore, according 
to Bri£8s , the supplying of the fifty destroyers by the United 
states to England, a belligerent, was a violation of ALlericats 
neutral status, a violation of'her national law, and a violation 
of international law.7l 
On September 10, 1840, James W. Ryan, a noted interna-
tional lawyer, dismissed any discussion at the Thirteenth Hague 
Convention as inapplicable to the Destroyer-Base Deal. His rea-
son for do :.n8 80 was that Article 28 of this Convention contained 
the stipulation that its provisions did not apply except ~etween 
contractinc powers. Since England had not been one of the can ... 
tracting p->wers, it was Inappllcable. 72 Ryan asserted that as 
late as the end of the eighteenth century, 1 t had been considered 
per:nissible for a state to assist one belliGerent without aban-
doning neutrali ty. He considered that the critics of the Pres-
ident were basing their opinions on isolated, special and subor-
dinate rules with respect to the transfer of warships to a belli-
gerent. None of the critics' objections were applicable, Ryan 
71 Briggs, ffneglected Aspects of the Des'truyer Deal, tI 
,funer lcan -=cJ,.;;;o ... u;;;;.r.:;;;:n;,;,;a;.::.l of International Law, XXXI V, 586 ... 587. 
- - -
72 Conf,rossional Record, Appendix, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 
1940, 5600-5601. 
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since underlying all of these rules and international 
la- was the primary and basic principal that every nation, in 
time of national emergency, might properly take necessary llieaa~ 
for self-protection by increasing its national defense. Moreove~ 
A~erlcan defenses had been strengthened by the aoquisition of the 
naval bases. Ryan deolared that the cr1 tloisr:" that the statutes 
of the United States had been violated by tL~ transaction was in-
correct.. This was true since their provisions were lin:i ted to thE 
congressional field of domestic relations, and were intended by 
Congress to apply merely during a war in which the United btates 
was neutral, and to prevent private citizens, subordinate offi-
cials, or aliens from sending armed vessels or warships to belli-
gerents. 73 Bo,here dld the statutes mentlon the ChIef Executl vee 
They were not intended to restrict the official or governc,ental 
act of the American Government through its Chief Exeoutive, act~ 
vicariously as the teohnical sovereign in the field ot foreign 
relations. He declared it was an elementary canon of legal inteJ:'lo 
pretation that the Government's own exeoutive officers were pre-
sumpti vely not intended to be bound by a statute unless nan:ed in 
it.74 
73 Ibid., 5601. 
-
74 Ibid. Guarantee Title and Trust Cor~;pany v Ti tle 
Guaranty Company,:224 U. S. 152. 
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In t:l.1.S C01'1:-.t.ection, Hyan q"J.oted Justioe story's <looi ... 
75 
5:on in the case of the 11n1 ted Stu tr)s v Hoor. 
In [;eneral, acts of' t.;lO Legislature were .;a) un t 
to reGulate and direct the acts and richts of citizens; 
anu :n [:lost oascs the rcasonin;~; applicable to t~·x.Ha ap-
plies with very different and often contrary force to 
t:l(} Govern .. :lent itself. I t appeal's to l:~e therefore, to 
ue a safe rule founded in the pr'inciples of' the oommon 
law that the ~~eneral words bf a ntatute oUGht not to 
include trle Government, or affect its I' l,.~hts, unless 
t:lut constrtl.ction be olear and Indisp..:.table upon the 
text of tile act. 
Accordingly, even thou;.:.:h the statutes were clearly applicable to 
all ;::;overnment offioials functionint;; .tn the field of tioL:1ostlc af-
fairs, and were therefore wi:t.hin Congress 1 jurisdIctIon, thoy 
would still not he applicable to t:19 President when functioninG 
as the technical sovereign or government representative plenipo-
tentiary in his supreme and exclusi va consti tutional fie ld of 
foreIgn relations. The statutes must, under the settled legal 
rules of interpretation, be read in the liCht of the fact thl.l.t 
cont;ressional power in the field of forei(;n relations Is 11ml ted 
by the Constitution to declarlnc, war and reGulating foreIGn com-
merce, and, in the case of the Senate, to rati fy1ni:; treaties 
entered into by the President. In the countryts foreiGn relatlc:n 
with its important, compllcatedJ delicate and. nanifold problo:ns, 
the President alone l:ad the power to speak or' listen as a repre-
sentatl ve of the nation, concluded Ryan. He H;ake treaties wi til 
75 25 Fed. Cas. 329, 330. 
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t~e advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. 
Into the field of negotiation the Senate oannot intrude. Gongras. 
is powerless to invade it.76 
In tl~ early fall of 1940, Professor Edwin Borchard of 
t~e Yale Law School presented an unfavorable interpretation of At. 
torney General Jackson' a opinion of the exchange of the fifty de-
stroyers for the eight naval bases.77 Borchard claimed that the 
Attorney General had limited his opinion to the question of con-
stitutional and statutory authority; Jac~son had intentionally 
omi tted all reference to international law, wi thout which the 
opinion was not complete. It was a Ifveritab1e tour de force. fI 
---
Borohard pointed out that the Attorney General based the presi-
dentJal right to aot independently of the Senate on three powers, 
.f1rst, -an assumed plenary power of the President to deal with 
.foreign affairs; second, the power of the President as Commander 
1n Chief of the Army and Navy; and third, the Chief Exeoutive's 
statutory power to dispose of naval vessels which had been "found 
unfit for further use and stricken from the Naval Registery." 
Jackson had supported the presidential power to deal 
with foreign affairs on the deoision rendered by the Supreme Co~ 
76 Congressional itecord, Appendix, 76 Gong., 3 Sess., 
1940, 5601. 
77 Edwin Borchard, "The Attorney General's Opinion of 
the Exohange of Destroyers for Naval Basos, If Ameri can .Journa12! 
lpternational f!!, XXXIV, October, 1940, 690. 
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in the Curtiss Wright Case of 1936. 'rhe Court had decided that 
in the ma.tter of "negot1ation and 1nquiry, Congressional legill.la-
tioD must often give the President a degree of discretion and 
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be B.wJissable 
.ere domestic affairs alone involved. ff Professor Borchard said 
that this did not give the President cart!, blanche to do anything 
he pleased in foreign affairs; it was li::-:1ted to "negotiation an 
, i tt Inqll ry. He admitted that the President was the Bole organ of 
the nation in its external relations and its sole representative 
with foreign nations. But this was merely a power of agency, not 
a power to conclude and bind the nation 1n fundL~ental matters.? 
The President must necessarily make all k1nds of provisional 
agreements, continued Borchard, but it had been the usual practi 
to submit important matters to Congress or the Senate for ap-
proval. Moreover, when Justice Sutherland, 1n the Curti ss fh'igh 
Case, spoke of the "very delicate plenary and executive power or 
the PreSident, ff he had added that it "must be exercised 1n sub-
ordination to the applicable provisions of the constitution." 
Apart from such provisions there were constitutional understand-
ings which required that agreements of great importance should 
not be concluded by executive authority alone. 
Borchard maintaiI'l8dthat the Attorney General had in-
voked a law of 188:3 which authorized the Secretary of the Navy to 
78 Ibid., 691. 
-
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'dispose of vessels unfit for further use and strioken from the 
Naval Register. IIBut no vessel of the Navy shall hereafter be 
sold in any other manner than herein provlded ••• unless the Presi-
dent of the United States shall otherwise direot In writing." He 
supported the use of that statute by invoking the oaS8 of LevimDI 
v the United States Whioh referred to the disposal of an unneeded 
yacht. 79 The Supreme Court had said of the Statute of 1183 that 
"the power of the President to direct a departure from the sta-
tute is not C'.onfined to a sale for less than the appraised value 
but extends to the manner of sale. tI Professor Bor chard found it 
a little unusual for the Attorney General to use this statute and 
this case as a support for the disposal by exeou ti va agreement of 
the destroyers. Furthermore, the uset'ulness of the destroyers 
had been attested by naval officers (iefore the Senate Committee 
on Naval Affairs. 80 
Concerning the ,;;,tatute of June 28, 1940, whereby 
Coneress sought to lim! t the transfer of material by requiring a 
certification from the Chief of Haval Operations, the Attorney 
General considered that "thus to prohibit aot1on by the constitu-
tionally created Commanaer-in-Chief I exoept upon author1zation of 
an offioer subordinate in rank, was of questionable constl1utlalaU~ 
-
79 258 U. S. 198, 1922. 
80 Borohard, nThe Attorney General's Opinion of the k-
change of Destroyers for Naval Bases, JI Amerioan Journal of Inter-...,;;;.;--...;;..;;..= _______ .;;.;;..0.= _ ..;;,;;;.;;.;;..;;.;.. 
~atlonal Law, XXXIV, 692. 
-
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gd'lin Borchard considered the Attorney Genora1' s construction 
"novel, II in as much as he had concluded that the naval bases 
.,ould, as compared wi th the destroyers, add so much to the defen-
,1 va positions of the Uni tad States that the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations "should certify ••• that the destroyers ••• are not essential 
to the defense of the Uni ted States, if in his judgrnent the ex-
ohange w111 strengthen rather than impair the total defense of 
the Uni ted States. "81 
To the learned YalaProfessor, there was no possibillty 
of reconciling the Destroyer Deal with neutra1lty or with the 
United States ~tatutes. The Deal could only oe explained by the 
legal fact that the United ;.)tates was in a state of l1r.:lited war. 
In this connection, the concept of "nonbelligerency, t1 like that 
of l'measures short of war, II had no legal standing. They had been 
used to justify breaches of neutrality with the hope that they 
would result in a state of war. Under such circumstances, it 
was not easy to justify the President's words informing Congress 
of the Destroyer-Base trade that "this is not inconsistent in any 
sense with out state of peace. rr It would have been more eonsls-
tent had the Attorney General not sought to reconcile the trade 
With a state of peace and neutrality.82 
- 81 Ibid., 693. 
-
82 IbId., 697. 
-
CHAPTER V 
LEARNED OPINIon 
A group which played a tr'emendous part in bringing 
about the transfer of the fift1 destroyers to Great Britain was a 
popular committee organized by William Allen ';~hlte 1n the spring 
of 1940.1 In AprIl, when Germany smashed into Norway and DenmarkJ 
and after a rew weeks forced those countries, as well as Holland 
and Belgium, under Nazi control, William Allen White and other 
thoughtful AmeriCL'18 began to fear that the fanatical conquest ot 
Europe by Hitler challenged the democratic way of lIte. He was 
oonvinced, therefore, that it was necessary to keep the British 
navy afloat so that, behind it, Amerioa could prepare for the in-
evItable attack of tl~ totalitarian powers upon the American dem-
2 
ooraoy. 
In this connection, the old, popular newspaper editor at 
the EiltJporia qazett~ hurried to New York City, and with his close 
1 "Inside Story" of the Propaganda Engine," St. Loui8 
Post-Dispatch, SeptfH::ber 22, 1940, reprinted in congressrona~ 
EiCOr~, Appendix, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 1940, 5808. 
2 Walter Johnson, Vl'111iwn Allen White f s America, New 
York, 1947, 523. ' 
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associate, Clark Elchelberger,3 laid plans for the new committee 
which would consolidate and crystallize public opinion and let 
Congress know that millions of Americans wanted aid to go to the 
democracies.' As a result of the conversations between iblte and 
EIGhelberger, a message, seeking support for the new CO.rl'lm.; ttea, 
was sent to about slxty prominent persons. Early in May, White 
received favorable responses from governors; college presidents; 
bishops, Catholic and Protestant; editors; lawyers; and writers. 
When the story of the formation of the Coromi ttee to De .. 
fend America bY' Aiding the Allies was released, the country 
leanned that a huge number ot acceptance telegrams had been ~ 
lng the Emporia telegraph oftice. White optimistically declared, 
"Public opinion from people in all walks of life seems to be 
moving rapldly toward crystallizing every possible legal aid to 
the Allies." Whi te' s name alone, because ot the widespread pub-
lic confidence he had long enjoyed, was a valuable asset to the 
Connrl1ttee, and no doubts one of the greateat reasons why it was so 
quickly accepted and supported by so large a majority.5 
In June, when France staggered and tell under the 
3 Clark hichelbcrger was at one time director of the 
League of Nations Association in New York City. 
4 Johnson, White's Arnerlc~.t 523. 
5 ff Ins ide S tory of the l~ropaganda E.ngine, tf §.h Louls 
Post-DlsxatCl:}.t September 22, 1~40, reprinted in Cone;ressional 
R;COrd, ppendix, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 1940, 5808. 
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German assult, the White Committee concentrated all its efforts 
to mobilize American public opinion in favor of aid short of war. 
TIle "Jommi ttee in1 tiated radio talks, sponsored newspaper adver-
tisements and rallies, and encouraged prominent c1 tizens to wri te 
to Congressr.en. The purpose of all this was to urge America to 
becO:me nonbelligerent, and to oounteract isolationist propaganda 
that German domina tlon of Europe was no threat to the securi ty 
of the United States.6 During those crucial days, ~blte tele-
graphed President Roosevelt;7 
My correspondence 1s heaping up unanimously 
behind the plan to aid the Allies by anyth1ng other than 
war. As an old friend, let me warn you that maybe you 
will not be able to lead the American people unless you 
catch up with them. 
White believed that if the United States did not aid Great ~bdn 
with the destroyers and the British Isles were invaded, the 
fleet would go to Hitler. 'rhus reinforced, the German leader 
would have sufficient naval power to seize the Eri tish possessiaw 
1n the West Indies and construct Nazi air and naval bases there. 
Since these islands were near the Panama Canal, they would, 1n a 
rew months, be a considerable BourGe of trouble for the United 
States. 8 
6 ,Johnson, White's America .. 527 ... 528. 
7 Ibid ... 527. 
'I 
I 
, I 
8 Walter Johnson, ed., Selected Letters 2! William 
!llen \~htte, New York, 1947, 407-408. II: 
" i 
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Joncerning White's association with President Roosevel 
White claimed that he never did anything the President had not 
asked for, and that he always conferred with Roosevelt on the 
Comr:li ttee t s program. "He never failed us," Whi te said la tar, "we 
could go to him {!toosevel~ any men.ber of our ••• cOflunittee. lie 
.. as frank, oordial and wise ill' his oounsel ••• a patriot in this 
matter if ever there was one."9 
The early fruits of White's efforts are seen in the 
fact that by July, a Fortune poll revealed that sixty-seven per· 
cent of the people favored aid to the Allies. Approximately two 
million Signatures had been sent to the white House, and thou-
sands of telegrams and letters had gone to Senators and Represen-
tati ves telling them that stopping Hi tler at the English Channel 
was good cor:mon sense .10 
During the presidential campaign of 1940, the Emporia 
editor devoted a large amount of time to attempting to bring the 
two Ilominees, President Franklin Hoosevelt and nendell Wilkie, 
gether on a common statement approving the 
destroyers to England. About June 29, President Hoosevelt had 
ready suggested to William A. White that destroyers might be re-
leased to England in return for naval bases in the British 
9 Johnson, White's Americ~, 529. 
10 Ibid. 
- II 
151 
~ 11 
possessions in the We s tern Hemisphere. Al thouCh ~'1.!hi te did not 
succeed in brinGinG t:10r.l to;sc t:lor on ::mCf1 a joint statement, he 
\yD.S able to tell Roosevelt that his opponent was f'or the plan. 
'The Corilmi ttee focused its attention upon arousin,_' publl 
support for t:1e release of tho destroyers. On July 26, White 
told his policy corunl ttea, "If the President really wants to do 
tllis, it can be done, b~lt we Dust show him thut the country will 
12 
follow him In this matter." The public was told t:1U t Brl tain 
needed t:1e destroyers; they were ur~ed to write or te1e.r.;;raph the 
t 
Pires:;'dent and ConGressmen t:lat the destroyers sno'lld be released. 
About this time, thore was an amorphous group of Indtv1 
duals oporatinG alol'lb paral1ellinos w1th the 'i~hite Committee, 
and at times in collaboration w.ith it. It had no fixed na:rle or 
orcanization, but it wa.s Iilentioned in the press as t!le "Cent.lry 
Club group, n or the "Miller croup. II It had been decided that th 
members should const! tute sort of a clearin~: house to 1'acili tate 
11 Ibid., 532. 
12 Ibid. 
-
13 SOf.1e tin~e before this a full page adv6rtisement, 
"Stop Hitler, fI was published throughout the country. Hobert 1::. 
Sherwood, an ardent protagonist of aid for the Allies and a clos 
friendat' the President t s, wrote the ad and Gi.laranteed the Jost 
amountinG to $5,000. President Roosevelt COl:lcionted, favorably 
upon it at a press conference. He said although he coulJ not en 
dorse every specific phrase in it, he thou(;ht it was a f lne edu-
ce. tional thing. "Inside story of tL:6 PropaGanda Engine, It st. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, September 22, 1940, reprinted in Gongrossicn !!. Hec~ AppendIx, 76 Cone;.,3 Sess., 1~40, 5809-5810. 
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tl18 arranceuen t of mee tln~~s and the axe cu tion of ide as thu t ulght 
be o.::sreed upon. J:i'rancis P. r.dller of l"alrfax, Virginia, well 
known over the country as an organizer of study groups for the 
14 
council on Foreign Relations, was chosen manager. Under his 
leadership the group agreed that the destroyers shoulci be tl"'ans-
ferred to England by executive· action. (£hey also advocated a 
cru:.paign of education concerning the vi tal ir:lportance of the Bri-
15 
tish fleet to the United States. 
During July and August, L:lembers of the Miller e;roup co- ill 
I,', 
opera ted with the William Allen V~hi te ComIlli ttee to prepare the 
wa.y for the release of the destroyers. Carryin[ out the first 
1 ter:: on their agenda, Herbert Agar, editor of the Louisville 
Courier-Journal; Ward Cheney, a waalthy silk manufacturer; and 
Miller held personal interviews in 'iiashington wi til the President 
and most of the members of the A:abinet, and urged the immediate 
16 
transfer of the destroyers to Great Bri tain. Agar and Clark 
Eichelberger saw the President on AUGust 1; Frank Idller talked 
with Henry Wallace, the Democratic nominee for t~lC Vice Presi-
dancy; and Joseph Alsop, a columnist, conferred with Admiral 
14 Ibid., ~,liller opened an office at 11 west 42nd 
Street, New York City. 
15 Walter Johnson, The Battle At:;ains1! :isolatio:n, 
ChicaGO, 1914, 116. 
16 "Inside Story of the Propacanda Engine," .§1.Louis 
Post-Dispatch, Sep telz,ber 22, 1940, reprinted in ConGressional 
Record, Appendix, 76 Cong.,3 Sess., 1940, 5811. 
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stark, Chief of Naval Operations. Thus, the burden of their 
~eSsage was driven home to the President and other offioials. 
They asserted that in view of the danger of Hitler's proJeoted 
fOrld-wide revolution, the United States was pursuing a oowardly 
course; publio opinion favored the release of the destroysrs. 17 
On August 4, nation wide attention was focused on the 
project when General John J. Pershing, Commander of the American 
Expeditionary Ii'orce during '/>ijrld War I, broadcast a warning to 
the American peoPle. 18 General Pershing declared that Americans 
could defend the things they held most dear only by making up 
their n.inds flto face the truth without flinching. No war was e 
preven ted by hiding the danger and by arguing that the danger 
does not eXist." The r:Jen who were best qualified to know what 
was going on in Europe were unanimous 1n the belief that grave 
danger lurked in the present world situation 
Great Britain was the only democracy left to 
in Europe. But the United States could still hope to keep the 
on the other side of the AtlantiC, it America 
Pershing considered it his duty to warn the American people bet 
it was too late that the British Navy needed destroyers to escort 
its warships, hunt submarines, and repel the invasion from 
17 Ibid. 
18 This tal;{ is taken from "Pershing's Security Broad-
cast, If published by the Com.r.:~1ttee to Defend luner! ca by Aiding 
the Allie"s, New York, 1940. 
IIII 
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oermany. The United States had an immense reserve of destroyers 
left over from the last war. If' there was anything the United 
3tates could do to save the British fleet during this period, the 
oountry would be failing in its duty to Amerioa if 1 t was not 
done. ili thin the next few days, the General t a appeal was se-
conded by three retired. naval 6Cfioers, Admiral Viilliam H. 
standley, Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, and Hear Admiral Yates 
st1rling, Jr. Menibers of the William Allen ~"hi te Commi ttee be-
lieved that the persuaal ve speech of General £)ershing did rt<.ore 
than any other single thing to mobilize publio sentiment behind 
the :Jestroyer Deal. 19 
Press opinion was divided concerning the wisdom of the 
appeal of the General and the Admirals for the release of the 
fifty destroyers to Great Britain. Conmenting on the General's 
speeoh of Aue;ust 4, Heverend James Oillis, editor of the Catholic 
World, agreed with General Pershing the. t the cure was "to face 
the truth without flinching and to act upon the truth without 
hesl tating. tt F1ather Gl1118 asserted on this occaSion, however, 
that the General ha.d failed to speak: the tull truth. "Make avan. 
able" was a slippery phrase. The scholarly editor accused him of 
not followin1.1: through to the inevitable conclusion of his 
19 "Inside Story of the Propaganda Bngine," St. Louia 
Post ... Dis*atch, September 22, 1940, reprinted in CongresSIOnal 
EeCOrd, ppendlx, 76 Geng., :5 Sess., 1940, 5808. 
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ergw:lent , which would be, "what I a.w recoillro.endlng is equivalent 
to war, it is war." But no, contlnJ.ed Father G':"llis, tlle General 
repeatod t!le Itfavorite bromide tf of the interventionist, the 
trickly phrase, "measuros short of war." The General must know 
that, in tho present clrcu.m.stances, to convoy destroyers froI!l the 
United States to a belligerent,Power would be an act of war, ac-
tually if not technically. If General Pershine did not know this 
he had not business making radio speeches to the nation. 
Continuing, the eel'li tor accused sor-je newspapers of fo1-
lowInG their usual course of talkinc.; around and about the subjec 
when reluctant to tell the II' readers the unpleasant truth. Tho 
NoW York Herald Tribune, for example, too!{ refuee behind Incon-
--
clusi ve stat e ments sllch as, "no aid to the successfu.l defense 0 
Great Britain should be withheld and ConGress should have tb.e 
realism needed for an action of this kind. II He concluded that 
the c:reat metropolitan paper had not tile coura[,e or the sinceri t 
20 
to add, II this :neans war. II 
The articulate §.h Louis ~-Dispatch charged Admiral 
Standley wI th persuadinG the Ameri can people to evade the le gal 
barr leI' to the transfer of the destroyers \ly having Conc:.:;ress de-
clare a national ernergency and thus gi ve the PresIdent full 
powers. 'fhis paper considered thH t such power woul·d lead to one 
20 James Gillis, "Truth TellinL£," Catholic World, New 
York, CLI, September 1940, 642-043. 
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to military dlctatobsl1ip" It declared that the ;:;atter 
bad become ::;0 involved in politics and intricue that any discreet 
naval man, still in service, knew better than to discuss it. 
lIThe job of national defense is that of the officers in active 
serv:i.ce; it is not the job of the retired admirals," insisted the 
21 
Dispatch. 
-
The New York Times approved the proposals of tl-:fl Gener-
......... -- . 
al and th.e Admirals. It sueeested that if ConGress feared the 
effect of the transfer on tile ele ctDDate in a cri tieal presiden-
tial election year, t~le public should. be consulted. But the new 
-
~ Daily ~ asked how t:le Uni ted States could spare fifty 
destroyers now and perhaps fifty more later when the flrst had 
beO:l blown up, since Congress had declded that \louble the strene;tl 
of the present navy was needed. Why send American destroyers 
wi tl:.in bombinc ranGe of hi tler, ·when they could be kept in Amer-
22 
iean waters to defend its shores asainst attack? 
The White Co~nmittee's success in crystallizing public 
opinion to advocate the release of the destroyers may be deter-
mined by the message carrying three [:lillion signatures to the 
21 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, n.d.,reprinted in Congres-
sional Record:-AP'pendlx,"'"'76Coni:. ,3 Sess., 1940, 5009. 
22 ~!.2.£! Times, August 10, 1940, ,,). 3:8, 'l'his 
paper prl.nted edi torial opinions from many newSpalJorS ':"n the Uni-
ted States and throughout the world. 
15'7 
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p:resider:.t an.d Concress in favor of the Destroyer-Deal. The 
Gor;:u\li ttee t s success may also be determined from the reSd.l t of a 
qUt)stiona.ire conducted on the proposed release of the destropers 
by t:le American Institute of Public Opinion. In AUGust, 1940, 
t:16 Ai;lerican lnstl tu te of Pub1i c Opinion, under the direction of 
Doctor George Gallup, condJ.cteti a questionaire on the proposed 
24 
release of t~·le destroyers. This questionaire was conducted in 
a cross-section survey from coast to coast. Each state was 
"sampled, II and all groups in the votinc population were repl'ese 
The question covering tho issue was worded in two different ways. 
The first was: 
General Pershing says the United States should 
sell to England fifty of our destroyer ships which were 
buil t durin.:.., the last V:orld ';.ar and are now baGk 1n 
service. Do you approve or disapprove of our cover~ent 
seeling these destroyers to England? 
Of those expressini':; an opinion, Sixty-two per cent approved the 
sale, and thirty-eiGht per cent disapproved of It. The second 
was: 
England needs destroyer ships to replace those 
which have been damaced or sunk. The United States has 
some destroyers whIch wore built durinG the last World 
23 "Inside Story of the Propal':anda Encine, II ~L~ 
~-DisAatoh, September 22, lV40, repr4 1nted in COl),gressional 
Record, ppendlx, '76 Cong., 3 Sess., 1940, 5808. . 
24 Shepardson and ScroGgs, U. S. in World Affairs,Ap-
pendix II, 307-316. These pole s were wnd'lcted under the so-
called sampling method, by w:lich the q:A.ostio!ls w(;)re subrai tted to 
croups of persons seleoted from different ceur;raphical sectIons 
and from various economic and social groups. 
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War and are not tJeing put back 1n active serviee. Do 
you think we should sell some of those ships to l!.ngland? 
Of those expressing an opinion, sixty-one per cen t voted yes, 
and thirty-nine per cent voted no. On each question, a;Jproxi-
mately one voter in every eleven expressed no opinion, or was un-
decided. On the first question, the undecided vote was eIght per 
cent; on the second, the vote was nine per cent. In this survey, 
the great majori ty of the voters, explaining the reason for their 
attitude, declared simply."England is fic;hting our battle." 
1'hose opposed to the sale di vided about equally into 
two groups; those who said the country itself needed the destroy-
ers, a nd those who considered that the sale would be an act of 
war. Every section of the country voted for the sale. The South 
voted more strongly for t~ sale of the destroyers than did any 
other section. 
A few days after the 0eal was announced, William Allen 
~hlte said he believed that the flfty destroyers would be of the 
greatest physical and l'~,oral assis tance to Great Eri tain in re-
pelling the invasion. The Kansas edItor reflected, 
The United Jtates secured air and naval 
bases whl ch will be a trerLendous factor in national de ... 
fense. The public almost unanimously applauds the ne-
gotiations. I for one believe that the i'resldent acted 
absQlutely correctly in negotiating the arrangement as 
an Execi.ltive matter. 'I'here was not time for the long 
debate which Congressional consideration would have re-
sulted In. I am proud of the "art that this Committee 
and its many Chapters played in mobilizing public opinion 
159 
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in support of this great step.25 
Many favorable editorial comments were given in the 
press. The!!! Reeublic, a journal of opinion, declared that the 
united States had an enormous number of American destroyers, more 
than would ever be required for a well-rounded fleet then or in 
the future. Therefore, destroyers should be released to repel 
the German invasion of ~ngland.26 
The !!! ~ Times admitted that perhaps the releasing 
of the vessels would be an lIae t of war, If but such an act would 
not necessarily push the Uni ted States into war. It pointed out 
that the most belli~rent actlon would be ignored if it was to 
the interest of the dictators to ignore it. No aid, therefore, 
which the United ~tates could give to Britain would involve the 
country in war unless Germany wanted to fight. Moreover, this 
co~~try had not been neutral for some time. It had taken sides; 
it had given aid. If it had taken the opPOSite course, the risks 
would have been just, the same. 27 
When the Destroyer-Base Deal was announced on September 
3, the Wall; Street Journal solemnly asserted that the swap, with 
25 ftlnside Story of t he Propaganda J::ngine, ff St. Louis 
Post-Disiatoh, September 22, 1940, reprinted 1n Con&ressrona~ 
ltecord, ppendix, 76 Gong., 3 Sess., 1940, 5808. 
26 
1940, 207. 
. 27 
~ li!! Republic, New York, CIII, August 12, 
!!! ~ .T.i.M.e.s, August 17, 1940, p. 14:5 • 
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all its signlfic&10e, should be v1ewed in relation to the whole 
developing world picture and the distribution of world [;ii11 tary 
power. The Journal felt that the most vital single eonsideration 
of the United States should be to take every conceivable precau-
tion that British naval power did not fall into the hands of the 
NaziS. In that event, the totalitarian powers or Europe would 
have eight times the shipbuilding tacilities of the United 
states. 28 
The New York Herald TribWle praised the President for 
.---............... .T 
having achieved two goals that were "wholly admirable and long 
overdue. N The Tribune hoped that any doubts over the wiadom of 
his uniting destroyers and the naval bases in one sensational 
bareain would not blind the cOWltry to the "i tal natLmal impor-
tance of the agreement. The Tribune felt that there was no logi-
cal relationShip between the two projects. The former was merely 
an extension of the broad endeavor of the United States to aid 
the Allies through the sale of war materials. The latter, as 
every I!;ill tary expert would adr:lit, belonged to a far different 
category. 29 
The !!! ~ DaiIl!!!!, hoping that the deal would not 
lead to war against Geroany, said that President Roosevelt had 
28 !!!! Street ~~urnal, September 4, 1940, p. 3:4. 
29 li!! ~ Timea, September 4, 1940, p. 13:1. 
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performed the greatest single service of his years as Chief Ex-
ecutive, That he had the courage to do what was right, necessary, 
and proper, in comple te disregard of the possible disastrO\\8 ef ... 
rects to hia political future, was the complimentary remark from 
the St, LO,ui. ~ Tir:les. 30 The \\ashington ~ upheld the ar-
rangement and lllaintalned that the transfer of the destroyers was 
e. small price to pay for the advantages the Uni ted States gained. 
In the present emergency, the two great English speaking democ-
racies showed that they possessed the requisite vigor, forsight 
and deter:r.ination to act boldly.31 The Pi ttsburg £.2.!l Gazette 
believed that the United States should give England every possib~ 
assistance, without sending troops over seas. 
"1'he act of turning the overage destroyers over to the 
British is a recognition of the truth that she is now fighting far 
the safety of American democracy, fI declared the Cleveland Plain 
Dealer. 32 Nevertheless, it would have liked the arrangement 
better if some degree of cooperation from Congress had been 
sought, since the program was too iu;portant for a single depart-
ment of government to have arrogated to itself all credit for the 
perf ormance • The Baltimore Sun maintained that the transfer made 
- -
United States neutrality, already highly diaphonous, a well nigh 
30 Ibid. 
-
31 Ibid., p. 13:2. 
-
32 Ibid. 
-
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transparent oover for nonbelligerent cooperation on the side of 
Great Britain. But if the fifty destroyers were not enough, the 
United States should provide more. 33 The Louisville Gourier-
Journal called the Deal a down payn~nt on seourity. There had 
not been a better bargain in Amerioa "since the Indians sold 
itianhattan Island for twenty-four dollars in WmnpUll.l and a demijohn 
of hard liquor ... 34 
The President was hailed as a statesman by the Phila-
delphia Record. It declared that the British fleet had been the 
-
first line of defense for the United States in the Atlantio 
Ooean. Without it .. America would have had to divide the navy, 
leaving neither the Atlantic nor the Pacific wing adequate for 
the protection of American shores. It was a master stroke of 
combined good will and good business. 35 The Cinoinnati Ingui.er 
deolaJ'ed that by the agreement the two governments had cemented 
a friendship ot immeasurable value to both peoples. Although the 
l:!2! Angeles Times agreed that the acquisl tlon of the air and naval. 
bases added to national defense, it hoped that the United States 
had not paid too high a price for them by thus being brought near 
to war. 36 The Chica60 Tribune rejoiced to Mike the announcement. 
33 Ibid. , p. 13:3. 
-
34 Ibid. , p. 13:4. 
-
35 Ibid ... p. 13:5. 
-
36 Ibid. 
-
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'!he Deal fulfilled a policy advocated by that newspsper since 
1922. The Tribune claimed that it had pressed upon various adn:dn-
istrations the policy of acquiring the naval bases for defense. 37 
Any people shocked at the method used by the President 
were overwhelmed by the popular approval of its swift accomplish-
ment, reported!4.!!.. 38 The Kan'sas Ci t;t; lli!: felt that the agree-
ment would be mutually beneficial. The New Orleans Times PioaYUDI 
-
declared that h1story would note this "timely trade ff as seoond 
only in ir:;portance to Jefferson'.s Louisiana Purchase, and the San 
-
]:i'ranclsoo Chronicle believed the Deal should have been made long 
before. 39 
In an article entitled, "Today and Tomorrow-The Great 
Precedent, If reprinted in the Appendix of the Con&;:essional Record. 
Walter Lippman drew· a most interesting parallel between the Loui-
siana Purchase and other historical events of that day, and the 
Destroyer-Base Deal. The negotiations between the British Empire 
and the .Uni ted States demonstrated how pern:anent and continuous 
were the fundam.ental lines of J~merican foreign policy. It need 
not have been surprising for the United States to negotiate an 
37 Chicago Daily Tribune, September 4, 1940, p. 14:1. 
38 ~, Hew York, IX, September 16, 1940, 19. 
39 "World Reaction to the Destroyer-Base Deal, n China 
Weekly Heview, Shanghai, XCIV, September 14, 1940, 45. Ed-
Itorial opinion of various newspapers throughout the world was 
printed in this periodical. 
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understa.nding w1th Britain in tao midst of a creat L .. periallstic 
war. LippF.l.an explained that the foreign poli cy of the United 
states, which had given the Western Hemisphere a century of se-
curity, independence, and freedom was shaped by such understand-
40 
ines with Great Bri tain durin;::; tr-i6 Napoleonic Wars. 
Lippman related that' when Thomas Jefferson learned that 
Spa.in was about to transfer her title to Louisiana to Frl1nce,he 
declared, "the day that France takes possession of New Orleans 
••• we mus t marry oursel ves to the British flee t and nation. if It 
was not a state of thinCs desired, but it was a measure, w;lich 
Jefferson believed, was necessary for trl.e United states. Bvlt 
Jefferson, contlnuedt}~ popular columnist, unlike the latter def 
isolationists, had no illusions on the fundamental issues that 
revolutionary imperialism must not be allowed to establish itself 
in the Western Hemisphere, and that it could be prevented only b~ 
Anglo-Amari can con trol of the ocoan. Jefferson considered such a 
understanding with Great Britain not an entanslement but the verj 
basic condition of American security. Therefore, President 
Roosevelt, negotiating with M.r. Churchill In regard to American 
security, was in the direct line of descent from the founders of 
American independence. Twenty years later, when the so-called 
Holy Alliance, controlled b¥ despotic monarchies, formulated 
40 Walter Lippman "Today and Tommorrow-The Great Pre-
cedent, If n. d., reprinted in Con*opessi<:>!!!! Record, Appendix, 76 
Cong., 3 Sess., 1940, 5476-5477. 
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plans to reconquer Spanish America, the Monroe Doctrine for 
ht3lillspheric security was anno~nced to the world. In this con-
nceL:ton, Jeflferson sald, flGreat Britain is the nation ,hich can 
do us the most harm of anyone, with her on our side we need not 
fear the ,,,.hole world. If Following the same idea, James Madison 
;,aintained, "Wi th the Bri tish power and Navy co "blned wi t:l our 
own, we have nothIng to feB:r from the rest of the world. If The 
analogy was not superficial, it was real, it was orGanic. Yet, 
concluded Lippr:an, there were I:len who dared to charc;e that a 
necotlat:totl based l.lpOn recognition of the vi tal cunnection be-
tween American secur! ty and Sri tish sea power was "un-American." 
Among those giving adverse op ,nions was the spokesl:ian 
of the Republican party, \ the presidential nOL1inee, Wendell 
Vdlkie, who observed that undoubtedly the country would approve 
the arrangement, But he found it re,retable that Roosevelt had 
nei thor deerned it necessary to seC'Jre the approval of' Congress, 
nor permitted public di.cussion prior to the adoption. A few 
days later he branded it "the most arbitaary and dictatorial 
action ever taken by any President in the history of the United 
States." Upholding the presidential action, the supportinc press 
replied that since the trade was so overwheblingly approved, 
thero was adequate proof the. t the people ha.d not Drily accepted it 
166 
41 
but welcomed such swift, bold executive action for defense .. 
The Dallas News declared that the Attorney General's 
opionion was not definite law, and that in a court more jealous 
of the constItutional powers of Congress "than was the present 
42 
;liChest bench," it would not have been upheld. A ~ York 
. 
Raily !!!! editorial cautioned America aGainst doinL business 
with the British. The British were shrewd businessmen and even 
shrewder traders. "They do not keep their promises," it 
declared, pointing to the "raw deal" that Italy had received in 
World War I when she had been promised a variety of coneessions 
and posseSSions, none of which she received. Further!llOre, in 
relation to the United states, Britain had promised to pay her 
war debt. She did not do so, but instead dubbed America, "Uncle 
Shylock." This sort of duplicity, the ~ asserted, did not 
increase confidence In the promises of the British. America, 
t~lerefore, should get the ti tle to and occupancy of the island 
43 
sltes before the destroyers were released. 
The Boston Post called tho Deal, AN IMPERIOUS ACTl f1'he 
-..;;...;;....;...;..;..;. -
~ declared that the people of the United States knew that by 
41 "Wilkie Objects," Life, Vol. IX, Septe~Ilber 16,1940, 
24; !!!! ~ Times, Septer,lber 4,""'T940, p. 1:3-14:2. 
42 .lli:.! ~ Times, September 4, 1;140, p. 13:5. 
43 ~ ~ Dai1~ !!!!, n.d., reprinted in 
Conbressional Record, Appendix, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 1940, 5451. 
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the releasinG of the destroyers trJeY had been committed by 
president Roosevelt to preserve the British Empire, its ri:::hts, 
and dOl'!1inions allover the earth. !tHer war is now America's 
war. It we were a British colony we could not do more. Most 
of them are doing less.1t It oalled the legali ty of the Deal as 
"raw a piece of chicaneryll as had yet been foisted upon a trust-
inG people in more than 150 years. Congress had been ignored, 
due process of deliberation was "debauched." Such swift, subtle 
and adroit action was not according to the cannons of Americanism 
By hauling down Old Glory from the destroyers, ~narica had cut 
adrift from the splendor of our vaunted independence. "No 
raising of the Union Jack over their decks will or can replace 
44 
it.1I 
The most volatile editorial of the opposition press 
appeared in the §j:,.Louis ~-Dispatch. It screarlling headlines 
declared, '\)1CrrATOR ROOSEVELT COMMITS ACT OF WAR!" The President 
had passed down an edict that compared with the edicts forced 
down the throats of Geroans,Italians and Russians by Hitler, 
Mussollni and Stalin. It was an edict that would eventually 
result in "the shedding of the blood of millions of Americans." 
The authori ty whi ch the President quoted for the secret deal was 
legal trickery, charged the DisEatch, conjured by a·YAs-man. It 
44 nAn Imperious Act," Boston-Posta September 4,1940, 
reprinted in ConGreSSional Record, Appendix '7() Cong.3 Sess. I 
1940, 5451. 
lG8 
was a violutlor. of A.mor1can law and international law. Lioreover, 
.<-:at; ~:;oO(: would leases be if Hitler should acquire title to those 
:;'slanus by rii,ht of conquost? tllf t:lis secretly necotiated. deal 
epes thru, the fat is in the fire, and all nay as well got 
ready for a fulldress participation in the European war." If 
ConGress and the people did not rise in solemn wrath to stop 
Roosevel t, then the colintry deserved the stupendous tra;.:;edy t);1at 
45 
loomed right around t:l0 corner, concluded the DisEatch, gloomily. 
The Catholic weekly, America, considerine the matter 
from a pragmatical standpoint, felt it was better to be safe than 
sorry. The trade was probably a judicious one, it admitted, but 
there was quos tion as to tho manner in which the bases were secuza. 
od. I t was a step wi th far-reaching ir:lpllca tiona and poss ible 
consequences. "Was 1 t rie;ht," 1 t asked, "for Mr. Roosevelt to <il( 
his hand deep into the Grab-bag of old war tiI:J.e powers in order 
to swinL~ the deal?tf It savored of chicanery W!.1en the President, 
without previously informing the public, had recourse to such 
Gone are the former great protesters of the 
Senate and the House, weak are the spokesman of the 
political parties, subservient are the newspapers, once 
militant, and thoughtless 1s ti1e mass of tho people, 
The democratic processes more or less remain, but dem-
ocracy 1s dyine. 
45 Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, n.d.,reprinted in Con-
{;resslonal Record, Appeno.ix 76 Ctbng., :3 3ess.,1940,5429-5430:--
i! 
-
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Vias the wise, but sad observat::,on from America. 
The Christian Cent~y asserted the Deal was a step, a 
leap toward war. Having quoted the Statutes of 1883 and 1917 fOIl-
biddlng th.e transfer, it acc ..... sed the President of not referrlng 
t:'l0 action to Congress for 1 ts a!-iproval because he knew that Con-
cress would no r.lore approve the Deal than it would have voted fox 
the release of the "mosquito fleet. It "Tho President on hls own 
47 
G.J.thorlty has taken a grave step." 
~ considered that the President's parallel between 
himself and Thomas Jefferson, on the ono hand, and the circum-
stances of the trade and those which faced the third President it 
1803, on the other, was not perfect. When Jefferson. purchased 
Louisiana, Concress was not in seesion; but Franklin Roosevelt's 
Concress was hard at work. No W1iq,,;e opportunity had been pre-
sented to Roosevelt by su.rprise. He had prepared the Deal in 
43 
secrecy wlthout taking Congress or the public into his confidenCE. 
John T. Flynn, Chairman of the Keep America Out of War 
COIT'.mittee, saw the United States walking lithe last mile in the 
fatal descent into war." He insisted that the President would 
46 America, New York,Vol.LXIII, September 14,1940,618. 
47 "American Destroyers Join Sri tish Freet, II Christlar 
Century, New Yor~, Vol.LVIII,September 11,1940,1100. 
48 "The Big Deal," !.!E!!, Chicago, Vol.XXXVI,September 
ly, 1940, 11-12. 
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hElve been impeached if it were not for "Congress's long record 
49 
of servile submission to the executive." 
Collier~! pessimistically predicted that if the Presi-
de:1t ijot away flunscathed a:ld unscorched wi th this act of absolute 
power, If there need be no end to sllch acts by him or by lat sr 
presidents. "Unless ways can Be found to restore the constitu-
tional l1mi ts to the powers and a~ilbi tions of the executive brancb 
50 
of governr:J.ont, del:1coracy in the United States is on the sk:ids. If 
The "treaty of alliance II between the two powers to 
protect their C:X:1Il'l;;n interests in this hemisphere was considered 
by t!'le !!ill Street Journal important enough in its milItary and 
diplomatIc consequences to have been debated thoroughly by 
Congress. Yet, Congress was "interpreted" entirely out of the 
proceedinGS. "By s'd.ch procedure American Governmunt approaches 
, 5~ 
the political outskirts of Berlin," was the Journal's reflection, 
The Detroit .E!:!! Press printed this appropriate bit of 
verse concerning Roosevelt's agreement with Great Britain: 
He takes a portion of our fleet 
Before we ever use it 
And says, 'For us it's obsolete 
But maybe George can <.lse it.' 
49 Ibid. 
-
56 "Where Do We Go From Here," Collier's n.d.,re-
printed 1n C()nGr.}:~ .. s.~.~ona1. R~ corgf Appendix, Vol. U6, Pt.XV 1 II, 76 GonG.,3 Seaa., 1940, 6009-0 O. 
51 Wall Street Jou.rnal, September 4, 1940, p.4:1. 
He d:.lbs our Boeing bon~binG planes 
O .... tmoded and passe 
But for Brittanla's domains 
He llopes they'll save tht~ day. 
"rwould m.ake the youn~; in heart fee 1 sad, 
Depressed and sorely srnitten 
To hear, 'youtre obsolete, my lad 
So go and fir:;ht for Britain. '52 
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The foreign press reported th.a t the ..:c:ajori ty of the 
British, wherever they gathered, rejoiced over the news that 
fifty American destroyers would be sent to fill in the Gaps of 
t:le Royal Navy in its struggle against tIle total German selGe of 
53 
t~le British Isles. The British press considered that t::le trade 
was the most conspicuous demonstration yet given of the ceneral 
American desire to render the utmost help cor.1patible wi th 
neutrality in a COUI'se recognized as vital to the future of the 
54 
United states. In London, papers in which the Deal dominated 
front pages .. the agreement was hailed in lyrical terl;.s. 'fhe 
Daily EXEress said that Roosevelt's gesture did not imply that 
America intended to declare war agaInst Germany. nIt is 
fortuituous and inevitable that every move America makes for her 
self preservation is a move 1n our defense too." 
460-461. 
52 Porter Sargent, Getting Us Into War, Boston, 1941, 
Poem by Ruth Kreoen. 
53 ~ ~ Times, September 4, 1940, p. 11:1. 
54 "World Reaction to the Destroyer Deal .. " China V'Ieek-
lz Review, Vol. XCIV, September 14, 1940, 145. Press opInIon---
from foreign newspapers was printed in th~s weekly. 
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The LondoE Daily ':I.'oleG:r'~l~ rer,arded t;te tra~:1Sfer as a 
notii'iea tlOll to Ili tIer of ALlOY-iea IS conr ldence in hr. '..ll tl:,',H" te 
55 
\i.~ C tor:r for 13ri taln. An ad: torial £1'01:1 t:le London 'f haes appr6 
c::.ated t;le fact t}la~~ t~lere was a great cause CO~,illlon to jj:r:>ltain 
a~ld tll6 United States. !tIt was to t?w British interest to :181p 
56 
"The nat:'on welcolaed t: ... 6 announcer:;.ent, fl declru."od t;le 
Daily ~ (London). It was a proper develop:::flent of tho Inevl-
-
tably increasinG cooperation between EnGland and the Uni ted S ta~ 
not only in the defense of COlanon liberties of l";Lankind, "but 1n 
tho w':der spht~re of action where we can jointly seClre a new 
world order." The Daily Herald (London) considered Churchill's 
announcement a .;rand piece of news. The territories wO;J.ld now 
1)OCO::10 l:'1ore than r:1ere possession; they would be str:)neholds of 
democracy. It was a ztlaJor milestone in the strusgle against 
Nazi acgression and a solid ~)roof of the co;;,plcte harl;,ony and 
57 
l:lUtual confidence between Viashing,ton and London. 
When Pri:r:le :,anister Chur'chill informed tll0 House of 
Cor::.rnons of the neGotiations between t:~le two~o:..l.ntries, Somorset 
5:5. 
paper. 
55 C::licaco Dail;z 'frih' .. mo, :)eptemb~)r 4, 1940,p.5:4-
Press opinion from forei,sn ne\.~papers was printed in t:lis 
56 New York Times, AUGust 21, 1940, p.4:5-4:6. 
--
57 l.bid. 
ill 
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Chairs, a Conservati vo, proposed. an ~li:1end:;ent for the rodactioa 
the ninety-nine year lease period, whlle a group of n1.ne uem-
bel'S talked down this sU£Gostlon and objected to any tlue limit 
on t,he proposal. Mr. Ian Hannah suggested a resolution that "the 
proper time for which to lease naval bases to tl1.e United States 
58 
of America will be e99 years.", 
Curiously enouGh, the Royal Navy treated the Deal 
clElrlishly. Two reasons were offeltWed for such reaotion. Firs t 
there was the Innate snobbishness of the Brl tish Navy and its 
distrust of any thine maritime that did not have UK. M.S." in 
front of its name, and of anybody who did not attend Dartll~outh, 
the Royal Naval College. Second, there was a sense of shame" on 
Wlll ch the Germans and I tallans capi talized, resul tlng frou, the 
fact that Britain had allowed her defenses to reach such a new 
low that she needed reinforce.:..:ent from. the Uni ted States. How-
ever, most off J.cials greeted the Deal with heartfelt aatlsi'aetion, 
s~lowing that they considered the Uni ted states' sympathy for 
59 
tl"leir cause not a mere :;:Hiitter of words. 
His Majesty, King GeorGe VI, accepted the decision wi tb 
Gratification. "I trust," he said, "that the grant to that 
58 London Times, September 5, 1940, p. 4:6. 
59 New York Times, September 8,1940, IV, p. 5:4-5:6. 
1?4 
Government of' defense facilities in certain terri tories on the A 
18!ltic seaboard m.ay especially serve to defend the her! tase of 
66 
fre e ;;lan. ff 
The Aus tralians ',Jere reported to acclaim the naval 
acreement; as one of the most iu:;.portant and hearteninG develop-
;;Lents of the war, and a f:lI'thet- demonstration that the main-
tenance of neutrality enabled the United states to supply more 
In'unediate and ;nore valuable aid than any direct participation in 
61 
1105 tili ties. 
Public reactIon in South America toward the Destroyor-
E;ase Deal was summarIzed 'oy Uruguay t s mos t importen t newspaper, 
Bl Dia of :Lontevideo. I t considered the agree,:lont a creat histcr 
--
leal event, destined to have. a tremondous and decisive influence. 
It w0clld :make a larGe i)Urt of the American continent inaccessible 
to invasion from other continents. It would closely \J,ni te all 
territor},€':s in the Western Her.1isphere and all ra.ces which ':'nhablt 
62 
then:. But La Nacion of Duenas Aires declared that in South 
-
Amerioan diplO1Ultic circles it was cenerally felt that consider-
able difficulty would be lliet in any effort of the United States 
60 Par11a.'Uentary; Debates, Lords, Vol.GXVII, November 
20, 1940, 739. 
61 _N~w Yorl~Times, September 5, 1940, p. 10:5. 
62 New York Timos. AU;2;ust 25, 1940, IV,p. 5:3. 
--
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to establish bases in South American republics.- Admitting their 
.~nability to defend thel:lselves, they still feared encroachment 
63 
from a country as powerful as the Uni ted States. 
ForeIgn Minister Oswalda Oranha of Brazil, at a public 
dinner announced that the Brazilian President, Gelu,lio D. Vargas, 
Cave his full approval to the transfer. "The Americans' people 
took due notice of the notes exchanged between the British and 
Altlerican Governments and read wIth confidence and satisfaction 
64 
t:B afflrr:latlons of the Govern!-:lent of His British ; .. :ajesty." 
According to the Boeata (Columbia) paper, Tienlpo .. the 
arrangement was tli.e most important act concerninG the Atuericas 
since the beglnnine; of the war. Although it was close to total 
bellicerency, yet, strategically it had extraordinary signlflcarue 
since the United States procured a belt of secu.rity for t..">1.e 
65 
Caribbean and the Panar~la Canal. 
The Anglo-Arnerican agreer~'lent was Ci ven the greatest 
prominence in the Spanish press, according to the London Tirqes. 
The "common defense" of the two English speaking deznocracies had 
deeply impressed the poople of the Iberian peninsula. It had 
66 
enhanced their growint; confidence in the Allied cause. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., September 5, 1940, p. 12:2. 
65 Ibid. 
66 London 'Times, September 4, 1940, p. 3:3. 
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It! general, most favorable reactions to the Destroyer-
Naval Base trade were reported from the people on the islands of 
the Atlantic and Caribbean area. Nevertheless .. a l)errnuda Assern-
bly, on A,-,gust 25, sent a L,smor::'al to the Br;.tish ;'ecretary of 
state .. a0 . !laring that tho pouple of Berl..uja were deeply disturbed 
lest t~le new plan of American ~leLlisphere defense .;,lght affect the 
sta t...l.S of' "he~olony of Hermuda. 'rhey rear!' jr;·:cd tiw ir loyall ty 
to His ;'::uJesty, the King, and earnestly requested the:.t nothin[, 
WG.lld be allowed to prejudice their constit,.ltion or the':"r Sovern-
67 
;,;ent under Bri tish rulo. The principal reaction in Ber:iluda, hs. 
ever, was ono of satlsfa.:!tion, th~t while firmly reJ:.aining Brltisl 
Berlnuda would enjoy the phys lcal as well as Laoral pro te c tlon of' 
t:le United States and that the colony \!,Quld l-irofit econorr.ically. 
Yet, some considered the project as tantamount to a step toward 
"war. They declaI'ed that the Golony would still flc the Union Jac~ 
and be at war with the Axis Powers, but that any military action 
on Bermuda by Germany or Italy would neceusarily bring the United 
68 
States' fighting forces into conflict w.:th the attacklJrs. 
The people of the Bahamas welcomed the establishment of 
a Uni ted states naval aud air base on their islands as lont; as 
British sovereiGnty was not affected. But there was considerable 
67 flli. 
68 ~ ~ 'rimes, August 26, 1940, p. 8:4-8:5. 
j:1 
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curiosity o~er the site to be caosen for the base, since the poo-
did not want Lt to interfere with their tourist trade which 
69 
wa.s eiChty per cent of their econo;:tlc life. 
From JW!lalca, st. Lucia, Trinidad and Bri tlsh Guiana, 
the peo1)lo were reported to be pleased with the arranSth.iEmt. It 
helped cement ties already bln~Ung iunerica and the Brl tish L.rr..pire 
T:le press reported that a cordial welcome awal ted the Unl ted 
70 
states' all' an~ naval forees. 
CanadIans In Ottawa cheered when the news of the deois-
lon was announced. V~hile PrLn6 Minister ~~lackc.nzle King bew,~ed his 
sa tisfactlon, the Canadian papers proclaL . .ed it wl th a chorus of 
appreciative edltorials. It was hailed as ono of the diplOll1atic 
71 
triumphs of the perlod. 
At first, the Germans professed an inability to under-
stand the .implications of the Veal, for "Germany had no intention 
whatever of attacking the ';'vestern Heldsphere. ff Although there v.ru: 
no official comment from Germany on the transfer, what the Nazi 
Goverrunent really thought was shown by an edi torial in the 
authoritative Hamburger Fremdenblatt Which bore all the earmarks 
of an official inspiration. Reoapitulating the famous case of 
69 Ibid., September 7, 1940, p. 31:1. 
70 Ibid., September 4, 1940, p. 15:6, and Septer~er 
G, 1940, p. 12:&-12:2. 
71 Ibid., September 4, 1~j40, p. 15:4. 
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the Alaba.ma~ Claims, tlle paper reviewed the strons feeling field at 
tr~at t.:J::e by the UnIted States Govorn.;aont aGainst BritaIn for thWi 
[<leline and abetting its adversary: 
American ind.lGnation about hnc;land's attit:...lde 
in the Civil War elevated the case of the Alabama to an 
external symbol of neatral violation. Since then it has 
been internationally recoGnized that neutral states are 
guil ty of violatinG tl~eir neutral status if they deli vcr 
or permit to be equ.ipped on thoir terri tory s.lips of 
war intended for a belligerent nation. 72 
Therefore, German feelines about the Destroyer Deal, the Harnbr.lru.r 
FrernEienblatt implied, cr,tlld not be very dissimilar from AHiorl~an 
sentiments at the time of the Alabaraa case. 
The Berlinger Nachtausgobe branded tho trade tla typical 
plutocratIc bargain." The ~eutsche Allgemeine Zeitu.ng chare;od 
the Uni ted States wi th using a 31 tuation to overhaul I:.ngland, just 
us in tho last war America had taken the chance of attaining parl.t 
with the Empire. 
The Nazi press read r;,any ir.lplications into the Ane.;lo-
American agreement. It took occasion to torture the British with 
such reflections as, that England's sitt.J.atLm was so obviou.sly 
desperate it had to relinquish its valuable bases; it ':ndicated 
that t:1S British Empire was "cracking up, tt and that the navy was 
in dire strai ts, compelled to assiGn to sea:n:lhand vessels the 
convoy Ing of valuable cargoes. But it as::!l,)!'ted, r'~ t was too late 
72 ~., Septe;nber 8, 1940, IV, p. 5:6. 
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to help EnL'-and. It Destroyers were inadeq .... Hlte help to swing the 
73 
balance :~ Britain's favor. 'l'hU2 tIle ease of the fifty de s tr:.);:r-
ers resell ted In another necatl ve chapter in the ::lorry hIstory of 
German-AmerIcan relat!.ons. .!"or, In the GeI'man view, it had 
brouGht the Untted States one step farther alonG tIle 
path it had been follo"11n~:, Sln?8 the outbreal{ of the war. 
The Nazi domina ted Swedish pre sa solemnly de clared that 
a deep ir:1presslon had been H~ade by the "Anglo-Saxon bloc. If The 
pro-German §,tockholm Tiddin£/lJr asserted that the agreement was a 
tcJ..rnlns point ::'n the history of those two Great powers; it opened 
vast prospects in world h;.story. It ii:,plied that Canada's defen~ 
would be handed over to America and that the Monroe Doctrine wouLc 
74 
be extended to other British dom.tnions. 
Italian newspapers charged the United States with seek-
inc to gain territory in the break up of the British Empire. 
Stefani, the official Italian news agency. observed that various 
South Al;lerican republics considered thut the Unl ted States was 
seeking rather cleverly to establIsh heger:lony over Central Am8r-
l~a and to transform the whole Caribbean area Into a h .. lL:6 naval 
• ase for the r;orth At.~erlcan fleet. The proposed concession of ail 
and naval bases by Bri tain to the Uni ted States was a prelude to 
and historical evolution, !lln wh':'ch the first chap~er was London's 
73 Ibid.1. September 4, 1940, p. 15:1. 
74 Ibid., September 8, 1940, p. 44:4. 
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donination o"'vor tho thlI'teon colonies of North America, tf a1'1d the 
last c:lapter would be represen.ted by Enc:;land onterinl:S lias a dor.:.-
75 
i~1ion in an imperial eO~:m1onwca.lth of the United States' n Cri-
tlcisL'l of the Uni ted States and President Roosevelt was confined 
to stron,".· expressions of contempt. The Gazetta ~ Popola said 
t;\at the "British Lion was be(~inninc~ to bleat." ,_ • L Accordinc to the 
Resto del Carlino, Britain had spontaneously made herself a secx:rxi 
- -
rate power, a client of the United ;;)tates, Now the AnGlo-Saxon 
world had its first center In \~ashlncton instead of Westminlster 
Atbey. 
The first au.thoritative reaction appeared in Home as 
late as September 28. 11ho P0:f201o ~'I talia declared t!.l8,t 
Washincton must rid itself of extravacant 
notions about rulin~: the world and beins the people's 
tribLmal,because she tWS nelther the rl.:)lt,force,nor 
,intelliGence to exercise such functions. Aboue all, 
',lIashinr: tl)n OUi~ht to ')Ol1vince herself tho. t hundreds of 
millions of ,[;en have not risen acainst London to pass 
from the Bri tish rope to the New Yorle knot. One cannot 
invoke the Monroe Doctrine for AnlOrica and t):len poke 
one's nose in to the affairs of Europe ••• by furnlshlnr", •• 
destroyers to the En . .1ish and leaainb stroneholds ••• '16 
The transaction was viewed by the Soviet press as 
like ly to ;:)rolong t:le war. The Communis t party :japer, I:ra vcta, 
accused the Uni ted States of manifes tine its lone c(mcealed 
colonial arnbitio!:1s. Dnder cover of the Monroe Doctrine, AmerL'GI 
75 Ibid., AUGust 23, 1940, p. 4:5. 
76 I.bid. , Septe,',lber 2\), 1940, p. 25 :2-2b :3. 
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imperialism proclaimed unshared hegemony over both Americans. 'rhe 
<It 
Soviet trade union press, !~, published a cartoon protraying 
the British Lion begginG before Uncle Sam with a warship in its 
moath. The caption read, "London is now compelled to reconcile 
itself to the position of a youn2er brother in the AnGlo-Saxon 
77 
family." 
The Japanese press s11rveyed the Bri tish-Amerlcan naval 
deal from its possible effects on Japan f s southward Expansion. 
It lnterpreted the United Statos' action as a forerunner of a 
78 
similar collaboration in the Pacific. The newspaper Asahi 
feared that if Britain fell, tho fleet would be sent to the Far 
East. Such a step would double the importance of the SinGapore 
base. Asahi declared: 
Japan must be prepared to face a pressing 
problem before long, concernine defense in the Pacific 
and m.feguarding our southward economic development 
policy. It is now obvious that the Unlted states 
having completed defense of its front door will 
consolidate the defense of its back door on the Pacific. 
Together with Ameri ca' s hiGh naval progra.rr. this must 
arouse our dee lies t concorn. 
77 IbId., Septenber 7, 1940, p. 6:1. 
78 Ibld., September 5, 1940, p. 10:3. 
CHAP'rbR VI 
CONCLUSION 
The Destroyer-Naval Base Deal was an unprecedented act 
of favoritism toward Great Bri tain. As a conspicuous ,jeasure 
short of war, it was continuation of the policy so often urged 
by the State Department under President Roosevelt, and completely 
accepted by the Chief Executive. The Administration was convi~ 
that under modern conditions a nation need not and should not re-
m.ain strictly neutral. The Administration was convinced that 
peace would be the inspiration behind the Administration's ur-
gently repeated recommendation for the repeal of the arms er.lbar[,;c 
It was ar[;ued that mandatory embargoes would bind the Executive, 
and that prospective aggressors like Germany, Italy and Japan 
could declare war because the United States would not furnish 
war materials to the victim. In this connection, tl~ inter-
ventionists warned the isolationists that the hands of the Ad-
ministration were tied at the very time that America mould have 
been free to place her influence where it would count. Such an 
atti tude would not I!lake for world peace, and the prospectl ve 
aggressors in Europe knew they could proceed with f.ull confidence 
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T:le Administration believed that Hi tler would never have attack-
<It 
ed Europe if he had not been assured that Britain and France 
could secure no arms in the United States. Therefore, when 
President Roosevelt urged the repeal of the arms embargo solely 
as a return to international law and AmerIcan traditional policy 
of neutrality, the Adrninistration was really tryinc to help the 
. 
democracies r'esist the German onslaught by facilitatinG for them 
tl1e purchase of war claterials. 
Early in June, 1940, the exchane;e of cables began be-
tween Great Britain and the United States. After several weeks 
of preliminary negotiations, the Unl ted States Gover.rl.r:lent aBreed 
to release to Great Eri taln fifty overago recomrllissioned 
destroyers. The British, on their part, r:.ade tile United States 
£ifts of two sites for projected bases on the islands of 
NeWfoundland and BerJ:;lada. Moreover, Great Britain gran ted n.inety< 
n~ne year rent-free leases for sites on six islands from the 
Bahamas to British Guiana. 
Presumably, the President thm.lt;ht it Imperati ve to av 
the delay which deliberate congressional action would have en-
tailed. The Anglo-American agreement was reached by sole ex-
ecutlve action. Congressmen showed a wide diverGence of opinion 
in re,_ ard to the Destroyer-Naval Base Deal. Some criticized the 
. 
arrangement because they felt it would lead to war, that it was 
anconstitutional, a surrender of Alaerica's flr'st line of defense, 
and an overt act of belliGerency. Proponents of the trade, on 
104 
efre cting tJ.;le negotiations without the a.dvice and consent of the 
senate becaJse the bases were so vitally necessary for national 
defense. 
Students of international law were dlvided in their 
opinion. Professor Herbert BrIGGs maintained that the supplyinG 
of the vessels by the United states Govemunent to a bellic:erent 
was a violation of Ar:.lerica's neutral statu.s, and a viola'~ion of 
national and international law. Professor Quincy Wright, a lead-
inL interventionist, defended the transaction. ;;;)ince Germany,by 
her violations of the Kelloge-Briand Pact, was not a lawful 
belligerent, signers of that instrument were not obliGated under 
interna tional law to observe toward Germany and her allies the 
duties of a neutral. Professor Edwin Borchard SOlemIlly asserted 
that "there was no possibility of reconeiling the Deatroyer Deal 
wi. th neutrality. n James Ryan, an eminent jurist, defended the 
Pre6ident's action by concludinG t>lat it was an clei:lentary canon 
of le[;al interpre tation that the Government's own executl ve 
officers were not intended to be bound by statutory proviSions 
unless named in them. 
Few Americans questioned the value of tr~ potential 
bases. A Gallup poll two weeks before the Deal revealed that a 
dlajorl ty favored trw reloase of tl1e destroyers. 
Pross opinion in the Western HemIsphere and in England 
acclai;,led the trade, although there were some opposine; articulate 
outbursts from some papers in the United States. Editorials frm! 
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papers infhlenced or controlled by the Axis were sarcastically 
hostile und threateninG. 
ThruuC;h extensive research, the wri tel' has atteH1pted 
to collate data from many sources relative to an issiAe th.at 
..... ndo;..lbtedly stireed up as nuch controversy as any other sincle 
:ssue of World War II. 
APPENDIX I 
THE PRESIDF;NT TRANSil.ITS TO COUGRESS CORRhSPONDF~NCE REGARDING 
EXC.HANGE AND THE OPINION OF TIrE AT'l'OR1IEY GENERAL 
REGARDING HIS PO'i~:~R TO NEGOTIATE THE TRAUSl.;>ER 
WITH GREAT BRITA!N .. SEPT'BMBER 3, 1940 
I transmit here wi th for the information of the Congress 
notes exohanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and 
the Seoretary of State on September 2, 1940, under which this go"" 
ernment has acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in 
Newfoundland, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica 
Santa Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua in British Guiana; also a cop, 
of an opinion of the Attorney General, dated August 27, 1940, re. 
earding my authority to consumate this arrangement. 
The right to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are 
gifts--generously given and gladly reoeived. The other bases men 
tioned have been aoquired in exchange for fifty of our overage 
destroyers. This is not inconsistent in any sense with our statu 
of peaoe. Still les8 is it a threat against any nation. It is 
an epochal and far reaching aot of preparation for Continental 
defense in the face of grave danger. 
Preparation for defense is an inalienable prerogative Q 
a sove~gn state. Under present circumstances this exercise of 
sovereignty is essential to a maintenance of our peace and saret, 
This 1s the most important actioll in the reinforcement of our na-
tional defense that has been taken since the Louisiana Purchase. 
Then, as now, considerations of safety from overseas attack were 
fundamental. 
The value to the Western Hemisphere of these outposts 
of security is beyond calculation. Their need has long been reOOt~ 
nized by our country and especially by those primarily charged 
with the duty of oharting and organizing our own naval and 
military defense. They are essential to the protection of the 
Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South 
America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico and our own a,astern and 
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gulf seaboards, Their consequent importance in hemispheric 
defense is obvious. For these reasons I have taken advantaGe 
of tb.e present opportunity to acquire them. 
Flmk, Roosevelt' s .E.2E.~ign Policy, 273-274. 
APPENDIX II 
LET'rrm rl'O CORDELL HULL, SI£ CHE'l'AHY OF STA'l'E, 
FROM THE BRITISH Ali.BASSADOR, 
THl';IrlARG:;.ULSS OF LOTHIAN 
SEPTEMBER 2, 1940 
I have the honor under instructions from His Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you 
that In view of the friendly and sympathetic interest of His 
h!ajesty's Government in the United Ktngdom in the national 
secu.rity of the United States and their desire to strengthen the 
ability of the United States to cooperate effectively with the 
other nations of the Americas in the defence of the Western 
Hemisphere, His Majesty's Government will secure the grant to the. 
Government of the United States freely and without consideration, 
of the lease for immediate establisrunent and use of naval and air 
bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and 
protection thereof, on the Avalon Peninsula, and on the southern 
coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast of the Great Bay 
of Bermuda. 
r~urthermore, in view of the above and 1n view of the 
desire of the United states to ac.uire additional air and naval 
bases in the Ca:cibbean and in British Guiana, without endeavorin£ 
to place a monetary or commercial value upon the many tangible 
and intangible riGhts and properties envolved, His :tLajesty's 
Government will make available to tho Uni ted States for im.ruediate 
establishment and use naval and air bases and facilities for 
entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on thE 
eastern side of the Bahamas, the southern coast of' Jamaica, and 
the western coast of Santa Lucia, the west coast of Trinidad in 
the Gulf of 1'aria, in the island of Antigua and in Bri tlsh Guiam 
within fifty miles of Georgetown, 1n oxchange for naval and 
:':"11i tary equipment and material which the Unl ted States Oovern-
(aent will transfer to His Majesty I s Government. 
All the bases and facilities referred to' in the preced-
ing paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a perIod 
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... 0::: ninety-nine years, free ,:'r()<:~ all rent and charges other than 
sLlch cOlilpensation to be n:utually aGreed on to be paid by t~le 
'Jnlted States in order to ,~~o . .lpensate t:le owners of Drivate Dro-
J:,e.r'ty for' 10sst)1 expropriation or da::.a8e arIsing out of the 
este.blisfl;,1ont of the bases and. facili ties in question. 
HIs Majesty I s Goverl1J:T!.ent in the leases to be !:l.yeed 
upon, wi 11 gl"ant to tho Uni ted Stat~s for the period of tl10 lease 
all the riGhts, lJower and authority within the bases leased, and 
wi thin the limits of t~-lO terr': torial waters and air space s ad-
jacent to or in t::J.O vicini t;y 01' sach tases, necessary to provide 
access to and defence of such .bases, an..i appropriate provisions 
for their control. 
Without prejudice to t::Je above-mentioned rights of the 
1Jni ted ;3tates authorities and tr:B ir jurisdiction wi thin the leas-
ed areas, the adjust,Llsnt and reconciliation betwen the jurisdic-
tion of the a.;.thorities of the Uni ted States wi thin these areas 
and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in 
w~11ch tb,es6 areas are Situated, 8;'14,,11 be deter"::lined by common 
acreer10nt. 
The exact looat:i.on firtd bounds of tho afor'esaid bases, 
the neoessary seaward coast, and anti-aircraft defenses, the lo-
cation of sufficient military garrisons, stores, and other ne-
cessary auxiliary facilit1es s~all be determined by common 
agreement. 
His Majesty's Government 1s prepared to designate im-
mediately experts to meet with ex)erts of tlle Unl ted States for 
these purposes. Should these experts be unable to agree tn any 
particular situation axcep-" in the case of Newfoundland and Bor-
muda, the matter shall be settled by the Secretary of state of 
the United i:)tates and Hls lr1ajesty's Secretary of State for 
ForeiGn Affairs. 
Ibid., 274-275. 
APPLNDIX III 
u:rrrrI.:R F'ROM SECHhTARY HULL TO 
'.rllE. ~;iAH~\.UhSS OF LOTHIAN 
SEPThri\BLR 2, 1940 
I have received your note of September 2, 1940. I am 
directed by the President to reply to your note as follows: 
'1'ho Goverrunent of tho United states appreciates the 
declarations and the generous action of His iilajostyl s Government 
as contained in your communication which are destined to enhance 
the national security of the United States and ereatly to 
s trenc;then its abili ty to coopora to efffl cti ve ly with the other 
nations of the Americas in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. 
It, therefore, gladly accepts the proposals. 
'rhe Government of the Unl ted States will iminediately 
designate experts to meet with experts designated by His Majesty' 
G6vernment to determine upon the exact location of the naval and 
air bases mentioned in your co~ununication under acknowledt;mont. 
In consideration of the declarations above quoted, the 
Government of the United States will immediately transfer to His 
Majesty's Government fifty United States Navy destroyers gener-
ally referred to as the 1,200 ton type. 
Accept, Excellency, the renewed aSSilrances of my 
highest consideration. 
Ibid., 275. 
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AP.ilBHDIX IV 
THE OPINION S\JBJ;ITTl"D 'ro PRESID~HT RO()SLV~,LT BY 
ROBERT JACKSON', NJ.1TORNEY Gh:lbRAL Oi" THE 
UNI'l'ED STAT};S, -AUGUST 27, 1940 
My dear Mr. President: In accordance with your request, 
I have considered your constItutional and statutory authority to 
proceed by executive agreement with the British Government im-
mediately to acquire for the United States certain offshore naval 
and air bases in the Atlantic Ocean without awaiting the inevitruili 
delays which would accompany the conclusion of a formal treaty. 
The essential characteristics of the proposal are: 
(a) The United states to acquire rights for immediate 
establishment and use of naval ana air bases in Newfoundland, Ber-
muda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Santa Lucia, Trinidad, and British 
Guiana, sllch rights to endure for a period of ninety-nine years 
and to include adequate proviSions for access to and defense of 
such bases and appropriate provIsions for tneir control. 
(b) In consideration it 1s proposed to transfer to 
Great Britain the title and possession of certaln overaGe ships 
and obsolescent military materials now the property of the 0nited 
States and certain other s'::1all patrol boats Which, though nearly 
completed are already obsolescent. 
(c) Upon such transfer all obligations of the United 
Sta tes are discharged. rrhe acq'..lisi tion consls ts only of riLhts, 
which the United States may eXercise or not at 1 ts. optIon; and if 
exercised, may a.bandon wi thout consent. The pri vilce;e of ,ulintaw 
ing such bases is subject only to limitations nece~sary to rucon-
cl1e United States' use with the sovcrelcnty retained by Great 
Bri tain. Our Government assurr,cs no responslbili ty for cl vil a&'.dn 
istration of any territory. It makes no promise to erect 
stru.ctures, or maintain forces at any point. It undortaxes no 
defense of the possessions of any colJIltry. In ahart, it acquires 
optional bases Which rr:.ay be developed as Congress appropriates 
funds therefor, but the Uni ted States does not assume any con-
tinuine or future obligations, commitment or alliance. 
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• The questions of' Bonstl tu.tional and statutory authori t~ 
with which alone I am concerned, seem to be these: 
}t'irst: May such an acquisition be ~oncluded by the 
President under and executive ac;reement, or must it be negotiated 
as a treaty, subject to ratification by the Senate? 
Second: Does authority exist in the President to aliED 
ate the title to such ships and obsolescent materials: and if so, 
on what conditions? 
Third: Do the statutes of the Uni ted States limit the 
right to deliver the so-called mosqaito boats now under construc':' 
tlonsor the overage destroyers by reason of the belligerent 
status of Great Britain? 
I. There is, of course, no doubt concerninG the autto .. 
ity of the President to negotiate with the British Government for 
the proposed exchange. 'rhe only questions that might be raised ir. 
connections therewi th are (1) whether the arrane;ement must be put 
in the form of a treaty and await ratification by the Senate or 
(2) whether t11ere must be additional leeislation by tho ConGress. 
Ordinarily, and assurninc the absense of enablinc leg-
islation, the question whether sach an agreement can be concluded 
under Presidential a.uthority or whether it must await ratlficatioI 
by a two-thirds vote of the United States Senate involves consid-
eration of two powers which the Constitution vests in the Pres-
ident. 
One of these is the power of t!le Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States Which 1s conferred upon 
the President by the Cons ti tation byt is not defined or limited. 
Happily, there has been little occasion in our history for the 1I) 
terpretation of ttl.e powers of the President as COIl1l'.nander~in-Chief 
of the Army and Navy. I do not find it necessary to rest upon 
that power alone to sustain the present proposal. But it will 
hardly be open to controversy that the vesting of such a fu.nction 
in the President also places upon hIm a responslbili ty to use all 
oOBstltutional authority which he rnay possess to provide adequate 
bases and stations for the utilization of the naval and air 
weapons of the Uni ted States at their highest efficiency in our 
defense. It seems equally beyond doubt that present world don-
ditions forbid him to risk any delay that 1s constitutionally 
avoidable. 
The second power to be considered is thut control of 
foreign relations which the Constitution vests in the President 
as a part of the executive function. The nature and extent of 
this power has recen.tly been explicitly and authoritatively de-
fined by Justice Sutherland, writing :t or the Supreme Court. In 
19:36, in United States v Curtiss-Wricht Export Corporation et ale 
299 U. S. :304, he said: 
'It Is important to bear in mind that we are here deal 
ing not alone on all thori ty ve s ted in the Pre s iden t by an exertion 
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of leGislative power, but with s:lch an a!.l.thority plus the very 
delicate plenary and exlusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of trle Federal Government in tl1e field of international rela-
tions, a power 'Nhi~;h <ioes not require as a basis for its exercise 
and act of Congress, but which, of course, likb every other gover!!" 
:j~en tal power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicablE 
provisions of tho Constitution. It is quite apparent that if,in 
the [:;.alntenance of our in ternat ional relations, embarrassment--
perhaps serious er~Ibarrassrrlent .. -is to be avoided and success for 
our aims achieved, ConGressional leGislation which is to be made 
effec ti ve throur;h negotiation and inquiry wi thin th.e internationa 
field must often accord to tr~ President a degree of discretion 
and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admiss-
able were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he,not Con-
gress, has tho better opportunity of knowing the conditions which 
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time 
of 'liar. He has his confidential sources of information. He has 
his agents in t~he form of diplomatic, consular and other official:i 
Secrecy in respect of information Lathered by them may be hii::;hly 
necessary, and tl1e pl~er:lature disclosure of it productive d' harm-
ful results.' 
The President's power over foreign relations while 
"delicate, plenary, and exclusive" is not unlimited. Some neGo-
tiations involved corllUlitments as to the future which woul(~ carry 
and obligation to exercise powers·vested in the Congress. Such 
Presidential arrangements are customarily submitted for ratifica-
tion by a two-thirds vote of the Senate before the future legis-
lative power of the co~try is corr~itted. liowever, the acquisi-
tions Which you are proposing to accept are without express or im-
plied promises on the part of the United States to be performed 
1n the future. llbe Consideration Which we later discuss, is com-
pleted upon transfer of the specified items. 'rne executive 
agreement obtains an opportunity to establish naval and air bases 
for the protection of our coastline but it tmposes no obligation 
upon the Congress to appropriate money to ImpDove the opportunity 
It 1s not necessary for the Senate to ratify an opportunity that 
entails no obligation. 
There are precedents which might be cited but not all 
strictly pertinent. 'rhe propos! tion ralls far short 1n t:lO.gnitude 
of the acqu.isi tion by President Jefferson of the Louisiana 
Territory from a belligerent during a European war, the Congoss 
later appropriatinG of the consideration and the Senate later 
ratifying a treaty ombodyinL, t~le agreenlcnt. I ru:. also reminded 
that in 1850, Secretary of State Daniel Webster acquired Horse 
Shoe .,Reef, at the entrance of Buffalo Harbor, upon condlttion that 
the United States vvould eni::age to erect no fortification tiJ.ereon. 
This was done without awaitinG legislative authority. Subse-
quently th.e Congress made appropriations for the liEhthouse, w:llcl 
was erected in 1856 
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(Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, Vol I, p.6(3). 
It is not believed, however, that it is necessary here 
to rely exclusively upon your constitutional power. As pointed 
out hereinafter (in discussing the second question) I think there 
is also ample statutory al!thori ty to support the acqu::'stion of 
t!-leSe bases, and the preeedents pel"'haps most nearly in point are 
the numerous acquisitions of ril~hts in f'oreign countries for sites 
of diplomatic and consular establishments--perhaps also the trade 
agreements recently uegotiated under statutory authority and the 
acquisi tion in 1903 of the coalinL, and naval stations and rights 
In Cuba under the act of lJarch'2, 1901. (ch 803,31 Stat 895,898). 
In the last ~.~entioned case the a.greement was subsequent 
ly embodied in a treaty but it was only one of a number of under-
takings, some clearly of a nature to be dealt with ordinarily by 
treaty, and the statute had required "that by way of ruther 
assurance the Government of Cuba will embody the fore~oins pro-
visions in a perwanent treaty with the United ~~tates. 
The transaction not proposed reSp1'6Sents only an ex-
change with no statutory requirement for the embodiment thereof 
in any treaty and involving no prom.ises or undertakings by tr.16 
United States that might I'alse the question of the propriety of 
incorporation in a treaty. I therefore advise the acquisition by 
executi va agrea~nant of the rights proposed to be conveyed to the 
United States by Great Brltain will not require ratification by 
the Senate. 
II. Tho right of the President to dispose of vessels 
of the Navy and unneeded naval material fInds clear recognition 
in at least two enactments of the Congress and a decision of the 
Supreme Court--and any who assert thut the authority Goes not 
exist must assume the burden of establishinG that both the C~nGree 
and tho Suprer.:1e Court meant something less than the clear import 
of seemingly plain language. 
By Secion 5 of the Act of .. Larch 3, 1803, ch.141, 22 
Stat.582, 599-600 (U.S.a.,title 34,seo.492) the Congress place 
restrh: tions uiJon the me thods to be followed by the Secretary of 
the Navy in dIsposing of naval vessels, which have been found 
unfit for further use and stricken from the naval regIstry, but 
9y the last clause of the section recoGnized and confirmed such 
a rieht in the Proesldent free from sach limitations. It provides 
'But nQ vessel of the Navy shall hereafter be sold in 
any other manner than herein provided, or for less than such ap-
praised value, unless the President of t~~ United States shall 
otherwise direot in writinG. 1 
In Levinson v United States (258 U.S.l908. :aOl), the 
Supreme Court said of this statute thut • the powel' ,Jf the 
President to direct a departure from the statute i~ not confined 
to a sale for i~ss than the appraised value but extends to the 
manner of the sale,' and that 'the words "unless" qualifies both 
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the requirements of the concluding clau.se. I 
So far as cuncerns this statute, in my opinion,it leme 
t:1e President as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, free to make suc 
disposition of naval vessels as he fInds necessary in the public 
interest, and I r':'nd noth:nc that would indicate that the ConGrea. 
has tried to limit the President's pleanary powers to vessels al-
ready stricken from the naval recistry. The President, of course 
would exercise his powers only under the l'liCh sense of reaponsibU 
tty which follows his rank as Commander-in-Chief' of his Nationls 
defense forces. 
Furthermore, I find .in no other statute or in the deci-
sions any attempted limitations upon the pleanary powers of the 
President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, and as the 
head of the state in its relations with foreign countries to on-
ter into the proposed arrangements for the transfer to t:~(, Uri tisl 
GOllerrunent of certain overage des troyers and obsolescent ;:nili tary 
material except the limitations recently imposed by Section 14(0.) 
of the Act of June 28, 1940 (Pub.,Uo.571). This section, It will 
be noted, clearly recoGnized th.e authority to make transfers and 
seeks only to impose certain restrictions thereon. (rhe section 
reads as follows: 
'Section 14 (a) NotwlthstandlnG the provision of' any 
other law, no !:1ilitary or naval weapons, ship,boat,aircraft,mu-
nitions, supplies, or equipment, to which the United States has 
title, in whole or l.n part of which have been contracted for shal: 
hereafter be transi'ered, exchanged,sold,or otherwise disposed of 
in any manner whatsover unless the Chief of Naval Operations in 
the case of military material, shall flrst certify that such 
material is not essential to the defense of the United States' 
Thus to prohibit action by the constlt~tionally create( 
Commander-in-Chief except upon authorization of a statutory offic 
er subordinate in rank, is of questionable constitutionality. 
However, since the statute required certification only of matters 
as to which, you would wish, irre spe cti ve of the statute, to be 
satisfied, and as the lOGislatlve history of the section indicat .... 
ed that no arbitrary restriction Is intended, it seems unnecessary 
to raise the question of constitutionality WhIch such a provision 
would otherwise invi tee I am informed that the destroyers involv 
ed here are the s"u.vivors of a fleet of over 100 built at about 
the saLe time and under the SaL'1e design. Durinc the year 1930, 
fifty ... elEht of these were decommissioned with a vieliv toward scral?' 
ping and a correspondine nUlnber were recorm:lissioned as replaceroor:fh 
Usable I:1aterial and equipment from the fifty-eight vessels re-
mcved from. the service were transferred to the recor.:lr:lissionod ve-
ssels to recondition and modernize ther;1, and other.lsable materia 
and equipment were removed and the vessels stripped. 'riley were 
I I 
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then stricken from the Naval rei~ister, a.nd fifty of them were solti 
as scrap for prices ranging from $5,260 to $6,800 per vessel, and 
the retlaining oii~ht were used for such purposes as target vessels, 
experimental construction tests, and temporary barracks. The 
s;.lrvi vinl1 destroyers now under consideratIon have been recondi t1mro 
ed and are in service, but all of' them are overage, most of them 
by several years. 
In constnuing thIs statue ':'n its applicatlon to such a 
situation it is important to note that thIs su.bsection as origin-
ally proposed 1n the finatc bill provided that the appropriate 
stuff officer should first cer.tlfy that 'such material is not 
essen tlal to and cannot be used In the defense of' the Unl ted 
sta.tes.· Senator Barkley and ot;lers objected to the subsection 
as so worded on the ground thut it would prevent the release and 
exchanGe of surplus or d.sed planes and othor su.pplies for sale to 
the Bri tish, and that it would consequently nUllify the p17ovisiom 
of tIle bill, (seo Section 1 of the Act of July 2, 1940, H. R.9850, 
Public No. 703) which the Senate had passed several days earlier 
for that verypurpose. AlthOUGh Senator V~alsh stated that he did 
not think the proposed subsection had that effect he agreed to 
strike out the words land cannot beclsed.' Senator Barkley ob-
ss»,ved that he thought t:le modified language provided t a much morE 
elastic term. t Senator wals h further stated that he would bear 
in mind in cont!erence the ,. .lOWS of Senator Barkley unJ others, 
and that he had 'no desire or purpose to go beyond the present 
law, but to havo some certificate filod as to whether the propert~ 
is surplus or not.' (Coneressional Record, June 28,1940,pp.8831-
8832. ) 
In view of tids legIslative history it 1s clear that 
the Congress did not intend to prevent tile cert:flcatlon for tran-
sfer, exchange, sale or dIsposition or property ,,~erely because it 
is stIll used or usablu or of posslble value for future use. The 
statute does not c{)ntemplate ntfJre transactions in scrap, yet ex-
change or sale except as scrap would hardly be possible, if' con-
fined to material \'Ihose usefulness is entirely C;one. It need 
only be certified not essential, and 'essential', usually the eq-
ui valent of vi tal or indispensable, falls far short of lased or 
'usuable. t 
Moreover, as has been indicated,the congressional 
authorization is not ,aerely of a sale which oiCht imply only a 
cash transaction. I t also authorizes equlpraont to be' transferred, 
'exchanged,' or 'otherwise disposed of' and in connection with 
material of this kind for whL:h there 1s no fj;.arket) value is never 
absolute but only relat1ve--and chiefly related to what may be 
had in exchange or replacement. 
In view of the character of the transactions contempla .. 
ted, as well as the leGislative history, the concluaion is un-
escapable the Cone;ress has not sou€;ht by Section 14 (a) to impose 
an arbitrary limitation upon the judgement of the hie;hest staff 
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officers as to whether a transfer, exchanGe or other dIsposition 
of specified 1 te;:u':J would impair our essential defenses. Specific 
Iterl1s m·tlst be weiGhed in relation to our total defense pOSition 
before and after an ex-chance or ciisposition. Any other construc-
tion wO·cJ.ld bE:! a virtual pro h ibi tion of any sale, exchal'lge or dis-
position of material or 3up./Jlies so ion£; a:J they were capable of 
use, however ineffective and such a prohibition obviously was not, 
and was not intended to be written into the law. 
It is my opinion that proceeding under Section 14 (a) 
appropriate staff officers may and should consider remaining use-
ful life, strategic importance,. obsolescenso, and all other fac1Dl1 
affectinG defense value, not only with respect to what the govern-
ment of trw Uni ted State s ei ves up 1n any exchange or transfer, 
but also with respect to what the Government recet ves. In t=lis 
situation Good business sense is ~ood le~al sense. I therefore, 
advise tl19.t the appropriate staff officers inay, and should, certif~ 
under Section 14 (a) that ships and r,:iaterial involved in a sale 
or exchange are not essential to tho defense of the United states 
if in their judgment the cons\.l.:::1mation of the transaction does not 
impair or wea;.cen the total defense of the United States, and cer-
taInly so where the consummation of the arrangem.ent will strength-
en the total defensive position of the nation. 
Wi th specific l.'eference to the proposed agreea:.ent with 
the Govern .. w.ent of Grea.t Dri tain for the acqu.lsi tion of naval and 
air bases, it is my opinion that the Chief of Naval Operations m~ 
and should, certify under Section 14 (a) that tile destroyers in-
volved are not essential to the defense of the Unitod States if il 
his judgment the exchance of silch destroyers for such naval and 
atr bases will strenGthen rather than impair the tota.l defense of 
the Unl ted States. 
I have previously indicated that in my opinion there 
is statutory authority for the acquisition of the naval and air 
bases in exchange for the vessels und material. 'rhe question was 
not more fully treated at that point because dependent upon the 
statutes abou .. ediscussed and which required consideration in this 
section of the opinion. It is to be borne,in mind that these 
statutes clearly recognize and deal with the authority to make 
dispositions by sale, transfer,exchange,or otherwise; that they 
do not impose any limitations concerning individuals~ corporation. 
or govermment to which such dispositions may be made; that they 
do not specify or limit in any manner the consideration wl~h may 
enter into an exchanee. There is no reason whatever for holdine 
that sale s may not be made to or exchanges made wi tn a foreiGn 
e;overnrnent or that in su.ch a case a treaty is contemplated. 'rhis 
is emphasized when we consider that the transactions in some casel 
may be quite unimportant, perhaps only dispOSitions of scrap,and 
that domestic buyer (unless restrained by some ailthorized c!)ntl'aci 
or embargo) would be quite free to dispose of his purchase as r~ 
pleased. Furthermore, Section 14 (a) of the Act of June 28,1940, 
~ I 
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supra was enacted by the Congress in full contemplation of transfeu 
Itor ultimate delivery to foreiGn belligerent nations. Possibly it 
:nay be said that the authority for exchanee of naval vessels and 
~aterial presupposes the acquisition of something of value to the 
Navy or, at least, to the national defense. Certainly I can imply 
no narrower limitation when the law is wholly silent in this re-
spect, Assuming that there is, however, at least the limitation 
which I have mentioned, it is fully met in the acquisition of 
rights to maintain needed bases. And if, as I hold, the statutes 
law authorizes the exohange of vessels and material for other ve-
ssels and material or equally,' for the right to establish bases, 
it is an unescapable corollary that the statute law also authoru.. 
the acqu~sition of the ships or material or bases which form the 
oonsideration for the exohange. Whether the statutes of the Unlt&c 
States present the dispatch to Great Britain, a belligerent power, 
fo the so-called mosquito boats now under construction on the o~ 
age destroyers depends upon the interpretationm be plaoed on 
Section 3 of Title 5 of the Act of June 15, 1917 (ch 30,40 Stat. 
217, 22). This section reads: 
'During a war in which the Uni ted States is a neutral 
nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of the jurisdiction of 
the United States any vessel built, armed, or equipped as a vessel 
of war, or converted from a private vessel into a vessel of war, 
wi th any intent or under any agreer.aent or contract, written or ora 
that suoh vessel shall be delivered to a belligerent nation, or to 
any agent, officer or citizen of such nation, or with reasonable 
oause to believe that the said vessel shall or will be employed tn 
the service of any such belligerent nation after its departure 
from the Jurisdiotion of the United States.' 
This section must be read in the light of Seotion 2 of 
the same Act and the rules of international law which the Congres~ 
states that it was its intention to unplement (H. Rapt. No.30, 65 
Con., 1st Sess., p.9). So read, 1 t is clear that 1 t is inap. 
plicable to vessels like the overage destroyers, which were not 
built, armed, equipped as, or converted into, vessels of war with 
the intent that they should enter the service of a belligerent. 
If the section were not so construed, then it would 
render meaningless Section 2 of the Aot whlch authorizes the Pre-
sident to detain any armed vessel until he is satisfied that it 
will not engage in hostile operations before it reaches a neutral 
or belligerent port. The two sections are intelligible and re-
concilable only if read in light of the traditional rules of in-
ternational law.. They are clearly stated by Oppenheim In his worl 
on International Law, fifth edition, volume 2, seotion 334, pages 
574-576. 
'Whereas a neutral 1s in no wise obliged by his duty of 
Lnpartlali ty to prevont his subjeots from selling armed vessels 
to the belliGerents, such armed vessels beine Llerely contraband 
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of war, a neutral is bound to employ the means at his disposal to 
prevent his subjects from building, fittinr; out, or arminG to the 
order of either bellieerent, vessels intended to be used as ~Bn­
of-war, and to prevent the departure from his jurisdiction of any 
vessel wa::.ch, by order of either belligerent, has been adapted by 
warlike use. The dlfferencebbetweon selling armed vessels to bel-
ligerents and building them to order is usually defined 1n the 
followin;.:; way: 
'An armed ship, beine contraband of war, is in no wise 
different from other kinds of contraband, provided that she is not 
manned in a neutral port, so that she can corr~it hostilities at 
once after having reached the open sea. A subject of a neutral 
who builds an armed ship, or arms a merchantman, not to the order 
of a belligerent, but intending to sell her to a belligerent, does 
not differ from a manufacturer of arms who intends to sell them to 
a belligerent. There is nothing to prevent a neutral from allow-
ing his subjects to sell armed vessels, and deliver them to bel-
ligerents, either in a neutral port or in a belligerent port ••• 
. 'On the other hand, if a subject of a neutral builds 
armed ships to the order of a belligerent he prepared the means of 
naval operations, since the ships, on sailing outside the neutral 
territorial waters and taking in a crew and wmmunition can at one 
commit hostilities. Thus, through the carrying out of the order 
of the bellicerent, tne neutral terri tory has bean made a base of 
naval operations; and as the duty of iwpartiality includes an ob-
ligation to prevent either belligerent from making neutral terri-
tory the base of' military or naval operatlons, a neutral violates 
his neutrality by not preventing his subjects from carrying out 
an order of a belligerent for the bu.ilding and fitting out of men .. 
of-war. This dist1nction, althOUGh of course logically correct, 
is hairsplitting. But as, accordinc to the present law, neutral 
States need not prevent their subjects from su.pplying arms and 
~~unition to belligerents, it will probably conti~ to be drawn.' 
Viewed in the lit;ht of the above, I am of the opinion 
that this statute does prohibit the release and transfer to the 
British Government of' the so-called mosquito boats now under con-
struction for the United States Navy. If theee boats were re-
leased to the British Governriien tit would be legally impossible 
for that Government to take ther:i out of this country after their 
completion, since to the extent of such completion at least they 
would have been built, armed or equipped with the intent or with 
reasonable Callse to believe, that they would enter 'the service 
of a belligerent after beine sent out of the jurisdiction of the 
Uni ted States. 
This will not be true, however, with respect to the 
overage destroyers, since they were clearly not built, armed or 
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~quipped wi th4t any such intent or wi th reasonable cause to believe 
that they would ever enter the service of a belliGerent. 
In this connection it has beon noted that "LArine the 
war between Russia and Japan in 1904 and 1905, the Gel'man Govern-
ment permitted the sale to Russia of torpedo boats and also of 
ocean liners belonging to its a~xiliary navy. 
IV. Accordingly, you are respectfully advised: 
(a) That the proposed arrange~lents may be concluded 
as an executive agreemont, effective withol..lt awaiting ratlficatior. 
(b) That there is Presiden~ial power to transfer title 
and possession of the proposed considerations upon certification 
by appropriate staff officers. (c) That the dlspatch of the so-called mosquito boats 
would consti tute a violation of the statute lavis of the Uni ted 
states, bu.t with that exception there is no legal obstacle to the 
cons~mnatlon of the transaction, in accordance, of course, with 
the applicable provisions of the Nel..ltrali ty Act as to deli very. 
Ibid., 275-283. 
APPE~TDIX V 
CLRTlFI CATION FOH (rIlI; RELEASE OF' THE DESTROYERS 
FROK H. R. STARK, ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES 
nAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
'It is my opinion that the Chief of Naval Operations 
may, and should, certify under Section 14 (a) t:lat such destroye 
are not essential, to the defense of tl::te United States if in his 
judgement the exchance of such destroyers for strategic naval an 
air bases will strencthen rather than impair the total defense of 
the United States.' 
It l.s my opinion that an exchange of fifty overage 
destroyers for suitable naval and air bases on ninety-nine year 
leases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Santa 
Lucia, Trlnidad, Antigua and in British Guiana will strenethen 
rather than ir::lpair the total defense of the United States. The 
fore, I certify that on the basis of such an exchange and in 
accordance w;;.th the opinion of the Attorney General of the 
Uni ted states the fifty overage destroyers of tbe so-called l,9:X) 
ton typed are not essential to the defense of the United States. 
H. R. Stark, 
Admiral, United states Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operatlons 
Congressional Record, House, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., Tuesday, 
September 3, 1946, Vol. 86 Pt. X, 1940, 11357. 
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CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUrrIIOlUTILS 
I. PRIL'.AHY MAThRIAL 
Jones, Shepard S., and 1I.yers, Denys P., Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, 3 vols., Boston, 1941, II. 
These volwl1es are filled wi th the records of great events. 
The percentage of paces treatinG emergency of war problems 
is very large. This 'W:)rk is lilOSt useful for the detailed 
account of' the proposed release of the torpedo boats to 
Great Britain. 
Moore, John Bassett, The Collected Papers of Jolm Bassett Moore, 
7 vols., New Have~lg44. . - -
The following essays in the various volumes were used. "The 
System of Neutrality," Vol.IV, 262-297, is a clear presenta-
tion of the tradi tional neutrality policy of the United 
States down to the outbreak of war in 1914, and a discussion 
of t!1e Wilson Administration's sympathetic policy for the 
Ailllies. In "An Appeal to Reason," Vol. VI, 455-463, the 
author, as an advocate of traditional neutrality, presents 
an appraisal of tlmt policy for the United States as the 
only safe .p,0licy for the country to follow. In "The New 
Isolation, I Vol. VI, 465-490, Moore declared that arms em-
bargoes are contrary to traditional neutrality. In "The 
Pending Neutrality Proposals,n Vol.VII, 46-66, and "The 
Pending Ne.J.trallty Legislation," Vol.VII, 84-87, the author 
insists that the new neutrality, collective security, and 
sanctions and measures short of war w111 not keep the United 
states out of war, because su.ch r;.eas-.tres are war. 
Scott, James Brown, ed., ~ Reiorts s:1. 2 l~aeue Conferences .9! 
1899 and 1907, New York, 19 7. 
This is an official explanatory and interpretative commenta-
ry on the two foace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. It Is 
usefu.l for its information concerninG the Thir.teenth Hague 
202 
203 
Convention If 1907 on tr.te rir:hts and duties of neutral 
powers in naval war. 
u.s. Congress, Senate, Concressional Record, 76th Cong.,3rd Sess., 
Vol. 86, Pts.III, IV" IX, X, Xl, XV, XVII, and XVIII, Wash-
ington, 1940. 
Herein described is t~le work of the Naval Affairs Corroni ttee 
in 1940 for the acquisition of naval bases in the Caribbean 
area. PTS. X a.."ld XI Ci veCongrossldmal opinion of the De-
stroyer-Naval Base Deal. Ft. X contains the legal interpre-
t~ion of the Deal by Herbert Briggs, Professor of Interna-
tional Law, Cornell University. pt. XVIII contains the legal 
opinion of four jurists who favored the release of the fifty 
destroyers; a speech delivered by David I. ~alsh of ~assaohu­
setts, Chairman of the Senate Naval Committe, opposing the 
release of tho destroyers; a..'1d an account of the William 
Allen Wili to Cor;.ami ttee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. 
Parliamentary; Debatest Commons, 37th Parl., 5th Sess., Vols.364 and 365, London, 9jQ. 
Included are speeches about the Deal delivered by Prime ~ll1n­
ister Winston Churchill of EnGland. 
Parliamentary; Debates, Lords, 37th Parl., 5th Soss., Vol. 117. 
It is useful for complimentary reports by His Majesty, King 
George VI, and opinions of SO:Le Llembers of t.l1e House of Lord 
The Departraent of State, Bulle tin, \~ashlngton, III, September, 
1940, 195-200. 
I t includes the docwllen ts of the Destroyer Deal. 
II. POLl CII<;S 
Funk, Wilfred, ad., Roosevelt t s li'oreign Policl, 1933-1941, New 
York, 1942. 
It was useful for copies of the oomplete text of President 
Franklin Roosevelt's aImouncement of the Deal to Congress; 
the letters exchanged between Cordel Hull and Lord Lothian; 
and the lecal opinion of Attorney General Hobert Jackson. 
~---------.,.,.~-.,-~--.-. .,. 
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Shepardson, \'Jhitney Ii., and Scroggs, William 0., The Uniteg StateJi 
~ World Affairs, 1940, New York, 1941. ---
This volume is the ninth in the series published by the 
Council on Foreien Relations. The authors, w!lile sympathetic 
to the Roosevelt Adl."'linistration, present complete discussions 
of the measures short of war. 
Bryan, William J., and Bryan, illary B., The i~emoirs of William 
Jennings Bryan, ChicaGO, 1925. - -
'llhe forr.ter Secretary of Stat;e reveals that (.'lost of the 
Wilson Awninistration was sympathetic to the Allies between 
1914 and 1917. 
Flynn, Thomas oJ., !!12. R.oosevelt M;'{th, New York, 1948. 
Because the author is violently prejudiced against the 
President, this work must be checked with more reliable 
sources. 
Hull, Cordell, liiemolrs .2f. Cordell Hull, 2 vols., New York, 1948. 
Vol. I presents very detailed information of the work of the 
State Department from 1935 to 1940 in relation to the dis-
turbedEuropean situation. 
Johnson, Walter, 'i~illia.m Alle? Whi tells America, New YorK, 1947. 
This book is an intimate picture of White in relation to the 
forces he helped to mold. It was useful for its detailed 
information on the formation of the COr'JIlli ttee to Defend 
America by Aidine the Allies. 
Lansing, Robert, ~ Memoirs of Robert LansinG, Indianapolis,193S. 
Lans.:nc shows that he was hostile to Germany before America 
entered the World War. 
Sherwood, Robert E., Hoosovelt ~Hopkins, New York, 1948. 
This 1s an intimate biography wrItten by a close friend of 
tho Presidont who favors the Administration's policies. 
Stimson, Henry L., and Bundy, Mc George, .2!! Active Service .!!.! 
~ War, new York, 1948. 
This is the memoirs of forty years of public service of 
Henry L. Stimson, an ardent believer in Gollectlve sec:lrity. 
IV. SECONDARY SOURCES 
A. BOOKS 
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Bailey, Thomas A., The Diploc.atic History 2f ~ American [.eople, 
3rd ed., New York; 1947. 
Thomas Bailey Gives a scholarly account of the growinC in-
terventionist policy of the United States fl"om 1941 to 1917. 
Borchard, EdwIn, and Lage, Williruri, NeutralitY!2!: ~ Un! ted 
States, New Haven, 1937. 
These stern adherents of traditional neu.trality give a 
learned presentation of America's neutrality policy from 
V';ashington I s Administration to the neutral! ty debates of 
1937. 
Churchill, Winston S., Their Finest Hour, Boston, 1949. 
It is a most complete history of World War II from the Bri-
tIsh viewpoint. It 1s a Lust for an understanding of the 
necessity of the Deal for the Bri tish. 
Davis, Forest, and Lindley, Ernest, How War Carne: An American 
White Pa2er, New York, 1942. --- --- ---- --
Lindley was an aclct10wledEed supporter of the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration's forelzn and dOf.:l.8stlc policies. The authors 
reveal inside information on the views and designs of the 
Executive Department in relation to trw Destroyer-Deal. 
Dulles, Viilliam A., and Armstrong" Hamilton F.,~ ~ ~ Neutral? 
New York, 1939. 
The aLithors are convinced that traditional neutrality can no 
longer be reconciled with cLirrent international difficulties. 
They advocate aid short 01' war to i{esp the United States out 
of war. 
Fenwick, Charles G., Arnerlcan Neutrali ty: Trial ~ Failure, lie'll 
York, 1940. 
The book is a short but clear discussion on the many-sided 
interpretations of American neutrality. 
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Ii'enwlck, Charles, G., :;'nternatlona'.b, Law. Hew York, 1948. 
The aathor takes the attitude that tradItional ne.1trality is 
a failure. 
Hicks, John D., ~ American nation, Hew York, 1941. 
This his tory of th,e United States frou the Cl vil War to the 
end of l'~ranklin Roosevelt's second Ad.ministration is useful 
for General background. 
Johnson, Walter, 1.h£ Battle Ac;alnst Isolation, Chioago, 1944. 
It is a reliable but sympathetic treatr:lont of the activity 
of the William Allen \\,111 te Cor:l1ni t tee mobilizing pub11 c 
opinion to force the goverru~~ent to sBad aid to the dem-
ocracies. 
Johnson, Vial ter, Selected Letters .£f. 'Nilliar:l Allen White, New 
York, 194'7. 
White, in SOL~ of his letters, reveals his close association 
wi th President Roosevelt concerning the release of the fi ty 
destroyers. 
Phillips, Charles F., and Garland, James V. , The American Neu-
trali ty Problem, New York, 1949. -
Traditional nO'-ttrality 1s upheld by the authors, but they 
also preser:.t a concise analysis of ct.her views on Arnerican 
neutrality. 
Sarcen t, 13orter, Ge ttinf,i .lL! Into WE;!:, Boston, 1941. 
Through the use of W1sympathetic periodicals and newspapers, 
the author tries to prove thtit the Roosevelt Administratlon 1 s 
policy paved the way for American intervention in the second 
Viorld War. 
Welles, Sumner, ~ ~ .f.2!: Decision, New York, 1944. 
Tho information concerning the Destroyer Deal is meager, al-
thoue;h \\elles replaced Cordell Hull during the -negotiations 
/ of the Deal. 
'J 
Whl te, Wllllam Allen, ed., Defense for America, New York, 1940. 
\'~hi te presents fourteen favorable arguments for helpinG 
Bri taln durinG the Europoan ~\ar in 1939 and 1940. 
I: 
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B. ARTICLES 
America, New York, LXVII, September 14, 1940, 618. 
This article presents a scholarly criticism of the Destroyer 
Deal as accor:1plished contrary to constitutional provisions. 
"Ar:"erican Destroyers Join British Fleet, tt Christian Century, New 
York, LVII, Septorrber 11, 1940, 1100 • 
. 
This article contains a favorable argument for the release bf' 
the destroyers to Britain. 
Borchard, Edwin, "The Attorney General's Opinion of the Exchange 
Of Destroyers for Naval Bases," American Journal Of Inter-
national~, New York, XXXIV, October, 1940, 690~97. 
BrigGs, Herbert, "Neglected Aspects of t~ Destroyer Deal,11 Amer-
ican Journal of International Law, New York, XXXIV, October, 
!940, 569-577;- ---
The Professor of International Law considers that the At-
tor'ney General misinterpreted certain statutory provisions 
forbiddinc the release of neutra.l vessels to DelliGerents. 
Elliot, Randle A., "United States Stratot:;ic Bases in the Atlantic, 
Foreign PolicI Reports, New York, XVI, January 15, 1941,258-
262. 
Elliot,presents an account of the eiGht naval and air base 
sites, from geographic and strategic considerations. 
Gillis, James "Truth TellinG, U Catholic \~'orld,New York, eLI, 
September, 1940, 641-643. 
This is an attack upon General John Pershing, who, In a radio 
speech on Ausust 4, 1940, urged the ir.:unediate release of the 
fifty destroyers, but at the sa.;;',e time netlected to tell the 
public that such an action by the United States Government 
would be an act of war. 
Longley, Anne H., "British 'West Indian Interlude,lI National ~ ~raphic i\la j :j azine, Washincton, LXXIX, January, 1941, 1-8. 
It is a geOGraphic description of the West Indies. 
L 
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Life, New York, IX, September 16, 1940, 19-22. 
It is a favorable interpretation of the transaction. 
Mason, Clendon, H., and Hepburn, David A., "St.Lucia Iro Have and 
To liold,11 Christian Science Monitor, Weekly Magazine Section, 
Boston, December 28, 1940, 2, 15. 
This is an artistic reSUlae of the history and geography of 
one of the four islands in the Windward group in the West 
Indios. 
Morconthau, Henry Jr., "Morgent:lau' s Diaries," Collier's New York, 
CXX, October, 1947. 
The diaries reveal that t:le Secreta.ry of t:1e Treasury d~ing 
Roosevelt's Adm.inistrution was r:lost eaeer for the Uni ted 
States Government to aid Great BritaIn. 
Newsweek, New Yor~, XV, May 20, 1940, 29. 
This article reveals that the President was sYl;;.pathetic 
toward the democracies of ',~estern Europe. 
Newsweek, New York, XV, 'blay 27, 1940, 31-32. 
The deterlnination of the Administration to help the dem-
ocracies is herein discussed. 
Newsweek, New YOI'~r, XVI, July 1, 1940, 7, 28, 
The account presents reasons why F'ranklin Hoosevelt chose 
Harry L. Stimson and Frank Knox for the cabinet. 
Sherwood, Robert E., "Seoret Papers of Harry L.Hoprcins, It Colliertf 
New York, i;XXI, June, 1948. 
Hopkins, the trusted friend of Roosevelt, reveals tiw Pres-
ident's personal sentiments for giving aid to the democracios 
"The BiC; Deal," Time, Chicaco, XXXVI, September 16, 1940, 11-12. 
This is a. disinterested acoount of publio opinion. 
"Tl'le Cruiser Naval Base Deal Between the Uni ted States· and Great 
Eri tain, If (filO Con[~ressional Digest, Washlngt,)n, XX, January, 
1941, 16-l~ 
I: 
I 
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It 1s a resume of t2.lEl 8creemont of the exact naval and all" 
base sites chosen. 
"The Island Sites," The 19th Century ~ After, London cxxxrx, 
April, 1941, 337-349:---
T!lB arti ole is a review of the geographic factors and the 
strateelc value of the proposed sites on Bermuda and the 
Bahamas. 
!h2. new Hepublic, New York, CIII, ,Auc;ust 12, 1940, 207. 
Reasons why the destroyers should be released to Great Bri-
tain are presented. 
"Uni ted States-Britain Destroyer-Naval Base Deal and Far Eastern 
Hepercussions, " China V;eeklz Heview, Shane;hai, XCIV, septem-
ber 14, 1940, 42-44. 
The author points out that there were atterapts to acquire 
air and naval stations 1n the Caribbean in the 1920's. 
"Washine;ton and \',ar, tI Newsweek, New York, XV, May 6, 1940, 9. 
The.article is a cODment on public reaction to the 
Soandinavian invasion by Hitler in the sprIng of 1940. 
tlWilkie Objects, 11 ,hlli.., New York IX, September 16, 1940, 24. 
It is a denuncIation of Wendell Wilkie's attack upon the 
method in which the Deal was accor:lplished. 
"World Reaction to the Destroyor-Base Deal," Chins: Weeklz Review, 
Shanghai, XCIV, September 14, 1940, 45. 
rrhe article reveals not only Asiatic reaction by quotes 
from European newspap~rs dominuted by the Nazi press. 
Wricht, Q,uincy, "The Transfer of Destroyers to Great Brltaln," 
~oerlcan Journal 2£ International Law, New York, XXXIV, 
October, 1940, 680-689. 
The author justifies the Destroyer-Base Deal by showing 
that the United States was no lonrel' neutral in-the 
traditional sense. 
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c. r:EViSPAPERS 
ChicBYO Dail1 News L 1940. 
rrhis paper was in favor oJ' the jJestroyer Deal. 
Chicaro Daily ~ribune, 1940. 
The Tribune considered the .Bcquisi tion of the bases a n(~c­
cessary step for Ar:1erican defense. 
London T~mes, 1940. 
Most favorable British reactions were expressed in the 
Times. 
~ ~ Times, 1940. 
Favorable editorials explained the New York Times' opinion, 
It also presented opinions froI:'! many newpapors tl1iouGhout 
the world. 
~ street Journal, 1940. 
The Journal questloned the const1 tutionall ty of the solo 
oxec:ltive action in the necotiatlons of the Deal. 
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